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Summary!
 
This thesis examines the role of two international organisations (IOs), the OECD 
DAC and the World Bank, in shaping the international aid effectiveness agenda, a 
policy agenda encouraging reforms of foreign aid policy to improve foreign aid. 
With particular emphasis on a period in the 1990s, when both IOs faced criticism 
and the need to adapt to changing geopolitics, it argues that the OECD DAC and the 
World Bank contributed to shaping the aid effectiveness agenda, and specifically the 
policy problems the agenda highlights and the policy solutions it recommends, in 
ways tied directly to these IOs’ specific fields of expertise and their unique 
institutional interests at the time. In doing so, both IOs adapted, evolved, and 
expanded the mechanisms by which they exercise their authority as international 
expert bureaucracies, and both strategically expanded the way in which they interact 
with their political environment. As a consequence, both IOs helped shape the 
present-day ideational framework among foreign aid experts and policymakers on 
how more effective foreign aid is achieved, which, in turn, favours the authority of 
both these IOs to advice and to act in the efforts to improve the effectiveness of 
foreign aid. Helping to shape the aid effectiveness agenda thus allowed the OECD 
DAC and the World Bank to strengthen their authority as expert bureaucracies in this 
specialised field of policy. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction!
The research presented in this thesis is motivated by observing, and seeking to 
understand, a range of contemporaneous policy reforms in foreign aid in most of the 
world’s foreign aid donor states; foreign aid policy reforms widely known as, and 
associated with the so-called aid effectiveness agenda. Following the Paris 
Declarations on Aid Effectiveness (PD), adopted in February 2005 by over 100 
signatories – donor- and developing-country governments, multilateral donors, 
regional development banks and aid agencies – donor states launched a variety of 
reforms of bilateral and multilateral foreign aid efforts with the declared objective of 
improving the effectiveness of foreign aid, or, as one study notes, of getting “more 
development bang for the foreign aid buck” (Bigsten et al. 2011, p. 44). 
To meet this goal, government reforms to improve aid effectiveness seek to 
comply with the provisions of the PD, its follow-up agreements, such as the 2008 
Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), and a growing, mainly economic literature on how 
to improve foreign aid. This thesis refers to this broad policy discourse as the aid 
effectiveness agenda. In other works it is also known as the “Paris agenda” (e.g. ODI 
2008) or “aid agenda” (e.g. Glennie 2011). The aid effectiveness agenda marks an 
important shift in foreign aid policymaking. It draws political attention to new 
problems, questions, and issues that did not previously feature as prominently in 
foreign aid policymaking (though, as I will show, these issues were not entirely 
unknown either). !
Though aid effectiveness is studied extensively – as a way to improve foreign aid 
(e.g. Easterly 2008), as a managerial and organisational challenge in foreign aid 
practice (e.g. Booth 2008), or as a benchmark for assessing the policy reforms made 
! ! ! &!
by governments (e.g. Knack, Rogers and Eubank 2011) – less scholarly attention has 
been given to the political processes that shape the aid agenda in the first place.!
   !
."."  Why Study the Aid Effectiveness Agenda?!
The aid effectiveness agenda is a remarkable political phenomenon for two 
reasons. First, the agenda is of conceptual interest for the changes it seeks to 
motivate in the foreign aid policies of several countries. It constitutes an original and 
recent policy agenda that successfully directed significant political awareness 
towards problems inherent in donor practices and the institutional make-up of the 
global architecture of foreign aid. Second, the agenda is of political interest due to 
the nature of the policy solutions it promotes. At the heart of the reforms encouraged 
by the aid effectiveness agenda are measures that seemingly seek to restrain the 
ability of donor states to pursue their preferences in the design and implementation 
of foreign aid. This challenge to a government’s pursuit of unilateral interests and 
preferences in foreign aid is well-illustrated by former British Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown in a speech to the British Department for International Development 
(DFID) in 2009:!
We must ensure that aid flows are predictable and support plans formulated 
by [aid recipients’] national governments, not spent on priorities, however 
well intentioned, imposed by donors from afar. (Brown 2009) !
These are not mere words. The aid effectiveness agenda and the PD – though not 
a legally binding international treaty – were remarkably effective in motivating 
policy reforms in the donor countries organised within the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
! ! ! '!
(OECD). It therefore excludes countries such as Saudi-Arabia or China, both here 
and throughout this thesis. As of the writing of this thesis, less than a decade has 
passed since the 2005 Paris Declaration (OECD 2005). In this time, the aid 
effectiveness agenda has developed remarkable normative authority over how 
politicians, experts, professionals, public servants and academics approach the task 
of improving foreign aid and development cooperation.!
The biggest question concerning the aid effectiveness agenda – whether 
government efforts to implement the Paris Declaration truly improved the impact of 
each dollar, euro or pound sterling of aid spent – remains difficult to answer.
1
 
However, there can be little doubt about the widespread efforts of governments to 
reform their foreign aid policies in accordance with the aid effectiveness agenda. !
However, neither of these two is the focus of this thesis, which does not seek to 
explain the (effective or ineffective) policy changes that follow from the aid 
effectiveness agenda. Instead it seeks to investigate the aid effectiveness agenda 
itself as research object – its origins, its characteristics, its omissions and its 
normative authority. !
The research presented in this thesis therefore investigates the emergence of the 
aid effectiveness agenda as the “structured intellectual background” (Béland 2005, p. 
8) that guides the efforts of foreign aid policies in dozens of donor countries. This 
study aims to shed light on the emergence and formation of the specific policy ideas 
that constitute the aid effectiveness agenda as present-day “philosophies that 
dominate political reality while others do not” (Schmidt 2008, p. 307).!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
   For OECD country case studies on this question, see http://pd-website.inforce.dk/content/content-
en.html (Accessed 27 April 2014). Econometric analysis of this does not, to my knowledge, exist 
yet.  
! ! ! (!
During my research on aid effectiveness as an ideational policy agenda along the 
lines of this question raised by Vivien Schmidt (2008), evidence quickly pointed to a 
pivotal role played by two International Organisations (IOs) – two IOs whose roles 
were, and are to this day, insufficiently appreciated for their role in determining the 
shape and the substance of the aid effectiveness agenda as it informs foreign aid 
policymaking: the OECD DAC and the World Bank. These two IOs are tasked with 
(among other things) with facilitating the aid effectiveness dialog among donor 
countries (DAC) and between donors and recipient countries (DAC and the World 
Bank), and with assisting reforms of foreign aid practices in donor countries (the 
World Bank). !
A key insight of the research presented here is that these two IOs – beyond their 
roles in facilitating political discourse on aid effectiveness – played an important part 
in shaping the emergence of today’s aid effectiveness agenda. The research question 
in this thesis is: How did IOs shape the emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda?!
!
."/"  Contributions to the Literature!
This thesis makes four important contributions to the literature: 
i. New research on a relatively under-studied organisation, the OECD DAC. 
ii. New research on an already well-studied organisation, the World Bank that 
challenges the common assumption that donor states typically exercise a high 
degree of control over the organisation in a principal-agent relationship. 
iii. New research showing how the national policies of donor states are 
potentially shaped by IOs. 
! ! ! )!
iv. New research on the aid effectiveness agenda, demonstrating how both 
OECD DAC and the World Bank influenced the shape and substance of the 
aid effectiveness agenda to a greater extent than is usually assumed. 
This thesis, to my knowledge, is among the first to trace the aid effectiveness 
agenda back to its root, charting how the agenda was formed from a disparate set of 
observations, ideas, and principles into an influential policy agenda that carries 
significant normative weight in policymaking today. It investigates how aid 
effectiveness became a transnational standard for how foreign aid ought to be done. 
Among the key findings of my research on the aid effectiveness agenda is the 
formative role played by the OECD DAC and the World Bank – over and beyond 
facilitating political dialogue or policy implementation – in shaping the emergence 
of the aid effectiveness agenda in its current form. This study thus makes the 
following distinct contributions to the literature on IOs, and these two IOs in 
particular. !
First, thanks to extensive field research on how the OECD DAC and World Bank 
shaped the emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda, this thesis adds new empirical 
material to the extensive literature on IOs. This is true for both (i) the smaller OECD 
DAC, which, thanks to its highly specialised mandate and perhaps due to its status as 
a body of the larger OECD, has received much less scholarly attention in IO 
research, and (ii) the World Bank, arguably one of the best-studied IOs in IR. 
Adding to the still-small body of research on the OECD DAC is one important aim 
of this thesis. As a second contribution, this thesis will add empirical insights into 
how the World Bank shaped the aid effectiveness agenda, and into the ideational 
authority the World Bank exerts vis-à-vis donor states, and not vis-à-vis the World 
Bank’s clients, challenging the common assumptions on the high degree of control 
! ! ! *!
that donor states exercise over the World Bank as an organisation in a principal-
agent relationship.!
As a third contribution, this thesis presents a new analysis on how national 
policies are potentially shaped by IOs. The aid effectiveness agenda is a specific set 
of political ideas that successfully motivates reforms of foreign aid policy. It is also 
an agenda made from a specific set of policy ideas that was, as shown in this thesis, 
shaped and advocated by two IOs in particular: The OECD DAC and the World 
Bank. It should be noted that this thesis does not provide in-depth analysis of how 
and why governments pursue reforms in foreign aid policy to comply with the aid 
effectiveness agenda. Neither can this thesis, with its focus on the specifics of the aid 
effectiveness agenda, speak fully to more abstract, theoretical work on this topic as 
developed by scholars like Fang and Stone (2012). It was the astonishing multitude 
of aid effectiveness reforms in donor states that first motivated my research, leading 
me, while working for the German bilateral development cooperation (Gesellschaft 
für International Zusammenarbeit [GIZ]), to ask how and where this seemingly 
omnipresent policy agenda came from.!
After finding that the OECD DAC and World Bank both played pivotal parts in 
shaping the aid effectiveness agenda, I hypothesised that the agenda’s impact on 
donor policies could point to an underappreciated ideational influence on the part of 
these IOs over the national aid policies of donor states. The latter is not a new 
finding as such. If substantiated, however, it may not yet have been sufficiently 
demonstrated in the case of foreign aid, not least because a formative role of these 
IOs in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda is neither widely appreciated by the 
literature on aid effectiveness (which is usually not IO research) nor studied in 
greater depth.!
! ! ! +!
Finally, the aid effectiveness agenda itself has not received much scholarly 
attention as the “structured intellectual background” (Béland 2005, p. 8) for a lot of 
foreign aid policy reforms today. There is a paucity of research investigating why aid 
effectiveness, as a political phenomenon, exists in the first place, and why 
policymakers in dozens of countries are beholden to is principles. This omission is 
perplexing, as many academics (as well as think tanks, such as the British Overseas 
Development Institute [ODI] or the US-based Center for Global Development 
[CGD]) dedicated to investigating, ranking and comparing how donor countries 
comply with the aid effectiveness agenda, both in specific cases (Winters 2012, 
Molanaers and Nijs 2011) and more generally (e.g. Knack, Rogers and Eubank 
2011). Likewise, there is a lively discourse on why the aid effectiveness agenda is 
flawed (e.g. Saliba-Couture 2011) or in need of improvement (e.g. ODI 2008). 
Indeed, a common theme in development studies is whether donor countries have 
made sufficient effort to implement the principles of the PD (e.g. Jain 2007, Booth 
2008) or that the changes proposed by the PD itself are not radical enough (e.g. 
Easterly and Pfutze 2008). This last observation is usually based on the observation 
that not all donor countries have met all the (mostly outcome-based) targets laid out 
in the PD (e.g. OECD 2011) or, more rarely, all the benchmarks laid out for 
“effective aid” by scholars themselves (e.g. Easterly and Williamson 2011). !
However, by focussing on where countries fell short of the specific five-year 
targets laid down in the Paris Declarations, scholarly attention is deflected from 
asking why and how the specific aid effectiveness principles embodied by the Paris 
Declaration came to occupy such a prominent position of authority in foreign aid 
politics and foreign aid policy, while other policy ideas did not. Why did donor 
countries sign onto the PD in the first place? !
! ! ! ,!
1.2. Investigating the Aid Agenda as Political Phenomenon!
As a political phenomenon, the aid effectiveness agenda raises important 
questions and challenges several assumptions about policymaking in IR. Yet, as a 
political agenda, it has received little attention from researchers in political or 
international studies. The majority of existing literature on aid effectiveness favours 
one of two extremes. On one side, the political processes, documents, and 
declarations that make up the aid effectiveness agenda are frequently omitted 
because they are seen as outcomes of politics (and politics is seen to be of limited 
relevance to aid effectiveness studies). Easterly and Williamson (2011) provide a 
good example of this approach to the political. Their study intentionally blocks all 
political aspects of aid effectiveness, with the authors formulating their agenda as 
follows “...we choose not to directly monitor compliance with Paris and Accra 
agreements, as these agreements are a negotiated political process rather than an 
academic monitoring exercise” (p. 5). In contrast, this thesis is interested in the Paris 
and Accra agreements because they are part of a political process, a process that has 
received scant academic attention.!
On the other side, the aid effectiveness agenda is frequently not even considered 
as political agenda. Where scholars like Easterly and Williamson strive to sterilise 
their research of the “political”, these latter kinds of studies (e.g. Hayman 2009, 
Dijkstra 2011, Winters 2012) assume that political outcomes – including the PD – 
are direct results of accumulated technocratic knowledge. Here, the political 
documents and processes constituting the aid effectiveness agenda are considered to 
be a direct translation of advancing knowledge into politics. For studies of this kind, 
the PD, the AAA and their implementation in foreign aid policy are seen as “the 
culmination of 10 years of dialogue” and the “best summary we have on the lessons 
! ! ! -!
of a half-century of experience in trying to achieve good results” (ODI 2008). 
Neither approach does justice to the questions raised by the aid effectiveness agenda. !
Some of these questions are: Where did the aid effectiveness agenda originate? 
How can this new political interest in the flaws inherent in the global institutional 
architecture of foreign aid be explained? Which ideas and norms exactly constitute 
the aid effectiveness agenda and which do not? How did aid effectiveness become 
the ideational framework for the foreign aid policymaking of sovereign donor states?!
Indeed, questions like these should be a crucial preface to questions more 
commonly found in aid effectiveness scholarship, including: How did the 
implementation of foreign aid change in the wake of the PD (e.g., Hayman 2009) 
and did the aid effectiveness agenda truly improve the ability of foreign aid to 
promote development and/or economic growth (e.g., Annen & Kosempel 2009)? But 
first one must ask which policy ideas gained sufficient political relevance and 
authority to be codified in international agreements, notably the Paris Declaration – 
which in turn goes so far as to encourage governments to cede part of their authority 
over their foreign aid priorities to IOs and subject themselves to multilateral 
oversight. !
This thesis argues that to answer the above question truly, a better understanding 
of the aid effectiveness agenda as political phenomenon is needed; with “political”, 
in a layman’s sense, broadly referring to “social relations involving authority or 
power [...] and to the methods and tactics used to formulate and apply policy”.
2
 
Today, the aid effectiveness agenda and the ideas inherent in the agenda have 
tangible authority over the formulation and application of foreign aid policy. 
Widespread policy reforms testify to that. A little over a decade ago, this was clearly 
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not the case. Investigating this, evidence indicates two IOs, the OECD DAC and the 
World Bank, as pivotal to the shape and the emergence of the aid effectiveness 
agenda. The focus of this is to evaluate the role these IOs played here.!
!
1.3.   Thesis Navigation!
The argument of this thesis is presented in eight chapters. This introduction 
(chapter 1) is followed by a discussion of the literature (chapter 2) and a discussion 
of the methodology underpinning this study (chapter 3). I then employ basic 
descriptive statistics to illustrate changes to foreign aid policies over the past two 
decades that are closely associated with the 2005 Paris Declaration (chapter 4). After 
describing the changes in policy that align with the PD, I explore them with two 
qualitative cases studies on the OECD DAC (chapter 5) and the World Bank (chapter 
6) respectively. These case studies present evidence from my field research and 
interviews conducted with the DAC in Paris and World Bank in Washington, DC 
and demonstrate how these two IOs helped shape the emergence of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. Chapter 7 critically examines additional and variant 
explanations for the main argument of this thesis. Chapter 7 thus serves to strengthen 
the validity of my findings and anchors them in the broader research literature on IOs 
and their role in national policymaking. Chapter 8 discusses the findings with 
reference to the literature review in chapter 2, summarises the argument made in this 
thesis and concludes. The following is a brief synopsis of each chapter.!
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!
Chapter 2!
Chapter 2 positions this thesis within the existing literature. By the very nature of 
the questions pursued in this study, several sources of scholarship will be considered. 
First, as this thesis investigates a dramatic shift in the intellectual background 
informing foreign aid policy, it reviews key studies on the role of norms and ideas in 
public policy. The aid effectiveness agenda draws political attention to a specific set 
of problems, and promotes a specific set of policy solutions. As a political agenda, 
aid effectiveness cascaded quickly from relative obscurity to an intellectual structural 
background for policymakers of near-global reach. As a consequence, theory dealing 
with questions of how ideas do or do not succeed in capturing the attention of 
policymakers with limited priorities is an important anchor for this study. Pivotal 
works in this field theorise on processes of policymaking (Kingdon 1984, Sabatier 
2007), and grapple with the role of ideas (Hall 1993, Béland and Cox 2011) in 
contested political processes (Parsons 2002, Wiener and Puetter 2009). !
Second, a strong focus of this thesis is two IOs, the OECD DAC and World Bank, 
and their role in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda. Therefore international 
relations (IR) literature on IOs is another important reference. This includes works 
on IOs’ organisational behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink 1999, Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004), and, of course, studies that look specifically at the OECD (Mahon 
and McBride 2008, Carroll and Kellow 2011) or the World Bank (Stone and Wright 
2007, Weaver 2008), as well as studies mapping how these IOs approach the issues 
of poverty and development (e.g. Blackmon 2008, Clegg 2010, Vetterlein 2012). 
Further important scholarship is the massive body of realist/rationalist-inspired work 
that seeks to conceptualise the political interactions and relations between states and 
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IOs (e.g. Hawkins et al. 2006), and research employing constructivist frameworks 
and concepts to study how IOs exercise authority over states and their policy 
processes (e.g. Woods 2006, Avant et al. 2010). !
By referencing this varied field of research on IOs in the context of international 
relations, this thesis on the OECD DAC (which often styles itself as a “purveyor of 
ideas”) and the World Bank (a “knowledge bank”) hopes to lay a foundation for a 
contribution to the literature that goes beyond this thesis’s main focus on the aid 
effectiveness agenda to speak to the broader field of academic scholarship on IOs. 
For scholars of IOs in IR, and for scholars of public policymaking, this thesis offers 
insights into causal mechanisms of how IOs strategically shape international policy 
discourses from their own institutional perspective.!
!
Chapter 3!
Chapter 3 discusses the methods underpinning this research. At the heart of this 
thesis are two case studies on how the OECD DAC and the World Bank shaped the 
emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda. It is important to note that these are not 
comparative case studies; indeed they are closely related. Both case studies 
investigate the aid effectiveness agenda over time, if from two different institutional 
perspectives. Experts from the DAC and the World Bank collaborated closely on 
issues of aid effectiveness for many years. In this sense, the agency of OECD DAC 
and the World Bank is often more akin to a single case. This makes comparative case 
study methods less useful for this thesis, notwithstanding the fact that there are 
revealing differences between the DAC’s and the Bank’s approaches to aid 
effectiveness.!
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To investigate the emergence, evolution, and dissemination of the aid 
effectiveness agenda means is to study a complex and many-layered political process 
situated in a specific historical context. To do so, this thesis relies heavily on 
methods of “process-tracing” (e.g. Checkel 2005b) within (rather than across) case 
studies. Chapter 3 discusses the advantages and disadvantages of process tracing 
methods to investigate the sort of complex relationships that characterise the role that 
was played by the OECD DAC and the World Bank in shaping the emergence of the 
aid effectiveness agenda within a specific historical context of institutional crisis and 
incisive geopolitical changes. Chapter 3 also helps structure the subsequent case 
studies and discusses the methodological considerations that guided my fieldwork 
and research interviews at the OECD DAC in Paris, France, and at the World Bank 
in Washington, DC, in the United States.!
!
Chapter 4!
Chapter 4 provides an illustration of the changes in a selection of foreign aid 
policies – foreign aid policies addressed by the PD – in the most prominent donor 
countries over the past 20 years using purely descriptive time-series analysis. 
Chapter 4 is a descriptive exercise. It makes no use of regression analysis or similar 
tools for investigating causality. Chapter 4 aims to provide a sense of scale for the 
policy changes widely associated with the aid effectiveness agenda before 
investigating how the OECD DAC and the World Bank shaped the emergence of 
that agenda. It does not seek to prove causality between the agenda and the foreign 
aid policy changes observed in the 30 OECD DAC member states that often 
reference the aid effectiveness agenda, as this is not the focus of this thesis.!
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The variables employed to visualise changes seemingly aligned with the PD are 
(a) preference of for programme-based aid over project-based aid; (b) use of direct 
budget support relative to all Official Development Assistance (ODA); (c) use of tied 
aid relative to all ODA; and (d) use of un-coordinated Technical Cooperation (TC). 
These four variables provide good indicators for foreign aid policy reform that 
constrain donor governments from pursuing their rational national interests, in a 
realist sense, through foreign aid policy and spending. !
Chapter 4 illustrates how notable changes in foreign aid policy have occurred. It 
furthermore tests whether visible changes in these indicators are significant 
“structural breaks” that cannot be explained by statistical variance to demonstrate 
that significant policy changes have occurred across most donor countries.!
 !
Chapter 5!
Chapter 5 is the first of two case studies. Each case study investigates how one of 
the two IOs examined in this thesis shaped the emergence of the aid effectiveness 
agenda by strategic ideational agency. The first case focuses on the OECD DAC. !
I trace the DAC’s role in (i) the inception, (ii) dispersion, and (iii) policy 
application of the aid effectiveness agenda. In doing so, I demonstrate how the 
OECD DAC’s strategic interest and “ideational agency” (Marcussen 2001) in foreign 
aid were crucial to the shape of the aid effectiveness agenda today. I present 
evidence showing how the nature and content of the aid effectiveness are in no small 
part a consequence of the DAC’s own need to reframe its legitimacy and purpose 
after a period of institutional crisis in the 1990s. This argument is made in two 
stages. !
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The first stage focuses on a period of institutional crisis that the DAC (and the 
OECD more broadly) experienced in the 1990s, as they were both forced to re-
interpret and re-invent their role in the changing post-Cold War world. The DAC’s 
efforts to apply its specific expertise to a new set of problems and topical policy 
discourses in foreign aid gave rise to key concepts inherent in today’s aid 
effectiveness agenda. !
The second stage examines what I call the ideational agency of the DAC in the 
aid effectiveness agenda. The rapid diffusion and acceptance of key concepts of the 
agenda is traced to the DAC’s access to policy-makers and to its unique function and 
communication channels as a hub of expert discourse. Conversely, the limit of the 
DAC’s access and its adoption of new tasks (e.g. field missions to non-OECD, 
developing countries), policy discourses (e.g. climate change) and institutional 
mandates (e.g. serving as honest broker between aid-donors and recipients) highlight 
tensions that come with the DAC’s new role in aid effectiveness politics.!
!
Chapter 6 !
Chapter 6 is the second of the two case studies, and focuses on the World Bank. 
Very much like the DAC, the World Bank played a pivotal role in the formation of 
the aid effectiveness agenda. Both IOs organised the formative conferences in Rome 
in 2003, Paris in 2005, and, to a lesser degree, in Accra in 2008 and Busan in 2011.!
The World Bank case study follows the same process-tracing structure employed 
in the case study on the OECD DAC. Like the DAC, the World Bank’s engagement 
with the aid effectiveness agenda is motivated and shaped by the Bank’s own self-
perception and institutional history (and legitimacy crisis) in the 1990s. Yet the 
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World Bank – a multilateral donor with a strong presence in aid-receiving countries 
– is a very different organisation from the smaller, more specialised OECD DAC. 
There are thus important differences in how the World Bank views aid effectiveness 
issues and in how it promotes political ideas with foreign aid policymakers or 
practitioners. !
In particular, this case study emphasises how the World Bank’s concern with aid 
effectiveness is shaped by its own institutional perspective and role as an important, 
usually highly prominent aid donor and aid organisation in aid-receiving countries. 
The World Bank often enjoys good access to governments of partner countries, and, 
in addition to its own projects, acts as service provider for donors and aid agencies. !
Motivated in part by its 1990s experiences with its twin-reforms of the Strategic 
Compact and the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), the World Bank 
tends to take a more technical, decentralised view of aid effectiveness in different 
countries. The case study discusses the World Bank’s approach to aid effectiveness 
on three issues that have provided strong motives for the World Bank to drive the aid 
effectiveness agenda. First is harmonization and procurement reform, which 
arguably helped get the first aid effectiveness conference in Rome 2003 off the 
ground. Second is aid coordination, in which the World Bank often adopts a leading 
role thanks to its prominent presence in partner countries and its carefully guarded 
reputation as a relatively unbiased broker. Last is the sub-agenda known as “use-of-
country-systems”, in which the Bank likewise enjoys comparative advantage as 
administrator of pooled aid resources and provider of risk assessments. !
Moreover, the chapter offers tentative explanations for the World Bank’s slow 
retreat from its leadership role in the aid effectiveness agenda at the global political 
level. This retreat started roughly with the Presidency of Paul Wolfowitz (March 
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2005 to June 2007). Disenchantment with the aid effectiveness agenda is common 
among Bank staff today, partly (as I argue in more detail in my case study) because 
the expectations within the World Bank were different from those held by most staff 
at the OECD DAC. In simplified terms, the World Bank could be said to emphasise 
harmonization and coordination of aid implementation in recipient countries 
(“bottom-up”, within the aid system) over policy reform (“top-down”).!
!
Chapter 7!
Chapter 7 presents a methodological discussion of the evidence and findings. It 
links the observed changes in the foreign aid policies of donor countries (chapter 4) 
to the evidence on how IOs shaped the emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda 
presented in the case studies in chapters 5 and 6 for a more thorough picture of the 
complex causalities at work. Chapter 7 discusses – from a methodological 
perspective – the validity of the evidence. To do so, it discusses further possible and 
plausible explanations, contributing factors, and counterfactuals to complement and 
strengthen the main focus of this thesis on the role of DAC and the World Bank in 
shaping the emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda.!
I discuss three possible alternative and/or complementary explanations. First, that 
advocating and adopting the aid effectiveness agenda is an intrinsic interest of donor 
governments and was so from the start. This alternative would share similarities with 
the view that IOs are ultimately instrumental to state interests. Second, I discuss the 
alternative of the aid effectiveness agenda representing an initiative from aid-
receiving countries. These countries (and their people) are the proclaimed 
beneficiaries of aid effectiveness. Policy reforms promoted by the aid effectiveness 
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agenda aim to achieve better development results by empowering aid-receiving 
states in their dealings with donors and aid agencies. It is not implausible to 
hypothesise that the aid effectiveness agenda originated through their agency. Third, 
I return again to the notion that the aid effectiveness agenda is a political expression 
of advancing knowledge and greater insights into the workings of the world’s 
foreign aid architecture. This is a strong theme in research and literature on aid 
effectiveness, not least because IOs, including the World Bank and OECD DAC, 
place great emphasis on – and derive authority and legitimacy from – the notion that 
they apply politically unbiased technocratic expertise to solving policy problems.!
!
Chapter 8!
Chapter 8 concludes with a discussion, in light of the main research question, of 
the findings presented in this thesis. It does so in four steps. First, it presents the four 
main findings from this study: (i) that the aid effectiveness agenda, especially in its 
early stages of emergence, was shaped by its institutional origins, which can be 
traced to the place and time of the OECD DAC and the World Bank in the 1990s; (ii) 
that in acting as ideational agencies for the aid effectiveness agenda, both of the IOs 
investigated here, expanded their repertoire of discursive mechanisms and the ways 
in which they leverage their authority as ”science policy bureaucracies” (Finnemore 
1996, p. 35); (iii) that both IOs also expanded the channels they communicate 
through, and the actors in foreign aid policy discourses that they communicate with, 
in sometimes surprising ways. How both IOs experimented and entered the, for 
them, new fields of communication, also suggest a strategic intent to buttress their 
capacity to influence the aid effectiveness agenda. And finally, (iv) that even though 
the ideational agency of both the OECD DAC and the World Bank was accompanied 
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by efforts of ideational change, their ability to shape and direct the aid effectiveness 
agenda nevertheless diminished over time. To this, the OECD DAC and the World 
Bank responded in different ways. 
In a second step, chapter 8 draws attention to the limitations of this thesis, born 
from the specific research design employed for this study. In a third step, it suggests 
three possible future avenues for research that would likely expand upon the findings 
presented here, or complement them with research efforts that explore aspects of the 
aid effectiveness agenda that could not be fully appreciated in these pages.!
As a last step, the conclusion closes with formulating an answer to the main 
research question: How did IOs shape the emergence of the aid effectiveness 
agenda? The two-part answer emphasises both the social construction and the 
strategic of the “strategic social construction” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 
888), which, as this thesis argues, lies at the heart of how the OECD DAC and the 
World Bank shaped the aid effectiveness agenda. !
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Chapter 2 – The Paris Declaration as a New Paradigm for Foreign Aid Policy 
Since the mid-1990s, there has been a renewed drive to address systemic 
weaknesses in the practice of foreign aid. A series of conferences shaped the “aid 
effectiveness agenda”, combining a range of hitherto-isolated questions and 
criticisms. The aid effectiveness agenda has been enshrined within several 
international declarations (Hayman 2009, p. 581), most notably the 2005 Paris 
Declaration (PD) on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2005). Today, the influence of the aid 
effectiveness agenda is evident in nearly all aspects of foreign aid policymaking and 
implementation. Yet few studies have examined how aid effectiveness as a policy 
agenda assumed its current shape. This thesis investigates how two IOs, the OECD 
DAC and the World Bank, shaped the emerging aid effectiveness agenda.  
Three observations suggest that a closer investigation of the role played by these 
two IOs is both worthwhile and necessary. First, aid-receiving countries were neither 
driving forces nor particularly involved in the political dialogue that shaped the PD 
(UK Parliament 2010). How does one explain a multitude of contemporaneous 
policy reforms across most donor states, presumably with all the costs associated 
with reforms, to the ostensible benefit of aid-receiving states, yet without – by most 
accounts – aid-receiving states’ agency in these very reforms? This alone 
necessitates that research on aid effectiveness move away from the dichotomy of 
donors and aid-receiving states to consider a broader field of actors in the 
transnational politics of aid effectiveness, possibly including NGOs, academia and 
think tanks and – the focus of this thesis – the IOs facilitating the formulation and 
assisting with the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda.  
Second, the monitoring of donors’ policy reforms to comply with the PD has 
fallen to IOs, notably the OECD DAC and their bi-annual “Survey on Monitoring 
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the Paris Declaration” (OECD 2006, 2008, 2011a). Third, the plans for structuring 
development and foreign aid in aid-receiving countries, with which donors ought to 
align themselves, are rarely those of the aid recipient states’ own governments. Often 
they are Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), or variants thereof, written to 
World Bank blueprints. Particularly in least-developed countries, they are often 
written under the bias of being tied to debt relief initiatives or loan conditionalities. 
Thus, even as policy reforms to improve aid effectiveness are ubiquitous among 
donors today, whether or not these reforms truly empower aid recipients is uncertain. 
I argue that the OECD DAC and World Bank shaped the PD in no small part to their 
own institutional interest.  
Thus I study the formulation and diffusion of the aid effectiveness agenda from 
the perspective of the OECD DAC and the World Bank as political agents who 
advocate this agenda for foreign aid policymaking. To do so, this thesis considers 
several bodies of scholarship. The first of these investigates interactions and 
relationships of states (usually governments) and IOs in the context of international 
relations. This vast literature draws on virtually all schools of political thinking. It 
includes realist and/or public-choice-inspired work that see IOs responding with 
(self-serving) rationality to (exogenous) state interests in principal-agent 
relationships (e.g. Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney 2006). It also includes 
institutionalist research on the potentially irrational, even pathological behaviour of 
IOs (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Weaver 2008) that may contradict (exogenous) 
states’ preferences. Likewise, several bodies of scholarship explore the less-tangible 
influence of supranational organisations (notably the European Union; e.g. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, Schimmelfennig 2005) and IOs (such as 
International Financial Institutions [IFIs]) over state governments (e.g. Woods 2006, 
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Park and Vetterlein 2010). These are but the tip of the iceberg of a theoretically 
incredibly diverse scholarship that explores the influence of IOs’ policy advice 
through everything ranging from game-theory models under conditions of limited or 
asymmetric information available to policymakers (e.g. Fang and Stone 2012) to 
constructivist theory on how “states are socialised to accept new norms, values, and 
perceptions of interest by international organizations” (Finnemore 1996, p. 5), as 
well as studies that seek to illuminate the impact of IOs (or the EU) on national 
policymaking through multiple approaches drawn from different theoretical 
perspectives (e.g. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). 
The research subject of this thesis – the aid effectiveness agenda – is closely 
associated with the widespread, parallel foreign aid policy reforms executed in most 
donor countries following the 2005 Paris Declaration. As Alastair Iain Johnston 
notes, the observable ways in which policies change direction after a state enters an 
international institution are a basic premise that “few would deny” (2001, p. 487) in 
IR scholarship – even if theory on what drives these changes remains controversial. !
It is not the focus of this study to explore how the widespread, parallel, and near-
simultaneous reforms of foreign aid policy in most major donor states (cp. chapter 4) 
follow from the aid effectiveness agenda. Rather, what motivates this research is, as 
Schmidt put it, asking “why some ideas become the policies, programs, and 
philosophies that dominate political reality while others do not” (2008, p. 307), with 
“some ideas” meaning the aid effectiveness agenda. This look back at the 
construction of authoritative international norms and values could be applicable to a 
wide range of research beyond the aid effectiveness agenda studied here. If, to give 
one example, the influence of the EU on Central and Eastern European countries is 
pervasive (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, p.5), but controversial in terms of 
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its significance, it would seem at least as equally important to investigate Vivian 
Schmidt’s question of which norms and values the EU projects through processes of 
Europeanization, the acquis communautaire, etc., and which norms and values it 
does not project, as it is to examine the different mechanisms of how this pervasive 
(and rarely disputed) influence specifically manifests in different countries. Here, a 
differentiation must be made between the diffusion of ideas and norms with 
relatively specific policy implications, the acquis communautaire as the most 
extreme prescription of legislation, and efforts by the IMF to effect change in the use 
of capital controls (e.g. Chwieroth 2010) or, as this thesis argues, the agency of the 
OECD DAC and the World Bank for the aid effectiveness agenda. These are, at least 
for the practicalities of scholarship, distinct from studies on the diffusion, or 
“teaching” (Gheciu 2005) of broader liberal-democratic norms, including, in foreign 
aid, the promotion of good governance, or, what Daniel Wincott (2011) terms 
“epochal framework”, such as the broad-based push for deregulation, privatization 
and smaller government in the 1980s when Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan 
shaped policy in the UK and US. !
This thesis, by examining the aid effectiveness agenda – a more manageable, but 
also more recent set of international policy norms than Europeanization, with none 
of the legal, and far less political and economic complexity than to the latter – 
investigates the construction of what Martha Finnemore described (in a broader 
meaning) as a normative context that “influences the behavior of decisionmakers and 
of mass publics who may choose to constrain those decisionmakers” (1996, p. 2). !
My observation of domestic foreign aid policy reforms of unusual scale first 
motivated this research on the aid effectiveness agenda, even before it became 
obvious that looking at IOs – in particular, the OECD DAC and the World Bank – 
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would be crucial to shedding light on this particular research question. Consequently, 
the thesis references a second literature, which focuses on the processes of public 
policymaking (Kingdon 1984; Sabatier 2007), particularly on works that grapple 
with the role of ideas and paradigms in policymaking (Hall 1993, Béland and Cox 
2011), politics (Parsons 2002, Wiener and Puetter 2009), and the formation of state 
interests in specific policy fields like foreign aid. The aid effectiveness agenda draws 
political attention to a specific set of problems, and promotes specific policy 
solutions. Moreover, as a political agenda, it grew quickly from obscurity to near-
global reach. Theoretical work dealing with questions of how ideas do or do not 
succeed in capturing the attention of policymakers is thus an important anchor for 
this thesis, even if an in-depth investigation of the mechanism of how aid 
effectiveness ideas translate into the policy reforms in various donor countries is not 
the main focus here.!
!
2.1. Aid Effectiveness and the Ideational Agency of IOs in Foreign Aid!
IOs play a pivotal role in global governance, including the governance of foreign 
aid. Three broad schools of political thought on IOs in world affairs and on IOs’ 
relationship with states are discussed here: Neorealism, institutionalism, and 
constructivism. These are discussed with reference to the research question and 
guiding hypotheses of this thesis. 
 
2.1.1.  Why Study Aid Effectiveness? – States and IOs in IR Theory 
One of social science’s most influential traditions in theorizing about IOs and 
interstate cooperation is economistic and rooted in assumptions of instrumental 
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rationality and efficiency concerns. This is a crucial body of work, not least because 
it introduced the principal-agent (PA) framework to the study of IOs. The PA 
framework guides, as theory or as an analogy, a great majority of scholarship on 
states and IOs, often even those that explicitly stand outside a realist tradition.  
Neorealist and neoliberal concepts are applied in a great range of IR research, 
both general and with a focus on IOs, including the transnational governance of 
foreign aid. The defining, neorealist work by Kenneth Waltz (1979) described world 
politics as analogous to a market filled with utility-maximising competitors. 
Neorealism is concerned with states as unitary, rational actors and their interest in 
survival and in power as means of survival. To capture better the realities of Cold 
War détente, US hegemony, and growing (initially Western) interdependence, 
neoliberalism pays more attention to the role of international regimes and 
institutions. Like neorealism, neoliberal theory is ultimately grounded in the basic 
assumptions of state power and rational interest as the drivers of IR dynamics.  
Within this competitive anarchy of IR, rational states may choose to favour 
interstate coordination over unilateral action, or they may choose delegation to IOs 
or multilateral regimes over interstate cooperation. States pursue these options in 
situations in which doing so provides Pareto-superior outcomes. If the default choice 
of states is unilateral action, definitions are needed for cooperation and delegation. 
Robert Keohane argues that cooperation occurs when “actors adjust their behaviour 
to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy 
coordination” (1984, p. 51). The PD’s provision that “[d]onors’ actions [be] more 
harmonised, transparent and collectively effective” (OECD 2005) clearly falls under 
the definition of interstate coordination. IOs are often seen to facilitate state 
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coordination. Delegation, furthermore, is a form of cooperation in which IOs
3
 are 
charged with implementing policy. Delegation is defined in here as “a conditional 
grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to act on 
behalf of the former” (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney 2006, p. 7). 
A vast literature investigates PA relationships between states and IOs. The studies 
often focus on two questions to explain why IOs exist and why they act as they do: 
First, why would rational states delegate tasks to IOs? Second, how do states ensure 
that the tasks they have delegated to IOs are implemented as intended?  
Hawkins et al. (2006, p. 13-20) offer an excellent overview of the literature on the 
first question. They classify the benefits for states incurred by delegating to IOs as (i) 
harnessing IO specialization; (ii) mitigating policy externalities in (game theory) 
coordination and collaboration dilemmas; (iii) facilitating collective decision-
making; (iv) resolving disputes between states; (v) enhancing the credibility of 
policies; and/ or (vi) “locking-in” certain policy biases. Policy delegation to IOs is 
seen as Pareto-optimal equilibrium in specific situations. Nonetheless, states remain 
the principals. Delegation is assumed to last only as long as it remains within their 
interest: “even small agent-source problems might lead principals to end their 
delegation at the first future opportunity” (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006, p. 228). 
Principal-agent theory also studies the control mechanisms employed by states to 
ensure that their IO-agents implement delegated policies as intended and to minimise 
“slippage”, a term used to describe an agent’s autonomous behaviour that is not 
explicable by its principals’ interests. These mechanisms range from straightforward 
sanctions, reporting requirements, and leadership and staff selection to subtle 
influences on organisational culture. Not surprisingly, both the World Bank and the 
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OECD are commonly conceptualised in neorealist and neoliberal works as agents of 
states (Milner 2004, Woodward 2009). When this brief and necessarily stylised 
rendition of neorealist and neoliberal IR theory on states and on the nature of states’ 
delegation to IO agents is applied to foreign aid, it is quickly apparent that the aid 
effectiveness agenda presents interesting questions for both schools
4
 of thought. If 
states in IR seek to maximise their comparative advantage, foreign aid should follow 
a similar logic of competitive state positioning. This has indeed been supported by 
studies on donor preferences (Alesina and Dollar 2000, Lancaster 2007) and on the 
rationales of aid agencies, which have also been shown to serve partial and special 
interests (e.g. Martens 2008). Likewise, there are numerous studies that analyse 
foreign aid in the context of other, non-developmental motives by states, including 
commercial interests (Alden 2007, Younas 2008) or national security (Rice, Graff 
and Carlos 2010). Moreover, anecdotal evidence indicates that adversarial states, 
such as Iran and Israel, grant foreign aid in pursuit of strategic alliances (The 
Economist 2010). States with clearly identifiable interests, including commerce and 
access to natural resources (e.g. China), national security (e.g. USA) or strategic 
political alliances often conform to neorealist/neoliberal predictions of the use of 
foreign aid as an ancillary tool of foreign policy in the pursuit of rational interests
5
. 
In contrast, the PD embodies the commitment of donors (excluding China, Israel, 
or Iran) to coordinate their aid policies with each other and with the countries that 
receive their aid. Moreover, the PD is also an agreement by governments to be held 
accountable for this commitment through external monitoring by IOs. If donor states 
undertake efforts to comply with this (non-binding) agenda and reform policies 
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Neoliberal theory, even though it acknowledges the self-interest of IOs, retains that premise.       
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accordingly, whereas before the PD they did not, this willingness of states to cede 
unilateral control over their foreign aid deserves to be explained in light of the 
theoretical considerations briefly summarised above. This is why aid effectiveness – 
as a political phenomenon – warrants more scholarly attention, irrespective of 
whether or not we find IOs to be relevant here. This, in a nutshell, originally 
motivated the research for this thesis, even before the pivotal role of the IOs in 
shaping the aid effectiveness agenda became apparent. 
The argument at the core of this thesis is that the aid effectiveness agenda in its 
current form – including the (non-binding) constraints it places on the bilateral 
foreign aid policies of sovereign states – was in no small part shaped by the 
institutional interests of the two IOs examined in the case studies in chapters 5 and 6. 
One evident counter-argument more in tune with the above theory would be that 
states (or a sufficiently influential alliance of some states) have a rational interest in 
constraining bilateral aid polices through the utilisation of IOs and international 
declarations. The latter counterfactual is discussed in greater depth in chapter 7. To 
investigate the former adequately – the central claim of this thesis – the theoretical 
focus here needs to consider the rich traditions of IR scholarship that allow for more 
autonomous and strategic agency of IOs in IR in their own right (see 2.1.2. & 2.1.3.).   
This, however, should not imply that neoliberal/neorealist insights have no 
bearing on whatsoever on the work presented in this thesis. The main 
neoliberal/neorealist insight for this thesis on how IOs shaped the emergence of the 
aid effectiveness agenda is the appreciation for the very real constraints placed on 
IOs by sovereign states as principals in PA relations. Even if IOs have agency and 
capacity to act in their own interests, the broad commitment of governments remains 
an irrefutable sine qua non for IOs (Abbott and Snidal 1998) and a very real concern 
! ! ! &-!
and point of reference for IO staff and leadership in their daily work. Kenneth Waltz 
himself emphasises that his famous structural-realist theory is not a theory of foreign 
policy (1996). In a notable analogy, Waltz likens a realist’s state-as-actor approach 
vis-à-vis a bureaucratic-politics theory to the relationship of an economist’s theory of 
the market vis-à-vis a theory of the firm. He concludes that structural realism should 
be regarded as a theory of constraints on foreign policy, rather than a theory of 
foreign policy, noting that: “what it does explain are the constraints that confine all 
states” (1979, p. 122). Though Waltz was not concerned with IOs, I argue that his 
caveat holds for research on IOs in global affairs.  
Returning to Kenneth Waltz’s analogy, the laws of the market do not inform us 
about a specific firm’s strategy; therefore, drawing on realist theory to study IOs 
incurs a risk of mingling broad structural constraints with causal explanations for 
specific behaviour. This is readily apparent in studies that seek to explain both IO 
and state behaviour as reciprocally dependent variables within the same PA 
framework (examples include Cortell and Peterson 2006; Hawkins and Jacoby 
2006). In these cases, realism-based studies are often forced to abstract one variable 
to a constant, such as Williamson’s portrayal of agents as “self-interest seeking with 
guile” (1985). 
To conclude then, the aim of the research presented here is to employ 
realist/neoliberal scholarship to identify boundaries for autonomous IO agency – the 
absolute limits to their portfolio of strategic options. These are found, for example, 
in the limited resources available to even the best-endowed IOs, compared with state 
governments, and in the governance structures that prevail in IOs such as the World 
Bank or the OECD. Research on how IOs shape an international policy agenda, 
which in turn provides the intellectual structural background for policymakers 
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(including those of powerful sovereign states), as presented in this thesis, must be 
conscious of these external constraints. The “hard limits” of IR realism help identify 
the real limits for IO behaviour and agency. Yet these constraints, as shown here, are 
not sufficient to fully explain fully all the factors shaping policy in IR. Less-tangible 
elements, such as the aid effectiveness agenda, can influence policy, and – as this 
thesis argues – IOs can and do act strategically to shape this kind of policy agenda. 
 
2.1.2. Why Do IOs Act Strategically? – IOs and Institutional Legitimacy 
The above discussion on neoliberal/neorealist IR literature emphasises the need to 
move beyond theory that conceives of IO existence and IO behaviour as separate 
from (exogenous) state interests, to include the potential for strategic IO agency. To 
do so, there is a need for frameworks that can conceptualise IO legitimacy and IOs’ 
legitimate behaviour without referencing (only) rational and exogenous state 
interests. Institutionalist theory has been crucial to developing concepts of 
institutional and/or organisational legitimacy (e.g. Higgott 2006, pp. 616-618).  
Legitimacy is conceptualised for this study as an externally attributed quality of 
institutions that authorises them to act in certain matters and ways. This differs 
crucially from a stringently neorealist view, in which the legitimacy and authority of 
an IO is a function of its mandate to fulfil a specific function on behalf of rational 
actors (usually states) in IR. Rather than the formal mandate, external perception of 
IOs is pivotal to the idea of legitimacy (Best 2007; Chapman 2009). Legitimacy of 
IOs, as understood in this thesis, instead stresses this perceived legitimacy of IO 
activities and authority. These perceptions may differ from the formal mandates of 
IOs, though changes in the fields in which an IO can legitimately exercise authority 
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are path-dependent to IOs over time, not least because historical perceptions of IO 
legitimacy (including their formal mandates) still matter for these perceptions of IO 
legitimacy and IOs’ legitimate authority. 
Path dependence in social sciences generally means that future trajectories depend 
not only on the current position or state of affairs, but also on how things were in the 
past. As Liebowitz and Margolis note: “[h]istory matters” (2000, p. 981), though 
specific concepts of path dependence differ. In economics, path dependence usually 
refers to bias against change, even if a given path is not the most efficient one, as 
long as the costs of change outweigh the costs of inefficient behaviour. In political 
and international studies, including the study of institutions, bias against change is 
not always based (solely) on cost calculations, though it is similarly used to express a 
bias resistance to (non-incremental) change despite changing circumstance.  
From a constructivist perspective, the legitimate exercise of authority of IOs is 
also constrained by intrinsic path-dependent limits on IO behaviour, which 
Chwieroth names “internal institutional configurations” (2008, p. 483). In his study 
of World Bank’s lending practices, for example, Chwieroth demonstrates how 
decisions made by Bank staff conflict with both state preferences, as expressed by 
the Bank’s Executive Directors
6
, and public-choice-inspired assumptions of budget 
maximization (e.g. Niskanen 1994). Chwieroth argues that this behaviour instead 
follows from internally shared beliefs that “specify legitimate organizational goals 
and means” (2008, p. 483). Therefore, while there may be tensions between the 
activities of IOs and the external perceptions of any IO’s legitimate role and 
authority, there may likewise be tensions between the activities of IOs and the 
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  The World Bank Board of Directors consists of 24 country representatives. The five largest 
shareholders – US, Japan, Germany, France, and the UK – each appoint one executive director. 
Others are grouped into constituencies, each of which elects an executive director.    
! ! ! '&!
internal perceptions of its organisational goals, means, and purpose. Both constrain 
(though do not absolutely prohibit) institutional adaptation and, crucially, agency for 
new legitimate purposes.  
As noted, this thesis primarily seeks to explain the nature and shape of the aid 
effectiveness agenda, and not to explain IOs themselves. However, evidence found 
when investigating the origins of the aid effectiveness agenda point to the strong 
formative role of the DAC and World Bank in shaping this agenda. The latter, 
characterised by the priorities both IOs emphasised in shaping the aid effectiveness 
agenda, are – I argue in chapters 5 and 6 – best understood as institutional responses 
to legitimacy crises, advocating a new legitimate role for these organisations within 
the limits of both internal and external constraints. 
I proceed by first addressing, very briefly, the vast scholarship on institutionalism 
in political theory. Second, I discuss how this scholarship informs my research on 
the role played by the World Bank and the OECD DAC in shaping the aid 
effectiveness agenda. In a nutshell, institutionalist theory helps explain why adaptive 
change of IOs to external, environmental change is not, and cannot be, instantaneous 
or indiscriminate. Even if outside perceptions of IO legitimacy change, IOs adapt 
within the path-dependent constraints of their own “internal institutional 
configurations”. 
 
Institutionalism: Defining Institutions and Organisations 
Institutionalism is a diverse field of research. Overviews of the literature 
distinguish between old institutionalism, rooted in classic economics, sociology, and 
! ! ! ''!
political science (Scott 2008), and new institutionalism, a recently revitalised study 
of institutions, their character, and the nature of institutional change. 
New institutionalism is often divided into rational choice institutionalism (RI), 
historical institutionalism (HI), and sociological institutionalism (HI) (Peters 1999, 
Schmidt 2010). While each school pursues a distinct approach to the study of 
institutions, they are united by the aim of surmounting unfeasible theoretical 
assumptions about micro-rational political actors (March and Olsen 2006). Recent 
work on discursive institutionalism (DI), a fourth institutionalism proposed by 
Vivien Schmidt (2008, 2011), incorporates constructivist concepts to explain the 
“power of ideas” (2008).  
Groundwork from new institutionalism that is important to this particular thesis 
includes (i) work on defining institutions and (ii) theory on institutions’ path-
dependent interests and behaviour. Prominent definitions of institutions – like the 
one from March and Olsen (2006) below – reveal the vast scope of the 
institutionalist literature cover:  
An institution is a relatively enduring collection of rules and organised 
practices, embedded in structure of meaning and resources that are relatively 
invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the 
idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing 
external circumstance. (March and Olsen 2006, p. 3) 
Research on institutions has explored structures “from the conscious to the 
unconscious, from the legally enforced to the taken for granted” and on levels raging 
from “world system to interpersonal interaction” (Scott 2008, p. 48). For this thesis, 
the term “institutions” is used largely as laid out in the typology of W. Richard Scott 
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(2008), an institutionalist scholar of organisations, including IOs. Scott’s framework 
for institutions has three dimensions, termed “pillars”: a regulative pillar consisting 
of legal, constitutional, and other rules that formally constrain and regularise 
behaviour; a normative pillar prescribing principle goals of behaviour and 
appropriate the ways to pursue these; and, finally, a cultural-cognitive pillar 
describing culturally shaped, taken-for-granted assumptions about reality and the 
frames within which it is perceived, understood, and given meaning. 
Although variations of these definitions exist (e.g. Friedland and Alford 1991), 
the key insight here is the ability to differentiate between IOs as organisations and as 
institutions, as well as to distinguish both from more intangible ideational structures 
that influence international politics, including the aid effectiveness agenda. Selznick 
(1957) provides a classic and intuitive distinction between organisations and 
institutions: 
The term “organization” thus suggests certain bareness, a lean, no-nonsense 
system of consciously co-ordinated activities. It refers to an expendable tool, a 
rational instrument engineered to do a job. An “institution”, on the other hand, 
is more nearly a natural product of social needs and pressures – a responsive, 
adaptive organism. (p. 5) 
This distinction is acutely relevant to the case studies presented in chapters 5 and 
6. A pivotal aspect in both cases is the legitimacy crises experienced by the World 
Bank and the OECD in the early 1990s. With the end of the Cold War’s bipolar 
world order as dominant political narrative for foreign relations with third-world 
countries (itself a Cold War term), and the growing doubts about foreign aid after the 
1980s “lost decade” of development, the rationale for both IOs was called into 
question (e.g. Einhorn 2006, Weaver and Park 2007, Woodward 2009). 
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Yet, as I demonstrate in later chapters, both the World Bank and the OECD DAC 
adapted their mission and mandate to these geopolitical changes, including through 
what has become today’s aid effectiveness agenda. For the World Bank in particular, 
a wealth of studies examines how “following a period of crisis [in the early 1990s], 
the Bank moved to shape understandings of its appropriate goals by increasingly 
legitimising its activities” (Clegg 2010, p. 474) by means that were different from 
those that had legitimised its activities (and thus the Bank itself as institution) prior 
to this crisis. Clegg characterises the crisis that faced the World Bank as a “hostile 
external environment” (p. 479). Hostile, in this sense, can refer to literal hostility 
towards an IO (such as the “50 Years Is Enough” campaign [Danaher 1994; also see 
chapter 6] targeting the World Bank in the 1990s), or simply to an environment in 
which the frames and motivations for policy are being rapidly redefined. The latter, 
for international development, has been persuasively shown in studies focussing on 
advocacy campaigns and their impact on policymakers during the 1990s (e.g. Busby 
2007). In either case, the result is that an IO’s past framing of policy issues turns 
from a source of (externally attributed) expert and moral authority to a source of 
external criticism and public doubts. 
Though studies on the World Bank’s crisis of the early 1990s are more numerous, 
the OECD’s parallel crisis as the “economic counterpart to NATO” (OECD 2004) in 
post-Cold War geopolitics showcases the nature of IOs legitimacy crises equally 
well. Quoting William G. Sumner (1959), Scott notes:  
[A]n institution consists of a concept (idea, notion, doctrine, interest, value) and 
a structure. The concept defines the purpose or functions of the institution; the 
structure embodies the idea of the institution and furnishes the instrumentalities 
through which the idea is put into action. (Scott 2001, p. 9) 
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For the OECD, acting as the “economic counterpart to NATO” (OECD 2004) was 
central to how the OECD understood itself as an institution. This self-conception as 
a multilateral, economic “NATO” was an integral part of, as Sumner called it, the 
ideas, notion, values, and interests that infused the particular organisation of the 
OECD. It provided the foundation for its expert and moral authority. It shaped a 
particular understanding among experts within the OECD of what they were doing 
and why. Yet with the end of the Cold War and the spread of market economies, the 
political need for such an economic counterpart to NATO diminished. The political 
environment for an expensive IO legitimizing itself grew increasingly hostile. The 
OECD and the DAC, like the World Bank, experienced a crisis of legitimacy. !
Christian Reus-Smit notes that “[i]nternational crises of legitimacy can be 
resolved only through recalibration, which necessarily involves the communicative 
reconciliation of the actor’s or institution’s social identity, interest, practices, norms, 
or procedures, with the normative expectations of other actors within its realm of 
political action” (2007, p. 157). That is rather too one-sided a conclusion, as it 
doesn’t consider even partial recalibration of the normative expectations within said 
realm of political action as a part of the process. I elaborate on this point below.!
To regain (externally attributed) legitimacy, an institution’s (such as an IO’s) 
“social identity, interest, practices, norms, or procedures” need to be re-aligned with 
the relevant external normative expectations. However, this kind of re-alignment 
may not be unique to an institution (or actor) experiencing such a crisis of 
legitimacy. While legitimacy crises demand reaction, they also provide opportunity 
(Campbell 2004, p. 115) to influence the “normative expectations of other actors 
within [the organisation’s] its realm of political action”, as evidenced by the 
constructivist scholarship on how IOs, as bureaucracies (see Barnett and Finnemore 
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2004), can, within the noted constraints, make new policy areas legible through the 
application of technocratic (rational, in a Weberian sense) authority to (re-)legitimise 
activities (interests, identity) in new fields as they “strategize rationally to 
reconfigure preferences, identities, or social context” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 
p. 888). 
The aid effectiveness agenda provides a poignant case for just this kind of “two-
sided” re-alignment of IOs’ “social identity, interest, practices, norms, or 
procedures” on one side and the “normative expectations of other actors“ on the 
other. The latter, e.g. policymakers, or “policy gatekeepers” (Busby 2007, p. 248, 
Carpenter 2010) within donor states’ governments, are key to the authorizing 
environment of these IOs. They too may (and did, in the case studies presented in 
chapter 5 and 6 of this thesis) change normative expectations as a consequence of 
IOs strategic social constructions.!
To understand how IOs respond strategically to crises of legitimacy thus requires 
an understanding of both the path dependencies that constrain them and the 
constructivist mechanisms that allow them to transform normative expectations of 
external actors strategically. I discuss path-dependent constraints first.!
 
 Institutionalism: Constrained and Path-Dependent Organisational Behaviour 
Crucially, the notion of IOs’ agency as both strategic as well as constrained, and 
therefore path-dependent, follows very much from Scott’s understanding of 
institutions as a duality of concept and structure, values and organisation. This 
provides a basis for theorising about how institutions adapt (and strategise) within 
constraints. This theoretical basis for strategic agency is distinctively different from 
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neoliberal notions of immediate and indiscriminate adaptability by IOs to exogenous 
changes. Internal processes do not move “rapidly to a unique solution” (March and 
Olsen 1984, p. 734); IO behaviour is confined to specific value- or path-dependent 
trajectories. 
Emphasis on the dual nature of institutions as both organisations and embedded, 
intangible meanings is closely associated with historical institutionalism. HI stresses 
that institutions are not entirely derived from other social structures; they have 
independent effects that make them identifiable as actors in political analysis. Unlike 
RI, institutions are not a result of aggregate individual choices. HI acknowledges that 
structures and outcomes are often neither planned nor intended, but are consequences 
of unanticipated effects and constrained choices (March and Olsen 1984, p. 743). 
One (certainly not the only) important model of change developed in 
institutionalist works is the theory of a punctuated equilibrium, (inspired by the 
biological theory of punctuated equilibrium developed by palaeontologists Stephen 
Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge (1977). Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (1993) 
first pioneered it as a model for policy change. It has also since been used to describe 
institutional change (e.g. Campbell 2004; 2010). The model states that changes occur 
only incrementally due to internal institutional constraints. This equilibrium of 
incremental change is punctuated by infrequent, more significant change. 
The caveat to this model is that assessments of significant changes that break with 
a stable equilibrium are often descriptive without clear criteria for a predictive, 
testable model. Nevertheless, the model is useful to explain the lack of constant, 
indiscriminate “rational” change in response to external changes. By conceptualizing 
path-dependent equilibriums as “punctuated”, it acknowledges that radical changes 
can still occur, though it is less suited to explaining when and why these changes 
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occur. The study on punctuated equilibrium as a theory for policy change by March 
and Olsen (1984) lists several exogenous causes that can (but do not necessarily) 
trigger significant policy change, including changes of government or environmental 
disasters.  
By applying the logic of a punctuated equilibrium to explain institutional changes 
(or lack thereof) in IR, including among IOs, prominent institutionalist Campbell 
(2004) identifies institutional crises as an important catalyst for change. 
Most institutionalists agree that ideas other than interests matter most for 
institutional change under conditions of great uncertainty, that is, when 
decision makers are faced with unusual or unsettled situations […]. In the 
extreme, actors perceive such situations as crises. […] Indeed, crises often 
trigger institutional shifts […]. (2004, p. 115) 
There are thus two concepts from two different traditions of institutionalist 
scholarship that prove crucial for this thesis on how (and why) the OECD DAC 
and the World Bank shaped the emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda. On one 
hand, there is the insight that crisis can serve as a trigger for change in a 
punctuated equilibrium model of institutional change. One the other hand, there is 
the idea of a “policy window” within which political actors and policy 
entrepreneurs can bring about policy change. One is – for lack of a better word – 
passive, emphasising the necessity of a “trigger” to animate change in inertia-
biased institutions. The other is more active, emphasising the limits and 
constraints for actors to engineer change within political systems biased towards 
inertia.  
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The case studies of chapters 5 and 6 provide detailed empirical evidence that 
institutional change of IOs incorporates elements of both of these aspects. All my 
interviews and research clearly point to the geopolitical changes of the 1990s – 
and their repercussion for IOs – as an important trigger for change. Yet the nature 
of institutional adaptation is not entirely passive; in the case of the OECD DAC 
and the World Bank, adaptation involved strategic agency that made use of the 
very policy window created by changing circumstances to influence the broader 
intellectual background structures that inform policies in the fields relevant to 
these two organisations, notably the aid effectiveness agenda in foreign aid policy. 
 
2.1.3. Constructivism: Concepts and Mechanisms of IO Change  
Neoliberal/neorealist theory offers important insights into external (usually state) 
interests for IOs. It highlights how, in the words of Abbott and Snidal (1998), 
commitment of governments remains the sine qua non for IOs. The legitimacy of 
IOs here is a function of fulfilling the tasks and mandates attributed to them, though 
there may be room for slippage. Institutionalism highlights the values that infuse 
organisational structures and the internal configurations that constrain institutional 
behaviour and prescribe path-dependent trajectories of incremental change. Here, the 
legitimacy of IOs is a function of their internal institutional configuration. The 
equilibriums of incremental change can be punctuated by episodes of more radical 
changes due to a variety of external causes. For IOs, one cause is a legitimacy crisis. 
Furthermore, constructivist theorising in this field focuses less on the role of IOs as 
agents or their internal institutional configurations, and more on the role of 
institutions as norm brokers and advocates of policy ideas, norms, and change. 
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The discussion of neoliberal/neorealist IR theory demonstrates why aid 
effectiveness presents an interesting political phenomenon worthy of study, doubly 
so once the formative role of IOs is suspected as being behind this foreign aid policy 
agenda. The discussion of institutionalist theory provides context for reasons why 
IOs have such a formative influence, adapting strategically to change within the 
constraints of both exogenous state interests and institutional path-dependencies. 
This final literature discussion, of (mostly) constructivist research on IOs and their 
use of expert authority, ideas, and norms to effect change outside their own 
institution, references the rich empirical and theoretical works that examine how IOs 
act and engage with states (and other actors).  
Once more, it is worth noting that research in this field on, loosely, the 
constructivist power of IOs need not contradict neoliberal/neorealist concepts of the 
authorising authority of states. Catherine Weaver’s work (2007, 2008) specifically 
investigates the leeway open to IOs, and the World Bank in particular, due to diffuse 
and often contradictory state preferences. Ngaire Woods notes that “even where [a] 
powerful state’s objectives are clear, the choice of how to achieve those objectives is 
often unclear” (2006 p. 39), to emphasise how room for strategic manoeuvring exists 
outside of PA “slippage”, even under assumptions of unambiguous state preferences. 
Likewise, from a position grounded in a principal-agent logic, Abbott and Snidal 
(1998) note that states may also choose to use IOs “to create information, ideas, 
norms and expectations ... [and] ... to legitimate or delegitimate particular ideas and 
practices” (1998, p. 8). IOs in this sense become more than mere arbiters, and 
trustees. They also act a norm brokers and “enforcers”
7
 (Higgott 2006, p. 617). The 
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relationships of specialised IOs with the governments of their main stakeholder states, but it is still 
crucial to note that such mechanisms cover a broader spectrum than those discussed in this thesis.  
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World Bank’s description of itself as a “knowledge bank” and the OECD’s 
aspiration to serve as an “international think tank” or a “purveyor of ideas” (Mahon 
and McBride 2008) certainly fit this notion.  
To proceed, I first discuss definitions in the literature of key concepts such as 
ideas, legitimacy, or ideational agency. Building on this, I briefly describe how the 
constructivist scholarship on ideas and paradigms offers possibilities to reconcile – 
on a theoretical level – the notions of external constraints and internal constraints in 
a model for IO behaviour and IOs’ institutional change. It is within the 
understanding of this model that this study pursues the strategic agency of the World 
Bank and the OECD DAC for the aid effectiveness agenda. 
 
2.1.3.1.  Defining Concepts  
As noted, this thesis draws heavily on the constructivist assumption that ideas 
play a pivotal role in shaping policy preferences and institutional change, including 
through the activities of IOs acting as ideational artists, agencies, and entrepreneurs. 
Specifically, this thesis draws on constructivist concepts to examine the role of the 
OECD DAC and the World Bank in shaping the emergence of the aid effectiveness 
agenda. The following provides a brief overview of important definitions. 
Ideas, as seen by constructivists, are the political tools or even weapons (Béland 
2009; Blyth 2011) that legitimise changes (or adherence to the status quo). Ideas 
become meaningful through political contestation (Wiener and Puetter 2009). They 
are different from interests in that they need not reflect (revealed) preferences. 
Rather, ideas embody the often-strategic “claims about descriptions of the world, 
causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions” (Parsons 2002) 
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employed by political actors to construct (or oppose) reform imperatives (Béland 
2009). The meaning-in-use of ideas may change in the course of political 
contestation. Moreover, ideas are frequently sufficiently ambiguous to accommodate 
multiple interests. Finally, ideas differ from political science concepts of norms or 
values by stressing the instrumental quality they have as actors make use of them in 
political discourse. Furthermore, the outcome of political contestations is a crucial 
factor in determining which ideas ultimately matter, in the sense that they develop a 
broader authority for policymaking, and which ideas do not. Finally, political ideas 
differ from, for lack of a better term, bare facts in how they are employed in the 
discursive processes of politics and policy change. Ideas are argued to be in the 
“foreground” (Campbell 2004; Schmidt 2008) of political contestation. In other 
words, they are found in the action plan programmes, the concept notes, and the 
policy briefs that are forwarded to motivate policy change and action. Although 
other definitions exist (e.g. Goldstein and Keohane 1993), Parsons’s constructivism 
is the most useful for this thesis. It allows ideas to be operationalised for an analysis 
of paradigm shifts in policymaking that can be linked to specific political actors.  
Ideational Artist and Agency are concepts frequently encountered in social 
science research on the OECD. Scholars such as Marcussen (2001), Kidal (2003) and 
Porter and Webb (2004) use them to conceptualise the OECD as a (self-serving) 
creator and distributor of policy ideas. On ideational agency, Nanna Kidal writes:  
What this role [ideational agency] implies is that the OECD constantly surfs 
around in national political debates, searching for new products and new 
markets like any transnational company. When the OECD discovers that a set 
of ideas has gained ground among the member states, it adopts and 
operationalizes them, thereby transforming them into causal ideas that can be 
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resold in the member states at a high price. Credibility is gained by constantly 
helping member states to concretise and implement diffuse ideas. (2003, p. 12)  
The important thing – borne out by the evidence presented in the research 
conducted for this thesis – is that this conception of the OECD as ideational agency 
builds on a concept of institutional self-interest. The OECD does not simply act as an 
instrumental distribution system for policy ideas among OECD member states, but 
does so with an eye to its own benefit as an institution. Beyond redistributing ideas 
as an ideational agency, the concept of the ideational artist highlights how the OECD 
“incessantly invents new ideas” (Marcussen 2001, p. 16) for much the same reason. 
Institutional Legitimacy: Scholars such as Jacqueline Best (2007) and Terrence 
Chapman (2009) have identified constructivist aspects at work in the external 
attribution of institutional legitimacy. They argue that, unlike with classic neoliberal 
accounts of IO instrumentality, organisations’ legitimacy is also shaped by the more 
constructivist notion of audience beliefs (Chapman 2009). In other words, IOs’ right 
to exist and exercise authority to act is not directly a result of their ability to 
implement state interests more efficiently than states might do alone; instead, the 
relationship between IOs and states is governed by a shared understanding – shaped 
by prevailing frames and narratives – of an institution’s appropriate goals and its 
ability to achieve these goals by appropriate means. For IOs in particular, the 
constructivist tradition of IR scholarship – drawing on Barnett and Finnemore 
(2004)’s conception of IOs as apolitical expert bureaucracies – identified “two of the 
central components of IO authority: expert authority comes from the acceptance that 
IOs hold specialised knowledge about the important social task with which they have 
been charged, while moral authority is often bolstered by IOs through frequent 
claims to be impartial, depoliticised agencies” (Clegg 2010, p. 477). 
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Legitimacy Crisis (of IOs): If IO legitimacy is a combination of its purpose, the 
mission, mandate or goal it serves as “constituted by the shared understanding in 
policy community”, and the expert and moral authority to pursue this mission, crises 
of legitimacy can be a loss of, or challenge to an IO’s purpose, a loss of its moral or 
expert authority, or a mix both. The legitimacy crises of the OECD (including the 
DAC) and the World Bank in the early 1990s – discussed in chapter 5 and 6 – cover 
both variants. The OECD’s legitimacy crisis was mainly one of lost purpose. As 
“economic counterpart to NATO” (OECD 2004), it faced the prospect of being 
perceived as no longer being needed. In contrast, the World Bank’s “decade of 
turmoil” (Clegg 2010, p. 479) in the 1990s was characterised by various challenges 
to its authority: including the leaked 1992 Wapenhans Report, which raised doubts 
on the Bank’s performance, and coalitions such as Jubilee 2000 and 50 Years is 
Enough, both of which also vocally challenged the World Bank’s impartiality.  
Paradigms, as a concept distinct from ideas, is more structural, aiming to capture 
a complete “framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of 
policy and kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very 
nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing” (Hall 1993, p. 279). 
Paradigms are less-dependent on political actors and not as immediately relevant in 
political contestation. They are more systemic, self-contained, and self-referential, 
providing language, concepts and values – the intellectual background – that inform 
(and regularise) the making of policy. Paradigms provide a link with institutionalism, 
under which rubric distinctions were made between an institution’s organisational 
structure and the ideational concepts that infuse structures with values (Selznick 
1957). Scott’s typology of regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive pillars 
(2001, 2008) refines this distinction for the study of organisations. Paradigms thus 
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designate the “concept” for institutions as part of a broader framework, as outlined 
by Hall. They are the structural complements to ideas. Paradigms constitute the 
ideational “background” (Campbell 2004; Schmidt 2008) that guides political 
struggles and processes of public policymaking. Taken together, ideas and paradigms 
capture what Giddens (1979) describes as a “duality” of structure: they constrain 
action, but they are also created and thereby transformed by it (see Ruggie 1998). 
The Political Authority of international organisations is a central concept for this 
thesis, which draws strongly on the notion of the political authority of international 
bureaucracies as described by Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2004). This 
bureaucratic political authority manifests itself though the policy ideas and 
paradigms that structure and inform political actions. Put simply, political authority 
helps define which problems are perceived as politically relevant, and which policy 
solutions policymakers take into consideration. 
The aid effectiveness agenda constitutes a newly relevant set of policy ideas that 
emphasises certain policy problems in foreign aid over others. It thus fits this type of 
bureaucratic authority of classification, codification and regulation that underpins 
policymaking, yet is usually not seen as part of the politics that guide policymaking. 
This kind of bureaucratic authority depends, crucially, on not being perceived as 
“political” and often on not being “perceived” at all. Instead, it constitutes the 
ideational background structures that shape political action in a given policy field. 
Kathleen McNamara, writing on the political authority of the European Union, 
notes that it:  
[...] is most effective when it is least obvious, that is, when the practices and 
rules of governance are so taken for granted that they are not noticed as 
! ! ! (+!
creating the very basis for the political action that is occurring. Note that this is 
entirely different from the cataloguing of political capacities that many would 
use to measure the EU’s power. Here, the taken-for-granted quality of 
governance results, most likely, in the lack of recognition that any obvious 
assertion of power has taken place. (McNamara 2010, p. 161-162) 
The aid effectiveness agenda presents a structural paradigm that acquired just 
such a taken-for-granted quality in a short amount of time. The strategic, political 
action of IOs behind this comparatively new paradigm is not widely recognised. 
This, quite possibly, is part of why the authority of IOs – as international 
bureaucracies – is effective. Yet this taken-for-granted quality of political authority 
by IOs such as the OECD is only given within the purview of their institutional 
legitimacy and their (perceived) mandates. If an IO sought to govern outside its 
legitimate sphere of influence, the “political” visibility would likely undermine its 
authority. 
For the specific case of the OECD (in general), Sharman (2006) writes: 
The OECD’s ability to influence politicians, transnational policy communities, 
corporations, journalists in the specialist and general press, [...] has been 
closely linked to its standing as an impartial, “apolitical” and technocratic 
institution. [...] But this strength is also a weakness. The converse of these 
benefits conferred, the extra credibility engendered by the authority of the 
speaker, is that the OECD is also constrained to act in a manner appropriate for 
such an institution in line with the expectations it has build up in the forty years 
of its existence. (Sharman 2006, p. 127-128) 
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And yet, this two-way condition of IOs’ unseen bureaucratic authority within 
their defined legitimate mandate and field of expertise is, ultimately, not a static 
product. To the extent that (agency for) political ideas – including those generated by 
IOs themselves – can, within constraints, affect both the authoritative environment 
for IOs (what they are legitimately perceived to govern) and the internal norms, 
values, and culture that constitute an IO as institution, the political authority of IOs 
can potentially extend into new policy fields. 
 
2.1.3.2.  How the OECD DAC and the World Bank Shaped the Aid Agenda  
Both IOs studied in this thesis, the World Bank and the OECD DAC, are 
examples of organisations that specialise in producing knowledge and ideas specific 
to a particular policy field: foreign aid. The World Bank is often seen to have a 
position of intellectual authority in the world of ideas on development. Dethier 
observes that “[e]xternally, the Bank influences the global environment in which 
development efforts are undertaken by producing and disseminating research and 
data that contribute to global development knowledge” (2007, p. 469). Joseph 
Stiglitz, former World Bank chief economist, notes more critically that the World 
Bank’s “predominant role in development research is so strong that, were it involved 
in the production of an ordinary commodity, it might be accused of anti-trust 
violation, dominating the industry” (Stiglitz 2007, quoted in Weaver 2008, p. 10).  
Nonetheless, another IO that rivals the World Bank in its claims to policy 
research expertise is clearly the OECD. The Paris-based organisation specialises in 
the construction, standardisation, and dissemination of policy ideas, including those 
pertaining to foreign aid policy, for its member states. The OECD conducts research 
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and produces background studies and reports on an enormous variety of policy 
issues. To do so, it draws both on the vast pool of statistical data it collects and on its 
reservoir of disciplinary knowledge, mainly, like the World Bank, in economics. As 
noted, the OECD has been characterised as an “international think tank” and a 
“purveyor of ideas” (Mahon and McBride 2008, p. 3) and, just like the World Bank, 
has tried presenting itself as “knowledge bank” (Authers 2005 quoted in Woodward 
2009, p. 81). 
Existing research on the intellectual authority exercised by IOs often places an 
emphasis on knowledge and ideas with an analysis of how IOs use their authority. 
Rao and Woolcock (2007) and Dethier (2007) take the World Bank’s power largely 
as a given. They investigate the causes and implications of the fact that this power is 
being held primarily by neoliberal economists. Weaver (2008) takes the policy 
dominance of the World Bank as a point of departure to examine the Bank’s internal 
“hypocrisy trap”, which she argues is a response to conflicting external demands, 
mainly from the governments funding the Bank. Other scholars have taken a closer 
look at the dynamics within IOs, including the World Bank and the IMF (e.g. Park 
2005, Woods 2006, Chwieroth 2008; 2010) to draw a more nuanced picture of how 
ideas shape the internal discourses of these organisations, and thereby their 
engagement with states.  
Research on the OECD, on the other hand, does trace the impact of the OECD’s 
work on the policies of its member states (Mahon and McBride 2008). Quite unlike 
the World Bank literature, OECD research is mostly silent on the organisation’s own 
internal culture or its institutional interests or agenda. The scholarly view on the 
OECD falls largely into two camps. One tends to cast the organisation as an 
instrumental catalyst for cascading policy norms and for the dissemination of 
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national policy preferences. For example, studies of the OECD’s role in promoting 
anti-corruption norms stress the US interests behind it (e.g. Pacini et al. 2002). The 
other tends to analyse the OECD’s diffusion of policy ideas among its members with 
a public-choice-flavoured view of the OECD as organisation (e.g. Kidal 2003). In 
light of this, the case study on the OECD DAC presented here, which draws heavily 
on concepts developed in research on IOs such as the World Bank, provides an 
important empirical contribution to this sparser literature on processes of 
institutional change and adaptation within the OECD.  
What all these studies have in common is their aim to understand international 
organisations – why they exist, how they operate, what functions they perform and 
why, what impact they have in IR, and how they could be reformed and improved. 
The research in this thesis employs very much the same conceptual tools, yet differs 
in one important aspect: the research presented in this thesis investigates the nature 
and origins of the aid effectiveness agenda, not IOs per se. This thesis is not 
intrinsically an IO study: It was not a foregone conclusion that my research would 
find the World Bank and the OECD DAC played a key role in the formation and the 
emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda. Though other actors and influences are 
clearly not negligible, neither the World Bank nor the OECD DAC is widely seen as 
shaping the aid effectiveness agenda politically (as opposed to facilitating it), and the 
thesis makes a contribution by drawing attention to this role, which is not something 
that is at the forefront of general scholarly inquiry into IOs. Aid effectiveness is not a 
formal mandate of the World Bank, and the OECD DAC is likely too specialised an 
organisation to attract more interest from IO scholars. Moreover, acknowledging and 
understanding the strategic, formative role of the World Bank and the OECD DAC 
in the aid effectiveness agenda could help inform efforts to improve this agenda 
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further, with the aim of advancing its stated objective of improving the effectiveness 
of foreign aid. It could be argued that efforts to develop the aid effectiveness agenda 
further are handicapped precisely because they do not account for the political 
dynamics of organisations like the World Bank and OECD DAC: these two key 
players are too often viewed as mere technocratic instruments without institutional 
interest in this field. 
By tracing the aid effectiveness agenda to its roots and investigating how the 
OECD DAC and the World Bank advocated and shaped the aid effectiveness agenda 
as a response to crisis, the research presented in this thesis adds new empirical 
insights into the constructivist dynamics by which IOs exercise their authority in IR, 
specifically through foreign aid, in ways that fit what Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) 
have defined as a strategic social construction “in which actors strategize rationally 
to reconfigure preferences, identities, or social context.” (p. 888). 
 
2.1.4. The Study of International and Supranational Organisations 
The theoretical debates referenced above are held and developed in a lively 
tradition of empirical scholarship on international and supranational organisations in 
IR, including the World Bank and the IMF (e.g. Woods 2006, Park and Vetterlein 
2010), the European Commission (e.g. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005), the 
OECD (e.g. Sharman 2006, Mahon and McBride 2008, Carroll and Kellow 2011), as 
well as on IOs more generally, without an empirical focus on one or two IOs in 
particular (e.g. Barnett and Finnemore 2004, Avant et al. 2010, Greenhill 2010). 
These literatures take a slightly different perspective from this study. They tend to 
investigate IOs for the explicit purpose of understanding how they operate and act, 
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and to what effect. In contrast, this thesis sets out to investigate the origins of an 
ideational paradigm that analysts have claimed motivates policy reform in a large 
number of countries, leading in turn to a Vivien Schmidt-inspired research interest in 
how and why precisely these ideas “become the policies, programs, and philosophies 
that dominate political reality while others do not” (2008, p. 307). The field research 
informing this thesis should help establish the ways in which the ideational agency 
of IOs is a crucial element in answering this kind of questions. !
A comparison could be made to the influence of the European Union – 
“Europeanisation” – in the EU’s (eastern) neighbourhood, which has produced a 
wealth of insights into how EU rules, norms and values are adopted by EU accession 
and/or EU member states, either by policy (e.g. Andonova 2005) or by country (e.g. 
Sissenich 2005). This makes it surprising, given the wealth of evidence of successful 
EU policy transfers and norm diffusions, that comparatively fewer scholars of 
Europeanisation have turned back to the EU and asked the crucial question, posed by 
Vivian Schmidt (2008), about which norms and rules came to dominate the political 
reality of Europeanisation – e.g. the acquis communautaire, etc.. – and which norms 
did no.!
At the same time, these empirical works on international and supranational 
organisations in IR are important references for this study, especially when they 
focus on the World Bank and/or the OECD. They provide a wealth of empirical 
insights into how the IOs interact with states, and in the instances in which states 
change policy preferences as a consequence of IO membership or by interacting with 
other states through IOs. For the World Bank, this has led to a rich scholarship on 
how the Bank itself has changed, both as organisation and as institution, in its 
approach to fields such as poverty (e.g. Vetterlein 2012) or development economics 
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(e.g. Yusuf et al. 2009), which are crucial to its legitimacy. All these studies act as 
secondary literature to supplement my first-hand interviews and research 
conductedin Washington and Paris for the case studies presented in chapters 5 and 6. 
At the same time, the research undertaken for this thesis seeks to contribute to this 
literature by focusing not on what constructivists call “the microprocesses about how 
precisely actors are exposed to, receive, process, and then act upon the normative 
arguments that predominate in particular social environments, such as international 
institutions” (Jonston 2001, p. 488), but instead on investigating the nature and 
formation of these “normative arguments” that are, as many country case studies 
show, catalysts and possible triggers for policy change through a variety of 
microprocesseses.!
 
2.1.5. Summary: Internal and External Constraints to IO Strategic Agency 
The research presented in this thesis investigates how the OECD DAC and the 
World Bank shaped the emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda. The aid 
effectiveness agenda, as a political phenomenon itself, and the formative role of the 
World Bank and the OECD DAC in its making, are worthy research subjects as they 
challenge important assumptions behind neoliberal/neorealist concepts of how IOs 
and states interact in the context of international relations. What defines the specifics 
of how these two IOs shaped the aid effectiveness agenda is best understood from an 
institutionalist perspective of crises as triggers of change and of the internal 
constraints of the organisational values, expertise, and culture that define them as 
institutions. The rich constructivist literature on how IOs engage with and exercise 
authority in states informs this research on the specific mechanisms of how the 
OECD DAC and the World Bank shaped the emergence of the aid effectiveness 
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agenda, even as the primary focus of this thesis is to explain the nature and origins of 
the aid effectiveness agenda, rather than explain the political influence of IOs. 
This thesis makes important contributions to IO scholarship by demonstrating, in 
a specific case, how IOs act strategically in an effort to shape the intellectual 
background governing and constraining policymaking relevant to their niche of 
expertise. Policymaking in specific fields such as foreign aid, in turn, affects the 
function, role and legitimate authority of IOs in these same policy niches. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I visualise this conflation of strategies by IOs both 
to adapt internally to crises and to transform their authorising environment externally 
through strategic ideational agency by applying Scott’s (2008) typology of 
paradigms and institutions.  
In defining institutions above, I omitted Scott’s third pillar of cultural-cognitive 
frames. By their very nature, these frames stand outside institutions (a duality of 
concept and structures), but encompass concepts of institutions to the extent that they 
are part of the greater narratives that specify “the goals of policy and kind of 
instruments that can be used to attain them” (Hall 1993, p. 279). Paradigms thus 
constitute (many) institutions.  
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Figure 1   Overlapping Epistemological Dimensions of Paradigms, Institutions and 
Organisations. (Source: Author’s Construction) 
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Linking these two elements foreshadows some of the relevant points highlighted 
below in discussing the literature on ideas and discourse in the processes of public 
policymaking. The cultural-cognitive pillar of frames and narrative transcends 
boundaries between national policymaking and international affairs. They shape the 
broader policy discourse, with relevance for both national public policy and 
international governance in a given field.  
To the extent that IOs such as the OECD DAC and the World Bank successfully 
shape such a broad cognitive frame of references for policymaking, with the aid 
effectiveness agenda being the example discussed here, they also exercise (limited 
and constrained) influence over the very authorising environment that infuses them 
with meaning, purpose, and legitimacy as international institutions. 
 
2.2.  Ideas in Processes of Public Policymaking  
The case studies on how the OECD DAC and the World Bank shaped the 
emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda (chapters 5 and 6) help illuminate an 
under researched aspect of IR research: how IOs strategically influence their 
authorising political environment in the context of IR. Over time, IOs help shape the 
broader narratives and frames (Scott’s “cultural-cognitive pillar”) that structure 
policy discourse and political agendas in a specific policy field such as foreign aid. 
IOs exercise power as they use their knowledge and authority not only to 
regulate what currently exists but also to constitute the world, creating new 
interests, actors, and social activities. This can be understood as ’social 
construction power’ because IOs use their knowledge to help create social 
reality. (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 7) 
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These narratives and frames, or “social reality” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 
7), in turn determine the roles and functions that IOs are legitimately seen to play in 
the global affairs of a particular policy. Once more, it should also be noted that no IO 
(or anyone else) could fully control the outcomes of social construction. It is not a 
form of influence that can be equated with perfect, absolute control. Rather, these are 
long-term processes with diffuse, often unpredictable outcomes that are also shaped 
by the interpretations of other actors (Hawkins and Jacobi 2006, p. 207). 
Nevertheless, outcomes of IO’s strategic social construction can and have been 
identified (e.g. Woods 2006), including in foreign aid (e.g. Park and Vetterlein 
2010). By addressing outcomes of IO agency in policies, there is a need to touch on a 
different scholarly literature. While the core of my thesis revolves around how IOs 
shaped the aid effectiveness agenda, a discussion of how the agenda potentially 
influences policymaking at a national level will inevitably be a part of this, and will 
need to be grounded in public policy scholarship.  
Here, two bodies of work are relevant to this thesis. The first is scholarship on 
ideas and discourse – “discursive institutionalism”, as Vivien Schmidt (2008) and 
others term it, which highlights its proximity to institutionalism. This is a relevant 
body of work with the theoretical tools needed to study the elusive concepts of ideas, 
narratives, and paradigms. Furthermore, work in this field speaks about the role of 
policy discourses in “epistemic communities” (Haas 1992) and “transnational 
government networks” (Slaughter 2005) to demonstrate how processes of 
policymaking and knowledge production transcend boundaries of national 
governments and IOs, as well as bodies such as non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), think tanks, or academia.  
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The second relevant body of literature here is that focusing on processes of public 
policy (e.g. Sabatier 2007). This is a broad scholarship that echoes (or originates) the 
theory discussed above in an IR context, including social construction and policy 
design (Ingram, Schneider and deLeon 2007) and punctuated-equilibrium models of 
policy change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Notably, chapter 7 of this thesis 
borrows conceptually from the multiple-streams (MS) framework by John Kingdon 
(1984). For this chapter, MS offers analytical perspectives on when, why, and under 
what conditions policies change. This thesis employs MS to assess alternative 
explanations that may account for observable policy changes in foreign aid (see 
chapter 4) not caused by IO agency, which is the main argument of this study.  
 
2.2.1. Discourse and Discursive Institutionalism  
Discourse is a broad, versatile concept that captures both ideas and the interactive 
processes by which ideas are conveyed (Schmidt 2008). Processes enable theorizing 
about the dynamics and the context of institutional change – “namely how, when, 
where, and why ideas [...] matter” (Schmidt 2008, p. 305). Relevant aspects are (i) 
the agents involved, (ii) the context in which they act, and (iii) the “logic of 
communication” (Risse 2000; Schmidt 2008) by which ideas may motivate change.  
Discourse and actors: Peter Hall points to discourse as a causal mechanism for 
policy change when he talks about how paradigms, which serve to make sense of the 
world and identify phenomena as problematic, enter policymaking processes. Citing 
Charles Anderson (1978), he states that “the deliberation of public policy takes place 
within a realm of discourse [...] policies are made within some system of ideas and 
standards which is comprehensible and plausible to the actors involved” (1993, p. 
279). This focus on discourse and on political contestation sets discourse-oriented 
! ! ! ),!
literature on ideas and politics apart from theory that conceptualises transnational 
values and beliefs as cascading (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), or demanding 
compliance (Legro 1997), or becoming internalised as institutions (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993), based solely on their intrinsic qualities as norms or policy ideas.  
Discourse, in contrast, emphasises political actors and agency in the analytical 
framework to explain better the causes of policy change. The motivation of actors is 
often approximated by concepts of self-interest that, even if not a strictly micro-
economic rationalism, helps assess which ideas are advocated and why. Colin Hay 
(2011) notes: 
Conceptions of self-interest provide a cognitive filter through which the actor 
orients herself towards her environment, providing one (of several) means by 
which an actor evaluates the relative merits of contending potential courses of 
action. (p. 79) 
The two case studies in chapters 5 and 6 present empirical evidence from my field 
research that demonstrates how the World Bank or OECD DAC shaped the 
emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda, thereby potentially if indirectly 
influencing (national) policy processes by shaping the structural intellectual 
background that informs policy discourse in the particular field of foreign aid policy.  
Discourse and context: An important advantage of the concept of discourse, as 
the medium for ideas, is the contextualised view it offers on processes that drive 
change. Context, in this case, refers to the observation that the power of ideas is 
strongly tied to how ideas are conveyed, adopted, and adapted – i.e. to whom, how, 
where, and why political actors who champion certain ideas make their particular 
cases. Historical context is crucial to my research on how IOs shaped the aid 
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effectiveness agenda. Both the World Bank and the OECD DAC acted against the 
background of a legitimacy crisis they both faced as institutions in the early 1990s. 
Yet the same geopolitical changes that shook these institutions from their 
equilibrium also caused national policymakers, experts and academics to be more 
open to narratives and ideas that fit a post-Cold War world of foreign aid. A key 
argument made by this thesis is that insofar as the aid effectiveness agenda can be 
deemed to have successfully changed bilateral foreign aid policies, this is as much a 
result of who shaped the aid effectiveness agenda as it is of at least two other factors. 
Those factors are, first, a specific window of opportunity provided by policymakers 
being open, and even looking for new cognitive frameworks within which to 
conceive of foreign aid; and second the intrinsic quality of the ideas found within aid 
effectiveness (which all predate the 1990s). 
In her work, Vivien Schmidt (2008) distinguishes between two types of discourse. 
The first is communicative discourse between political actors and the public. The 
second is coordinative discourse among a smaller, more elite circle of policy actors. 
This study clearly examines the latter, namely discourse among experts, IO staff, and 
policymakers within a specific policy area. Even though development aid is a public 
topic, the details of the aid effectiveness paradigm tend to be deliberated upon almost 
exclusively within a far more narrowly defined circle of technocratic experts.  
Crucially, this circle, which is at its core a community of IO staff, foreign aid 
professionals, experts, researchers, and policymakers, is transnational in nature. It is 
not defined by the allegiance of its member to a specific nation or organisation, but 
by a shared professionalism, technical language, and a shared “social reality” of the 
policy problems at hand. This largely distinguishes the “coordinated discourse” from 
the “communicative discourse”, which would be more likely to cut across a variety 
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of social realities within a group that is usually defined by organisational or, in the 
case of a political public, national boundaries. This makes the concept of 
“coordinated discourse” a close relative to literature on “transnational government 
networks” (Slaughter 2005) and “epistemic communities” (Haas 1992) and their 
influence in capturing and shaping policy within the “disaggregated sovereignty” 
(Slaughter 2004) of transnational governance (Mahon and McBride 2008).  
It should be noted that the divide between communicative discourses on policy, 
which tend to be public, and exclusive, coordinated discourses on policy is not 
insurmountable. An example that successfully bridged this divide in the field of 
foreign aid policy is the 1990s Jubilee 2000 campaign
8
 for debt relief for heavily 
indebted poor countries. The Jubilee 2000 campaign, characterised as a paramount 
example of a “transnational advocacy network” (Keck and Sikkink 1999, p. 89), 
illustrates how a coordinated discourse on foreign aid can enter a more public 
discourse through third-party agency (such as that of an advocacy network). The 
distinction between communicative and coordinated discourse is not an absolute 
classification. 
With this caveat in mind, there are a few differences that can serve to categorise 
communicative and coordinative discourse. The former is said to have a tendency to 
favour more normative, moral, and succinct arguments. The latter, in contrast, is said 
to allow for more complex programmes, and places a greater emphasis on rational 
(meaning politically unbiased) arguments and consensus-building. Campbell (2004) 
descriptively highlights this distinction in his typology of ideas and their effect on 
policymaking seen in Table 1, below.  
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8
 Jubilee 2000 was an international movement in over 40, mainly industrialised countries calling for a 
cancellation of third-world debt by the year 2000 (the Great Jubilee of 2000 years of the Catholic 
Church being origin of the name). 
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 Concepts and Theories in 
the Foreground of the 
Debate 
Underlying Assumptions in 
the Background of the 
Debate 
 Programs Paradigms 
Cognitive  
(Outcome oriented) 
Ideas as elite prescriptions 
that enable politicians, 
corporate leaders, and other 
decision makers to chart a 
clear and specific course of 
action. 
Ideas as elite assumptions that 
constrain the cognitive range 
of useful programs available 
to politicians, corporate 
leaders, and other decisions 
makers. 
 Frames Public Sentiments 
Normative  
(Non-outcome oriented) 
Ideas as symbols and concepts 
that enable decisions makers 
to legitimise programs to their 
constituents. 
Ideas as public assumptions 
that constrain the normative 
range of legitimate programs 
available to decision makers.  
Table 1 Types of Ideas and their Effects on Policymaking (Campbell 2004, p. 94) 
Despite some differences, Campbell’s “frames” and “public sentiments” are more 
closely related to a communicative discourse. His “programs” and “paradigms” 
relate more to a coordinative discourse and to the definitions of “ideas” and 
“paradigms” used for this thesis.  
The definition of “ideas” used in this study ties the concept more directly to 
political actors. Notwithstanding these differences, two important insights relevant to 
this thesis can be drawn from Campbell’s typology. First, this thesis focuses on a 
coordinative discourse among elites and on the programmatic ideas that motivate 
shifts in policy paradigms within a comparatively small group of experts. My 
research on how the OECD DAC and the World Bank shaped the aid effectiveness 
agenda is not concerned with communicative discourse. This does not mean that aid 
effectiveness issues are never raised by politicians communicating with the public – 
merely that this is not a focus of this study. Second, coordinative discourses favour 
the technocratic, apolitical and bureaucratic rationales of IOs and their (mainly) 
economist staff. IOs such as the World Bank and the OECD therefore excel in 
coordinative discourses. In contrast, the internal institutional configurations of these 
organisations provide staff with incentives to steer away from public, communicative 
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discourses. A common expression of this is the prevalent norm within the World 
Bank and the OECD DAC to avoid “politics”; which implicitly refers to the 
communicative type of discourse delivered by, for example, political parties or 
leaders. Yet, as this thesis argues, the coordinative discourse among circumscribed 
experts, technocrats, and policymakers that IOs favour is ultimately no less crucial 
when it comes to determining public policy.  
 
2.2.2.   Ideas and Choice in Public Policy 
A further problem presents itself in that research on policy ideas – which includes 
this thesis – usually exhibits a selection bias toward successful ideas (Metha 2011). 
Chapter 4 illustrates how significant shifts in foreign aid policy correspond with 
ideas embodied by the PD (OECD 2005) and the broader aid effectiveness agenda. 
The Paris Declaration and the aid effectiveness agenda in general are widely 
understood to have had an impact, including triggering a host of national policy 
reforms, but a scientifically robust demonstration of the causality of the aid 
effectiveness agenda in national policy changes is beyond the scope of this study. 
Such a demonstration would need to go beyond the examination of how IOs shaped 
the aid effectiveness agenda and investigate how the aid effectiveness agenda shaped 
policy processes in a convincingly representative sample of country case studies 
pursuing aid effectiveness reforms.  
This research, however, has adopted different terms of reference, by aiming to 
strengthen insights into how IOs shaped the emergence of the aid effectiveness 
agenda from the other side of public policy, so to speak, underpinned by in-depth 
field work presented in chapters 5 and 6 on the role of the OECD DAC and the 
World Bank in shaping elements of the aid agenda. Following the case studies, 
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chapter 7 introduces some plausible alternative and/or complementary factors that 
may also have played an important role in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda. As 
explained in more detail in chapter 3 on methodology, this closing step also implies a 
shift in theoretical focus, moving away from IO-centric literature, and discussion of 
the influence of IOs on the aid agenda, towards a public policy-centric literature, and 
discussion of the influence of alternative factors that are commonly found or 
expected to be relevant to changes in public policy. 
Therefore, chapter 7, in discussing complementary and alternative explanations, 
draws extensively on works on idea-driven change in public policy analysis (see 
Cairney 2012, pp. 220–243 for a recent textbook overview of the literature). 
Specifically, it draws on and adapts the iconic multiple streams (MS) framework 
(Kingdon 1984; 1995; Zahariadis 2007) as a means for inspecting political ideas as 
putative causes of policy change. Zahariadis describes multiple streams as “a lens, 
perspective, or framework [...] that explains how policies are made by national 
governments under conditions of ambiguity” (2007, p. 65). In the study of public 
policy, the MS framework follows and builds on the tradition of the “garbage can” 
model developed by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) by rejecting assumptions of a 
rational temporal order of policy formation involving (a) the identification of a 
problem, (b) the design of a policy solution, and (c) the vetting of policy solutions in 
politics. Instead, MS posits that policy changes require a convergence of various 
supporting factors (e.g. “streams”) to trigger significant changes. Without such a 
convergence of streams – termed “policy windows” (Zahariadis 2007, p. 73) – 
policymaking is assumed to favour a stable status quo in much the same dynamic 
predicted by punctuated equilibrium models of change. !
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The streams MS requires to converge to create policy windows are traditionally 
(a) problems, (b) policies, and (c) politics. Problems are policy issues deemed to 
require attention (Cairney 2012, p. 233). Policies are ideas/solutions proposed by 
actors, often seen as policy entrepreneurs (Zahariadis 2007, p. 74). Politics as a 
stream refers to how receptive policymakers are to certain solutions at particular 
times (Cairney 2012, p. 236). The relevance of this approach to this thesis lies in the 
possibility that, notwithstanding the narrower focus on IOs’ shaping of the 
emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda, reasonable alternative or complementary 
explanations may exist for the observed simultaneous foreign aid policy reforms 
undertaken in many major donor states.!
The MS framework is adapted for this thesis in chapter 7 to create an analytical 
set of three conditions to compare alternative explanations for the policy reforms 
described in chapter 4. These conditions correspond with the three streams described 
above. The first condition is political agents with motives to champion ideas (“policy 
solutions”) in the ideational contestation of politics. This is likely the largest 
departure in the adaptation of MS presented in this thesis. In comparison to 
traditional MS, greater emphasis is placed on how specific issues are framed as 
problems relevant to a crowded political agenda. In the case of aid effectiveness 
reforms, these problems mainly draw political attention to problems such as donor 
fragmentation or the administrative burden of foreign aid for aid recipients. As 
demonstrated in chapters 5 and 6, these problems were neither truly new nor 
previously unknown, though they only gained sufficient political weight to trigger 
widespread policy changes in the wake of the 2005 Paris Declaration. !
The second condition relates to the policy solutions favoured to address these 
problems, which correspond closely to the second stream of the MS framework. This 
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is arguably the aspect in which the original MS model and the adapted one presented 
in this thesis are most closely aligned. !
The third condition is a window of opportunity, within which relevant actors 
(policymakers) are receptive to new ideas and policy solutions such as the aid 
effectiveness agenda. This temporal and/or situation aspect presents an important 
variable for the political failure and success of policy ideas, which is independent 
from the “quality” or “content” of the policy ideas themselves.!
It is important to note that this approach, applied to this thesis, still clearly 
operates on assumptions of idea-driven policy changes, notwithstanding the fact that 
idea-driven change also depends, as Lieberman (2002) notes, on political actors. !
An idea’s time arrives not simply because the idea is compelling on its own terms, 
but because opportune political circumstances favour it. At those moments when 
a political idea finds persuasive expression among actors whose institutional 
position gives both the motive and the opportunity to translate it into policy – 
then, and only then, can we say that an idea has found a time. (2002, p. 709)!
The ideas embedded in the Paris Declaration found their time when they were 
given persuasive expression by the OECD DAC and the World Bank, drawing on 
their unique access to national policymakers (whose position, in turn, strongly 
determined state-IO relationships in the particular policy field of foreign aid), 
motivated by these organisations’ need to reinvent their institutional purpose and 
legitimacy for the post-Cold War realities of international development aid. 
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2.3. Conclusion – Strategic Ideational Agency of IOs in the Literature 
IOs are more than passive, technical arrangements that serve states. They act as 
political agents in their own strategic interest in global affairs, even as they cloak 
them in technical and apolitical terms of expert authority. One expression of IO 
authority in IR is the influence they exert as highly specialised experts on policy 
discourses, and thereby on the intellectual structural background that shapes 
policymaking in many fields. The aid effectiveness agenda, which is widely 
considered to be a decisive change in how experts and policymakers think about 
foreign aid policy and to have triggered policy reforms in most donor countries, 
presents one such intellectual background. This thesis investigates how two IOs – the 
OECD DAC and the World Bank – shaped the emergence of the aid effectiveness 
agenda. 
For this, a variety of different bodies of scholarship are referenced. IR scholarship 
on states and IOs is the first important anchor of this study. Given the public policy 
changes associated with the aid effectiveness agenda, public policy research is 
referenced as a second anchor for exploring alternative and/or complementary 
factors that may have contributed to shaping the aid effectiveness agenda in its 
current form instead of, or in addition to, the formative role of the OECD DAC and 
the World Bank. 
With reference to the first body of scholarship, the position occupied by the 
research presented in this thesis is largely a result of how the nature of the research-
subjects – the aid effectiveness agenda and the policy-prescriptions it advocates – 
challenge common assumptions of neoliberal/neorealist IR scholarship, doubly so if 
IOs are attributed a formative role in the contents of the aid effectiveness agenda. 
Institutionalist work on IOs is crucial to identifying the reasons, priorities, and 
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direction of these IOs engagement of aid effectiveness, born from the need of these 
institutions to re-invent their role in the new international, post-Cold War aid 
architecture of the 1990s. The rich constructivist literature on IOs and their 
relationship with states finally, is the scholarship closest to this thesis. This study 
draws heavily on this body of work to investigate how the OECD DAC and the 
World Bank shaped the emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda, even while it 
stands apart (and complements) this literature with its research focus on an 
international policy agenda, not intrinsically on IOs. 
The second body of literature on public policy, including theory on discourse, 
ideas and social construction in processes of policy formation, provides analytical 
tools that allow a critical examination of alternative and/or complementary factors 
that may also have been important in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda, even 
though this literature has produced few studies on how international political actors 
such as IOs engage in discourses and policy formation. Not least because of this 
omission, the research presented in subsequent chapters also provides empirical 
evidence relevant to research questions of how, when, and why certain ideas matter 
for policy changes. 
In terms of the overall argument of this thesis, the literatures touched upon in this 
chapter complement each other. The IR literature on IOs and states informs this 
research in terms of both why and how IOs would seek to shape the contents of the 
aid effectiveness agenda. As value-infused institutions, they act to adapt and 
persevere even (or especially) in times of change and crisis. Constructivist 
scholarship in particular points to ideas as the tools, methods, or even weapons in 
these types of adaptive processes by which IOs act to “create social reality” (Barnett 
and Finnemore 2004).  
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The public policy literature, in contrast, provides the conceptual tools to validate 
and complement the arguments presented on how IOs shaped the aid effectiveness 
agenda, precisely because the agenda’s effects mostly unfold in national policy 
reforms within the highly specialised field of policy. These are difficult to capture 
with the theoretical and methodological tools developed for the study of IOs in IR. 
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Chapter 3 –Case Study and Process-Tracing Methods 
This chapter explains the methods used in this thesis to investigate the political 
agency of the OECD DAC and World Bank in promoting and shaping the aid 
effectiveness agenda. The methodological challenge, then, is to “trace back” the 
contemporary aid effectiveness agenda, as a set of normative policy ideas, to its 
formative years and to identify how – or by which processes and whose agency – the 
policy principles of this international agenda came to acquire their contemporary 
normative weight. The method employed for this is process tracing within two linked 
case studies: one on the OECD DAC’s role in the formation of the aid effectiveness 
agenda, and one on the parallel role played by the World Bank. A discussion of 
counterfactuals (chapter 7) draws attention to other factors that may have played a 
smaller-than-expected role in the formation of the aid agenda. 
This chapter discusses these methods in three stages. The first focuses on the use 
of case studies to examine how the World Bank and the OECD DAC helped shape 
the aid effectiveness agenda. The second stage involves a discussion of process 
tracing to examine these IOs’ strategic agency in the formation and dissemination of 
the aid agenda. The third stage is a discussion of the interviews conducted with IO 
staff and experts in Paris and Washington, DC. 
 
3.1.  Case Studies 
At the heart of this thesis are the two case studies presented in chapters 5 and 6. 
These case studies investigate the political agency of the World Bank and the OECD 
DAC for the aid effectiveness agenda. This policy agenda is embodied, above all, by 
the 2005 Paris Declaration (PD) and its follow-up documents, such as the 2008 
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Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). The use of case studies, more specifically within-
case-study-process-tracing, rests at the heart of this research. This section illustrates 
the methodological fit of the chose case study research method with the overall aim 
of this study. 
 
3.1.1. Why Case Studies? Strengths, Weaknesses, Objectives 
Case studies were chosen for this thesis as case study methods best complement 
the contributions made by this research to the academic scholarship in constructivist 
IO research, notably on how IOs actively shape policy through ideas and norms. 
To illustrate the methodological fit of the selected two case studies for this thesis, 
this section contrasts advantages of case study methods in social sciences against 
important caveats. To do so, this chapter draws mostly on the work on case study 
methods for theory development by George and Bennett (2005), supplemented by 
other studies in this field (e.g. Gerring 2007). The main reason for using case studies 
for this research is their ability to explore complex and possibly reciprocal causal 
mechanisms, which are not as easily captured with many other methods. 
At the heart of this thesis is the argument that the OECD DAC and the World 
Bank played a pivotal role in the formation of the aid effectiveness agenda. The 
formative involvement of these IOs is rarely acknowledged in aid effectiveness 
research, despite the fact that the influence of the aid effectiveness agenda is widely 
felt in foreign aid practice. Chapter 4 gives a brief descriptive account of policy 
changes commonly associated with the aid effectiveness agenda; though no attempt 
at establishing causality is made. Indeed, several existing works directly or indirectly 
examine how national policy preferences can be shaped, including by IOs. Rather, 
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this thesis examines how the aid effectiveness agenda in particular is indeed heavily 
shaped by the strategic agency of these two particular IOs. It is the strategic interest 
and agency of these IOs as institutions in forming the agenda that is insufficiently 
addressed in aid effectiveness research, not least in that conducted by economists 
trying to abstract aid effectiveness from political roots (e.g. Easterly & Williamson 
2011). Conversely, the agenda’s impact on foreign aid policymaking and practice is 
well documented, even when policy reforms in donor countries in line with the aid 
effectiveness principles are judged to have fallen short of set goals (e.g. OECD 2006, 
2008; also ACFID 2009, Brown 2009). 
The strategic agency of IOs to shape and influence normative policy agendas, the 
very “framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy 
and kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of 
the problems they are meant to be addressing” (Hall 1993, p. 279), is a complex 
process woven into the coordinative discourse (Vivien Schmidt 2008) of 
transnational policymaking. It builds on a variety of causal mechanisms, including 
persuasion, shaming, and social influence (see Johnston 2001). Case studies are well 
suited to examining the complex processes and dynamics of IOs strategic agency. 
By “helping to bring mechanisms back in” (Checkel 2005c), the insights offered 
by case study research can advanced beyond co-variations and correlation of 
independently observed variables. Case study research favours a methodology and 
epistemology of process tracing, which is better suited to the aim of this thesis, 
which is to demonstrate the strategic agency of specific IOs in shaping a specific 
agenda, and not a general argument on how IOs interact with national policymaking. 
In conclusion, this thesis employs case study methods to address the complexity 
of the processes and dynamics that characterise the strategic agency of IOs, 
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specifically the oddly “invisible” strategic agency of the OECD DAC and the World 
Bank in the case of the aid effectiveness agenda. Moreover, case studies help to tease 
“out the more fine-grained distinctions and connections between alternative 
theoretical schools” (Checkel 2005c, p. 4), including between the rationalist and 
constructivist schools of thought (Fearon and Wendt 2002). 
The methodological benefits of case study research do not come without caveats. 
Research that employs case study designs often runs the risks of (i) over-
determination in explaining phenomena, (ii) bias in case selection, and (iii) imposing 
fairly restrictive limits to any broader generalisations of insights. These drawbacks 
are addressed in this thesis by a focussed logic of case selection and very specific 
objectives in the actual case study research. 
 
3.1.2. The Cases of the OECD DAC and the World Bank 
Three questions guide case study research: “What kind of case is this?”, “Why was 
this particular case chosen?” and “What variables are of interest in a case?”. First, 
case study research needs to identify the universe to which a case or group of cases 
belongs. This is the basic question of “What kind of case is this?” It enables 
structured comparison, both within a given study (or thesis) and with future studies 
of cases from the same universe. This allows case study research to contribute to an 
“orderly cumulation” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 68) of insights in social sciences. 
Second is the question of “Why was this particular case chosen?” – in the instance of 
this thesis, the case studies of the involvement of the OECD DAC and the World 
Bank in aid effectiveness. Textbooks on case study methods usually offer typologies 
of case studies, including “most-different” or “most-similar” designs (Burnham 
2008, p. 94), which are particular to comparative approaches, as well as “typical”, 
! ! ! +'!
“deviant”, “extreme”, “crucial”, “pathway” or simply “influential” cases (Gerring 
2007), which have broader appeal. Most of these can be applied to different research 
objectives. The following section returns to these two points for the cases in this 
thesis. 
What are these cases of? The case studies presented in chapters 5 and 6 examine 
the OECD DAC and on the World Bank respectively, and the role these international 
organisations played and still play in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda, which set 
ambitious international reform targets for global aid relations and foreign aid policy. 
Though both case studies, and with them this thesis, draw heavily on the academic 
literature on IOs, these are not primarily cases focusing on IOs. Rather, my research 
emphasises the interaction and discourse of (representatives of) these two IOs, 
mainly with government officials and development experts in Western donor 
countries within the cooperative discourses of policy experts in the field of foreign 
aid. Consequently, these are case studies on the unique authority of the OECD DAC 
and the World Bank as bureaucratic expert organisations that engage in strategic 
social construction “in which actors strategize rationally to reconfigure preferences, 
identities or social context” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 888).  
Why were these particular cases chosen? To a certain degree, the focus on the 
OECD DAC and the World Bank is already the result of early exploratory forays 
into the subject, which in turn became a conscious research design as I started to 
explore the aid effectiveness agenda in a more structured manner for this thesis. 
The initial research interest was to investigate the origins of the aid effectiveness 
agenda, which has proven to be highly transformative of the way policy experts think 
about foreign aid and about improving its institutional architecture. I did not 
conceive of this thesis as “IO-research” per se I first drafted a research outline. The 
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fact that the OECD DAC and the World Bank were quickly revealed to have played 
such a pivotal part in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda – both as IOs as such, in 
addition to governments, and for these IOs in particular, as opposed to the UN, or 
IOs and regional bodies more commonly known to represent aid recipient states’ 
interests, for example – is already a key revelation and an important contribution to 
aid effectiveness research, which widely ignores the role these two IOs play as 
political agents shaping the aid agenda. This early insight motivated me to adjust this 
thesis to examine their role in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda in greater depth.  
What variables are of interest in these cases? This thesis employs process 
tracing as a means of focusing on the causal mechanisms by which IOs disseminate 
policy ideas and shape policy discourses. The variables of interest are the 
mechanisms and processes that constitute the OECD DAC’s and the World Bank’s 
strategic social construction, as described by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). Further 
variables of interest are the “scope conditions” (Checkel 2005c). Scope conditions 
would act as intervening variables and/or conditionalities. In other words, certain 
scope conditions might need to be met for mechanisms to function. Thus, the 
dynamics of persuasion would be a mechanism and a lack of politicisation would be 
a scope condition, in explaining idea-driven change through persuasion. 
Mechanisms connect things; they link specified initial conditions and a specific 
outcome. As an example, arguing and persuasion can be seen as a causal 
mechanism that is triggered by the appropriate institutional design and that 
leads to a change in the interests or behaviour of the actors concerned. Of 
course, this causal mechanism can only be triggered under certain scope 
conditions, for instance a high degree of credibility on the part of the institution 
! ! ! +)!
and its community in the eyes of the addressee. (Checkel and Zürn 2005, p. 
1049) 
As noted, the cases of the OECD DAC and the World Bank were selected as a 
result of preliminary examinations of the research subject. As a result, there is little 
room for generalising insights from this study. This is a purposeful trade-off with the 
aim of achieving detailed evidence and insights into the rarely explicated role of 
these two IOs in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda. Consequently, the interest of 
this thesis is primarily why and how – not if – the OECD DAC and the World Bank 
engaged with and successfully shaped this normative agenda for foreign aid policy.  
In conclusion, the selection of OECD DAC and the World Bank as cases for this 
research aims to investigate why and how IOs, as political actors, engage in strategic 
social construction, thereby helping to shape and transform the “framework of ideas 
and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and kind of instruments that 
can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to 
be addressing” (Hall 1993, p. 279). 
 
3.2. Process Tracing and the Investigation of Causal Mechanisms  
Process tracing in social sciences is frequently associated with qualitative 
methods. The method has been discussed under different labels for several decades 
(Checkel 2005b). In the following I (i) outline the possibilities for causal inference 
from process-tracing studies and (ii) specify their implications for the design of this 
research and its application to the aid effectiveness agenda. 
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3.2.1. Variations of Causal Inference through Process Tracing 
James Mahoney (2010) summarises causal-process observation (CPO) for theory 
testing by distinguishing three distinct types of applications. He differentiates types 
of CPO based on whether it is primarily concerned with independent variables, 
(causal) mechanisms, or auxiliary outcomes, as presented by Table 2  
Information 
Investigated 
Type of Data Observed Type of Theory Tested 
Independent Variable Data concerning the 
existence of posited 
cause 
Theory proposes a cause whose 
existence is controversial 
(Causal) Mechanism Data concerning posited 
intervening events and 
processes 
Theory offers expectations about 
intervening processes that should 
(not) occur if a cause really affects 
outcome 
Auxiliary Outcome Data concerning posited 
auxiliary outcomes 
Theory offers expectations about 
outcomes besides the main one of 
interest that should be present if 
cause really affects outcome 
Table 2  Types of Causal-Process Observations (Adapted from Mahoney 2010) 
Causal process observations (CPO) of the first kind investigate whether a cause 
occurred in the manner or time posited by theory. The existence of the cause is often 
more controversial than the presumed link between a cause and its outcome. An 
often-cited example is the meteorite-collision theory for the extinction of dinosaurs 
(King, Keohane and Verba 1994, pp. 10-12). A social science example, forwarded 
by James Mahoney (2010, p. 127), is research on the existence of a “nuclear-taboo” 
as a normative prohibition that stigmatises nuclear weapons. Such a taboo, if it 
exists, would by definition influence policy decisions concerning nuclear weapons. 
This thesis does not present research of this kind. Both the observed changes in 
foreign aid policy among the major donors (chapter 4) and the existence of the aid 
effectiveness agenda as catalyst for these reforms are well documented (e.g. OECD 
2006, 2008, 2011; also Hayman 2009, Roberts 2009, etc..). 
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In contrast, CPOs concerned with causal mechanisms, the second kind in Table 2 
presented above, tend to use process-tracing methods to identify intervening 
processes, the causal chain, and mechanisms among independent variables and the 
outcomes (George and Bennett 2005, p. 206). 
Support for a causal explanation of a case is thus gathered through observations 
within a case. These observations should be linked in specific ways, based on a prior 
theory-based explanation. This is the process-tracing methodology employed in this 
thesis. James Mahoney (2010) places his typology wholly on the side of theory 
testing. Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005) on the other hand stress the 
use of process-tracing methods for both theory testing and theory-development. This 
type of CPO resembles the investigation presented in this thesis, as the overriding 
research question here concerns itself with details of how IOs shaped the emergence 
of the aid effectiveness agenda, which emphasises a detailed investigation of 
processes and events to achieve a better, more nuanced picture of the emergence of 
the aid effectiveness agenda, and of the role played by the OECD DAC and the 
World Bank. 
Finally, CPOs that investigate auxiliary outcomes are concerned with occurrences 
that should occur alongside an outcome, if in fact that outcome has been caused in 
the way stipulated by the theory under investigation. In many ways, the most 
important “auxiliary outcome” of the aid effectiveness agenda is arguably the main 
outcome that the vast majority of aid effectiveness research seeks to investigate: Did 
aid effectiveness reforms truly improve foreign aid to recipient countries? Did 
foreign aid become “better” as a result of the policy reforms inspired, informed, and 
possibly justified by the aid effectiveness agenda? 
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Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to pursue these questions, 
though it is my hope that a better and more explicit understanding of the strategic 
agency of IOs in shaping the agenda can in turn furnish a better understanding of the 
nature of the aid effectiveness agenda, its strengths and weaknesses, its potential and 
shortcomings, as a result of its political birthing process and the role of the OECD 
DAC and the World Bank therein. 
To conclude, process tracing is a case-based, qualitative method that relies mainly 
on observations within (rather than across) case studies. When used to test theory, 
process tracing can provide insights into the existence of causes, mechanisms, or 
auxiliary traces posited by a theory. The inductive side of process tracing can 
contribute to theory development by studying the mechanisms and underlying 
processes observed in a case study. Process tracing is employed in the case studies in 
chapters 5 and 6, as fits the aim of this thesis to identify and explore the agency and 
influence of IOs in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda – something found in the 
historical context and process of its emergence, but not in the formally declared 
purpose, principles and policy guidelines constituting the agenda itself. 
 
3.2.2. Investigation Mechanisms of Change through Process Tracing  
Process tracing aims to explain research questions through “causal mechanisms 
[which] provide more detailed and in a sense more fundamental explanations than 
general laws do. The difference between a law and a mechanism is that between a 
static correlation (“if X, then Y”) and a “process” (“X leads to Y through steps A, B, 
C”)” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 141). The case studies in chapters 5 and 6 of this 
thesis investigate how IOs, as political actors, translate their institutional interests 
into a paradigm shift in foreign aid policy that agrees with these interests. Rather 
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than search for co-variations across cases, this study explains causation through case-
specific causal mechanisms in two “most-likely” cases. 
An attempt to explain by reference to causal mechanisms, which in principle 
requires consistency with the finest level of detail observable, provides a 
powerful source of causal inference when carried out through the method of 
process-tracing, which examines processes within single cases in considerable 
detail. In practice, process tracing need not always go down to the finest level 
of detail observable, but by avoiding as if assumptions at high levels of analysis 
[...] process-tracing can eliminate some alternative explanations for a case and 
increase our confidence in others. (George and Bennett 2005, p. 149)  
The aim is to observe and to describe the mechanisms and processes of IOs’ 
political influence through a strategic social construction “in which actors strategize 
rationally to reconfigure preferences, identities or social context” (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998, p. 888). As a consequence, this thesis stresses constructivist 
mechanisms, such as persuasion, described as “a microprocess of socialization, [that] 
involves changing minds, opinions and attitudes about causality and affect (identity) 
in the absence of overtly material or mental coercion” (Johnston 2001, p. 17), social 
learning, where “learning and social interaction, rather than political pressure and 
individual choice, lead to agent compliance with normative prescriptions” (Checkel 
2001, p. 559), and imitation, “which also emphasize non-bargaining dynamics in 
apolitical, technical settings” (Checkel 2005c, p. 12). This constructivist focus, 
though pivotal to the contributions of this thesis, is not intrinsic to process-tracing 
methods, which can easily be employed for different studies. Ideally, a process-
tracing approach to case study analysis charts a set of hypothesised mechanisms, 
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which were previously conceived on the basis of prior theoretical assumptions. This 
reinforces the point that process tracing is largely a theory-driven method.  
Several times, Alexander George and Andrew Bennett ask “whether process-
tracing is similar to historical explanation and whether process-tracing is anything 
more than ‘good historical explanation’” (2005, p. 224). Even though they stress the 
potential, often-neglected utility of historical explanation in social sciences, they 
answer their own question by noting how theory-based hypotheses for causal 
mechanisms make a crucial difference. 
Process-tracing attempts to empirically establish the posited intervening 
variables and implications that should be true in a case if a particular 
explanation of that case is true. Theories or models of causal mechanisms must 
undergird each step of a hypothesized causal process for that process to 
constitute a historical explanation of the case. (George and Bennett 2005, p. 
147)  
Both case studies in this thesis build on a theory-based portrayal of relevant 
actors, contextual factors, scope conditions and, crucially, mechanisms, which are 
hypothesised to link cause to effect. Rather than being merely descriptive of a case, 
this approach of tracing a-priori hypothesised processes is a powerful tool for 
political analysis because observations are not independent from one another, but 
predicted to be connected in specific ways. Although both cases address the same 
policy field, foreign aid policy, the distinctively unique practices of the OECD DAC 
and the World Bank – how they disseminate knowledge, frame problems through 
their research excellence, or facilitate dialogue among policy makers from different 
nations – suggests that different mechanisms will be prominent in each case, even as 
the authority of both IOs likely shares certain basic characteristics. A crucial scope 
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condition for this is these IOs’ emphasis on an apolitical, technocratic organisational 
culture. 
 
3.3. Collecting Evidence for Process-Tracing Using Elite Interviews  
Tracing causal mechanisms seeks to open up the black box of processes and to 
reveal the micro-foundations, the nuts and bolts, of how events unfold in a case:  
The role of mechanisms is two-fold. First, they enable us to go from the larger 
to the smaller: from molecules to atoms, from societies to individuals. 
Secondly, and more fundamentally, they reduce the time lag between the 
explanans and explanandum. A mechanism provides a continuous and 
contiguous chain of causal or intentional links; a black box is a gap in the chain 
[…]. (George and Bennett 2005, p. 141) 
The choice of process tracing as a method to investigate causal mechanisms in 
this thesis – those essential to the shaping of the aid effectiveness paradigm – poses 
the question of how evidence and data in collected. In general, “process tracing 
methods, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview 
transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes 
or implies in a case is in fact evident” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 6). As a 
consequence, the last part of this chapter discusses the application the field and desk 
research undertaking for this thesis in the context of these methodological choices. 
 
3.3.1. Caveats to Process-Tracing and Elite Interviews 
Process tracing comes with two notable caveats. First, the intervening links, even 
if hypothesised beforehand, may not all be observable. This is particularly true for 
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constructivist mechanisms such as, for example, “persuasion” (Checkel 2005b). 
Even the most meticulous construction of contiguous chains of mechanisms need to 
recognise the practical limits to what George and Bennett (2005) describe as pushing 
inquiry “to the outer boundaries of what is observable” (p. 143). Second, the 
identification of a chain of causal links through process tracing need not eliminate all 
potential causes, contributing factors, or rival explanations. Given the ambition of 
process-tracing methods to allow for an analysis of complex causality, a single chain 
of observations linking cause to outcome may still very well turn out to be 
incomplete, or even be a misrepresentation of more complex processes.  
Using elite interviews as an important source of evidence helps to address the first 
caveat of unobservable micro-foundations. Interviews can allow the incorporation of 
first-hand insights, even if not originally anticipated by the researcher, into perceived 
sequences and connections and thereby identify chains of unobservable yet crucial 
connecting processes. This is achieved, in part, by reconstructing events and 
developments from participants’ perspectives and, in part, by establishing what first-
hand witnesses think and believe concerning the issues investigated.  
Elite interviews also help addressing the second caveat of equifinality and 
complex causality by giving the researcher first-hand witnesses who can judge and 
weight the various factors and events in ways that archival work, for example, is 
rarely able to do. Checkel (2005b), for example, recommends presenting 
interviewees with alternative causal mechanisms, thus aiding the selection (and 
elimination) from a range of possibilities. Interviews may therefore assure the 
validity of the analysis by using the accounts of participants as a “check” against a 
researcher’s own potential predisposition to discover the causal sequences that he or 
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she set out to find by weighting, ordering, and interpreting any confirmative and 
contradictory observations subjectively to confirm the researcher’s intent. 
 
 3.3.2.  Designing the Interviews  
Elite interviews are a quintessential research tool to obtain information on key 
decisions and decision-making processes. Formally, two dimensions define elite 
interviewing. Burnham et al. (2008) describe these as the (i) target group and the (ii) 
research technique. First, the target group is concerned with who is interviewed and 
the strategies for gaining access to the interviewees, especially if they are key 
decision makers. Second, research technique is concerned with how the interview is 
conducted. It encompasses the structure and form of the interview, its transcription, 
and the evaluation of its contents as evidence for the research at hand. 
Regarding the question of whom to interview, the focus of this thesis is key 
decision makers at the World Bank and the OECD DAC, who were, or still are, 
working on the aid effectiveness agenda. Interviews were conducted both with 
people actively involved in conceiving the agenda before the Rome Declaration on 
Harmonization and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2003, 2005), 
starting roughly in the mid-1990s, and IO staff working on various follow-up and 
monitoring processes, for example from the evaluation departments of these 
organisations. A total of 19 interviews of about an hour in length were conducted for 
this thesis. The list of people interviewed can be found in Appendix 1.  
It should be noted that in process-tracing research, interview partners do not 
themselves represent independent or dependent variables – as they commonly do in 
marketing or consumer research, for example – but are witnesses to the processes 
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studied. Consequently, techniques such as randomised sampling of respondents, used 
to ensure a representative sample, are omitted in favour of gaining access to people 
with valuable insights:  
The goal when applying the process tracing method will not be to use such 
interviews to make generalisations about the characteristics, beliefs or actions 
of the full population of relevant actors, but rather to use the testimony of those 
who were most closely involved to construct a theoretically-informed narrative 
of the process of interest. (Tansey 2007) 
For this thesis, questions of gaining access are certainly more pertinent. There is 
first, the question of who the key people are in the OECD DAC and the World Bank 
who were pivotal to the formation of the aid effectiveness paradigm, leading up to 
the PD of 2005. Second, the question is how to contact these persons, some of whom 
may no longer be with the organisations, and how to persuade them to take time for 
an interview.  
 [...] the ideal strategy when using the process tracing method is to combine the 
positional and reputational approaches when sampling potential interview 
subjects. In this way, researchers can not only interview a set of political actors 
that their research objectives suggest will be highly relevant, but will also open 
their research to the possible inclusion of other influential players who may not 
be obvious ex ante [...] (Tansey 2007) 
As noted in more detail in the case studies, the first half of the selection process, 
finding the relevant people to interview, proved far easier than expected. There was a 
very strong consensus within both the OECD DAC and the World Bank, even 
among newer staff who had joined after the Paris Declaration, regarding which 
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people were the key persons to talk to – the key persons who had moved the process 
along at critical junctures.  
The more difficult task was getting interviews with these people. It was easier to 
interview key persons from the OECD DAC, simply as a consequence of geography. 
Most of those who had worked on the aid effectiveness agenda, even before the Paris 
Declaration, still live in Europe, usually in France or in the UK. I was able to meet 
them at their convenience over the course of a full year. Others, especially those 
working in senior positions at the World Bank, were occasionally out of reach, 
simply because their schedules did not always allow for a lengthy interview with me 
during the two weeks I spent in the USA towards the end of 2011. There were a few 
names that are closely associated with the early days of aid effectiveness – such as 
Jim Adams from the World Bank, who was pivotal to bringing ideas of country 
ownership and country-owned strategy plans into the Bank (see Mallaby 2004, p. 
230) – whom I was unable to interview. As I had (slightly) less privileged access at 
the World Bank compared to the OECD DAC, nearly twice as many interviews were 
conducted there to reach a “saturation point” (Burnham et al. 2008) of diminishing 
returns per interview. Regarding the second question of how to conduct them, all 
interviews followed a semi-structured order, including three aspects in particular:  
1. The internalised, subconscious elements of organisational culture among 
respondents: As analytically robust process tracing requires investigation of 
necessary and sufficient scope conditions of causal mechanisms, as much as of 
the mechanisms themselves. The interviews sought to verify (or refute) 
assumptions about many internalised aspects of the respondents’ self-conception, 
their image of their institution, and their own roles in them. These aspects were 
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explored with historical (regarding the aid effectiveness paradigm), non-specific 
questions about work routines, conventions and established processes.  
2. The respondents’ testimony regarding the historical development of the aid 
effectiveness paradigm: Arguably the most relevant aspect, in terms of the 
methodological emphasis on process-tracing, was to use the opportunity of these 
interviews to establish the decisions, actions and events that make up the history 
of the aid effectiveness paradigm and thereby verify or refute the hypothesised 
causal mechanisms at the heart of this research through first-hand testimonies, 
especially in cases in which these mechanisms are not observable through other 
sources. This was done by asking interviewees to relate their experiences with 
specific events or trends in the unfolding debates – for example, the discussions 
and eventual decision to include measurable indicators in the PD, as well as 
which specific indicators. 
3. Critical evaluation of the interviews to account for biases and strengthen 
reliability: Evidence from interviews (as from other sources) is usually coloured 
in specific ways. As many texts on elite interviews point out, respondents may 
overstate or downplay their own or another actor’s role in certain events, 
rearrange accounts to appear more logical, favourable, or purposeful, omit 
aspects that are (seemingly) unimportant, and more (see Burnham et al., 2007). 
Therefore, criteria for assessment of the interview data are needed. George & 
Bennett (2005) provide a framework (for both interviews and other documents) 
consisting of the questions (i) “Who is speaking?” (ii) “Who are they speaking 
to?” (iii) “For what purpose are they speaking?” and (iv) “Under what 
circumstances?” Others forward similar frameworks (e.g. Dexter 1970, Tansey 
2007). 
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3.4. Generalisations and Validity of Results (Triangulation)  
Without a doubt, the two case studies are at the heart of this thesis, just as the 
interviews are at the heart of each case study. Both interviews and case studies are 
nonetheless embedded in a broader argument. Considering the noted caveats for 
process-tracing methods and interviews, the broader research design serves a crucial 
purpose by corroborating the analysis and validating the observations via 
triangulation through other sources. Besides the theory and methodology in chapters 
2 and 3, both case studies are preceded by a more descriptive account in chapter 4, 
which traces the changes in foreign aid policies over more than a decade. The case 
studies are then succeeded by chapter, which discusses possible other and additional 
causes, interprets and weighs the findings in the broader context. These steps of (i) 
description, (ii) explanation, and (iii) interpretation roughly correspond to the phases 
of case study design for theory development as formulated by George and Bennett:  
In phase one, the objectives, design, and structure of the research are 
formulated. In phase two, each case study is carried out in accordance with the 
design. In phase three, the researcher draws upon the findings of the case 
studies and assesses their contribution to achieve the research objective of the 
study. (2005, p. 73) 
Chapter 4 uses available data and descriptive statistics to illustrate the changes in 
foreign aid policies over recent years. The aim is to give an outline of the effect of 
the hypothesised paradigm change by, first, investigating in more detail the 
principles and changes advocated by the aid effectiveness agenda and the PD in 
particular and, second, interrogating available data for changes in the practices of 
foreign aid over time that agree with the aid effectiveness agenda. Chapter 4 
therefore addresses the question of what needs to be explained, upon which 
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subsequent analysis builds. By rendering the effects, limits, and dynamics of changes 
in foreign aid in recent years, chapter 4 also informs the design and structure of the 
case studies.  
Chapters 5 and 6, which contain the case studies, are explanatory in nature. The 
cases offer causal analysis through within-case tracing of processes and causal 
mechanisms to address the primary research question: How did IOs shape the 
emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda? 
Chapters 7 and 8 interpret and assess the causal analysis in the broader 
perspectives of aid practice and IR theory respectively. While generalisations from 
within-case study analysis are subject to certain limitations and caveats in the 
philosophy of the social sciences, the question remains of what the research means 
for policy and theory; i.e.: Why is this analysis important? 
Chapter Method of inquiry Data Procedures of 
validity 
4 Descriptive Statistics Aid statistics, notably by 
the OECD itself 
Statistical measures 
of validity  
5 & 6 Case Studies Elite interviews 
supported by analysis of 
documents 
Triangulation 
7 & 8 Interpretation, 
Comparison with larger 
universe  
Chapters 4, 5, & 6.  Peer review, 
credibility of prior 
data collection 
Table 3  Overall Structure of the Argument in this Thesis (Source: Author's creation) 
This structures the overall argument in this thesis. Moreover, the outline allows 
for three checks, or precautions, to ensure the validity of the argument and to 
mitigate the caveat of cognitive bias inherent to all small-N and single-case studies, 
including those in this thesis. This includes a bias for overconfidence in causal 
explanations and a tendency to assume that causes resemble consequences in terms 
of scale, scope, or complexity (George and Bennett 2005, p. 112). Or, as Ruback 
! ! ! ,-!
writes on the threat of cognitive bias: “The process-tracing method tracks causal 
sequences so effectively because the structure of the prose positions and predisposes 
the narrator to discover causal sequences” (2010, p. 491).  
 
3.5. Chapter 3 Conclusion 
This thesis investigates how IOs, as active participants in world affairs, 
successfully set political agendas that potentially shape and constrain national policy 
preferences. This research interest is motivated by the observation of the impact of 
that the aid effectiveness paradigm had on foreign aid policies in the past decade. 
The research interest is not primarily motivated by the epistemological cleavages and 
debates in academic scholarship. As a consequence, this chapter’s overview of 
methodology focuses on the overall “fit” of the chosen research methods with the 
nature of the study and its original contribution to the literature.  
At the core of the thesis are the two case studies on the OECD DAC and the 
World Bank, both of which are pursued in “the epistemology of causal mechanisms 
and the methodology of process-tracing” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 129). This 
thesis therefore does not present a comparative case study design, but an 
investigation of causal mechanism within the selected case studies. This 
methodology was chosen to address the main question of “how” certain changes in 
foreign aid policies are outcomes of the strategic agency of these IOs in a specific 
historical context. The latter is investigated by giving special attention to the scope 
conditions, which determine and influence the causal mechanisms at work; i.e. that 
activities and efforts of IOs that project their influence on foreign aid policy. 
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Conversely, a focus on within-case-study process tracing, such as the one chosen 
for this study, necessarily deemphasises aspirations to predictive theories and 
nomological generalisations. To account for these drawbacks, the case studies 
themselves are embedded in a broader three-step research design that covers (i) the 
description of the effect to be explained, (ii) the evidence presented in two case 
studies to provide explanation, and (iii) the discussion and interpretation of findings. 
Even though this thesis does not aspire to formulate a universal, predictive theory of 
IO political agency, procedures of validity at each step help ensure validity of the 
findings overall. 
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Chapter 4 – The Changing Landscape of Foreign Aid 
Have foreign aid policies changed in recent years? If so, how have they changed? 
Are there observable changes in policy, which align with the principles laid out by 
the 2005 Paris Declaration (PD) and the aid effectiveness agenda? Chapter 4 
explores OECD data on foreign aid, specifically, bilateral aid by donors organised 
within the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, to provide a 
descriptive answer to the above questions. These answers are descriptive because 
this chapter uses univariate time series analysis to provide a snapshot of specific 
policy changes that agree with the aid effectiveness agenda, but does not – on a 
methodological level – explore correlations or causality.  
Chapter 4 does not provide quantitative multivariate analysis to confirm or refute 
the research hypotheses of this thesis. Instead, chapter 4 takes a consciously 
descriptive approach to provide a sense of scale and timing to the broader changes in 
foreign aid policies in the context of the aid effectiveness agenda. Having established 
this context, the case studies in chapters 5 and 6 then focus in greater detail and 
specificity on the role the OECD DAC and the World Bank played in shaping the aid 
effectiveness agenda as it exists today. 
Chapter 4 proceeds in three steps: First it revisits the PD to identify a selection of 
key recommendations for donor policies to improve aid effectiveness. Second, it 
explores the data via four dimensions of foreign aid, which correspond to these 
recommendations. These dimensions are (i) project- vs. programme-based aid; (ii) 
general and sector-budget support as a variant of programme-based aid; (iii) tied vs. 
untied aid; and (iv) technical cooperation (TC). Where applicable, I test the data for 
structural breaks to identify significant changes in their application over time. The 
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third and final part interprets the findings both in light of the previous chapters and 
with respect to the OECD DAC and World Bank case studies in chapters 5 and 6. 
 
4.1. The Policy Recommendations of the Paris Declaration 
The first step to mapping policy reforms sympathetic to the recommendations of 
the aid effectiveness agenda, based on available data on foreign aid, is to clarify 
exactly what changes the aid agenda advocates. A crucial observation is that the aid 
effectiveness agenda, including the PD and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action 
(AAA), is not immediately concerned with the effectiveness of foreign aid in aid-
receiving countries. Rather, the provisions in these documents reflect a broad 
agreement that the global institutional architecture of foreign aid is flawed and in 
need of reform (see Birdsall 2004; Goody 2009).  
As a consequence, the aid effectiveness agenda seeks to improve the design, the 
delivery and the management of foreign aid. The promoted reforms build on the 
broad consensus underpinning the aid effectiveness agenda that foreign aid is more 
effective when recipients “take ownership” of aid programmes, when development 
policy is less hamstrung by conditionality of donors and when aid is not tied to the 
purchase of specific goods and services (Birdsall 2004). In addition, the 
effectiveness of foreign aid is argued to improve if donors minimise the strain of 
bureaucratic and administrative processes of foreign aid on the (usually) scarce 
administrative resources of aid recipients, notably by coordinating their development 
assistance to a greater degree (Jain 2007). Thus, while the ultimate aim of the PD is 
to improve aid to maximise its benefits to the poor, the immediate focus is clearly on 
the processes of managing aid, rather than on the impact of foreign aid (e.g. Roberts 
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2009). Even as it shares many of the same overall goals of improving the impact of 
aid on people’s lives, the emphasis on design, delivery and management in the aid 
effectiveness literature sets it apart from the no-less-vivid debates on whether aid 
actually works (e.g. Sachs 2005) or works sufficiently often (e.g. Easterly 2003).  
Three clarifications are needed before developing measures to map relevant 
policy changes among donor countries: First, by setting out to measure reforms of 
donor country policies, this study is unrelated to the vast literature on what 
constitutes (more) effective aid against measures of growth or poverty reduction (e.g. 
Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009). Second, this thesis does not attempt to answer the 
question of whether the PD succeeded in making foreign aid more effective in 
reducing poverty or stimulating growth. Finally, the analysis in this chapter 
concentrates on policy changes undertaken by donor governments – as opposed to 
changes in the implementation of foreign aid in recipient countries – that align with 
the principles of the aid effectiveness agenda.  
What then are the essential aims of the aid effectiveness agenda this chapter seeks 
to identify? As previously noted, the most iconic representation of the aid 
effectiveness agenda is the PD. It is reasonable to assume that most donors, members 
of aid agencies and IOs, as well as many scholars in the field refer to the 2005 Paris 
Declaration, its principles, and follow-up documents like the AAA when they talk 
about aid effectiveness (Roberts 2009). The PD represents an effort to address long-
standing aid-related issues, and to provide formal recognition of the principles of aid 
effectiveness. Most of these have been the subjects of aid policy debates since the 
1990s. Endorsed by over 100 governments and IOs, the PD is, in essence, an 
agreement on five principles of aid effectiveness (OECD 2005; also Goody 2009): 
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• Ownership: Countries receiving aid should set development priorities, coordinate 
aid activities in their countries, and generally be the architects of all aid-related 
processes. Donors commit to supporting this and to building necessary capacities 
in recipient countries. 
• Alignment: Donors need to align their aid with recipient countries’ systems and 
procedures as much as possible, again with the specific intention to build capacity. 
Recipient countries in turn should improve transparency and their management of 
aid.  
• Harmonisation: Donors need to coordinate their efforts. This includes, wherever 
feasible, common arrangements and procedures for planning, funding, and 
reporting. Donors should also simplify procedures and reduce their missions and 
reviews.  
• Managing for Results: All aid should be implemented in ways that focus on 
results, result-oriented reporting, and transparent performance assessments. 
• Mutual Accountability: Donors and recipients need to enhance their reciprocal 
accounts of the use of foreign aid. Recipients should strengthen oversight by 
institutions like parliaments, while donors should provide accurate and timely 
information on aid flows. 
On the basis of these principles, the PD outlines 12 indicators that are “to be 
measured nationally and monitored internationally” (OECD 2005). However, the 
PD’s distribution of indicators across the five principles is highly uneven. More than 
half of the indicators, along with several sub-indicators, measure the goal of 
Alignment, often very precisely. Harmonisation is a distant second. In contrast, 
measurements for other principles, such as the lone indicator for Mutual 
Accountability, are far more spare, and often little more than restatements of the 
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original principles. Not coincidentally, the PD’s principles of alignment and 
harmonization are the more controversial and more in terms of the design of donors’ 
aid policies. Although investigating these two principles in isolation is a 
simplification of the aid effectiveness agenda, and even of the Paris Declaration 
itself, these principles encompass most of the policy changes that appear to run 
against a broadly realist conception of rational states, constraining the ability of 
governments to spend foreign aid in line with their unilateral interests, making them 
the most relevant policy reforms to illustrate with respect to the overall aim of this 
thesis.  
To proceed, I first briefly review the existing literature comparing the foreign aid 
practices of donors. Second, I discuss four variants, or modes, of foreign aid found at 
the heart of the advocacy for the alignment of donors. 
 
4.1.1. Previous Work on Measuring Foreign Aid Quality and Practice 
Before setting out to measure changes in foreign aid concurring with the aid 
effectiveness principles, I briefly discuss previous research undertaken in this field. 
Efforts in this direction (often predating the PD) come primarily from economics in 
the form of studies aiming to assess and compare foreign aid by donor countries on 
measures other than relative or absolute quantities of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA).  
One such study by Paul Mosley (1985) looks at several criteria, including 
selectivity of donors across and within aid recipient countries, as well as degrees of 
concessionality and conditionality. Mark McGillivray (1989) and Mark McGillivray 
and Howard White (1994) focus on different ways of using the per capita incomes of 
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aid recipients as a measure of donor performance by basing aid allocation on the 
relative needs of recipient countries. More recently, David Dollar and Victoria Levin 
(2004) rank 41 bilateral and multilateral donors with respect to a “policy selectivity 
index” (2004, p. 5), which measures the extent that the institutional and policy 
environment of recipient countries is taken into account in the design of foreign aid. 
Unlike many other studies, Dollar and Levin (2006) also compare different periods 
and find that selectivity has increased over the last 20 years. Easterly and Pfutze 
characterise and measure four dimensions of an ideal aid agency. These four 
dimensions include:  
[…] specialization, or the degree to which aid is not fragmented among too 
many donors, too many countries and too many sectors for each donor; 
selectivity, or the extent to which aid avoids corrupt autocrats and goes to the 
poorest countries; use of ineffective aid channels such as tied aid, food aid, and 
technical assistance, and the overhead costs of aid agencies (ibid., 2008)  
David Roodman (2009) aims to replace a strict focus on volumes of foreign aid 
with a quality-adjusted metric for aid. Knack et al. introduce 18 indicators of donor 
practice, including those “that reflect the Paris Declaration in a more comprehensive 
and representative way” (ibid, 2010). Nancy Birdsall and Homi Kharas (2010) 
launched a biennial assessment measuring the quality of ODA on 30 indicators over 
four dimensions: maximising efficiency, fostering institutions, reducing burden, 
transparency, and learning. The OECD DAC’s surveys for monitoring the PD from 
the years 200610, 200811, and, 2011 feature strongly in many of the above studies.  
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10 http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_38521876_1_1_1_1,00.html  
11 http://www.oecd.org/document/0/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_41203264_1_1_1_1,00.html  
 (Accessed on 21 March 2014) 
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How useful are these studies for this thesis? Although all of these studies make 
inspirational use of the available data, methodology, and findings, their overall aim 
differs from the objectives of the research presented in this thesis. Notably, and 
including the older studies that pre-date the PD, these works are without exception 
concerned with “the relative aid giving performance of aid donors” (McGillivray, 
1989) and how foreign aid should be “evaluated and compared across donors” 
(Knack et al., 2010) by measures other than the quantity of aid given. Thus, the 
academic and the grey literature in this field often adopts a logic that is not dissimilar 
to an OECD peer review of comparative rankings and ratings, either as aggregates 
(Easterly and Pfutze 2008, Knack et al., 2010) or in partially (e.g., Birdsall and 
Kharas 2010), at a given point in time. Usually only passing references are made to 
developments over time and studies that postdate the PD have a tendency to accept 
and adopt the provision of the OECD DAC itself as unequivocal insights, even 
though the value of many of the changes it advocates are at least contested (see 
Riddell, 2007). In some cases, they are even potentially contradictory, as in the case 
of selectivity measures that assess aid targeted at either the poorest nations or those 
that are governed well, or both.  
In contrast, this chapter is concerned with the changes in donors’ foreign aid 
policies addressed by the aid effectiveness agenda over time, compared to five or ten 
years before, and not with comparison of how donors measure up vis-à-vis each 
other.  
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4.1.2. Mapping the Paris Principle of Alignment in Policy Reforms 
The PD itself opens with the statement of the signatories that “[w]e reaffirm the 
commitments made at Rome12 to harmonise and align aid delivery.” It therefore 
builds on the reasoning that “we believe they [the core principles] will increase the 
impact aid has in reducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building 
capacity and accelerating achievement of the MDGs [Millennium Development 
Goals]” (OECD, 2005). Given these objectives of the PD, changes in foreign aid that 
agree with the aid effectiveness agenda and the PD’s principles of alignment and 
harmonisation constitute shifts in the mode of foreign aid delivery. Specifically, the 
PD promotes policy changes that steer foreign aid away from project aid and 
freestanding technical cooperation (TC) and towards programme-based approaches 
(PD § 16-21), including general and sector budget support, a further untying of aid 
(PD § 31), and a reduction in classical technical assistance in favour of TC designed 
to emphasise a transfer of knowledge.  
Project-based aid: Project aid refers to stand-alone donor projects, for example to 
build schools or irrigation systems. Projects usually target a specific purpose, and 
can be executed autonomously from other development efforts. Accountability is 
tied to the specific projects, which tend to be highly controlled by donor agencies 
and experts. This traditional form of aid offers significant advantages to donor 
countries: These aid programs are easy to evaluate, can alleviate specific problems, 
and provide visibility to the donor and agency, which is in turn useful in promoting 
results in both the recipient country and constituencies back home (Goody 2009, p. 
7). The aid effectiveness agenda, on the other hand, tends to argue against project aid 
for several valid reasons: Project-based aid often fails to build local expertise and 
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12 High-Level Forum on Harmonization held in Rome in February 2003 
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ownership, resulting in a lack of sustainability beyond the duration of the project 
itself. Projects can increase administrative costs and the reporting burden for 
recipients. Limited donor collaboration often leads to a duplication of activities. 
Programme-based aid: At its broadest, programme aid is all aid that is not project 
aid (Riddell 2007, p. 195). Programme-based aid is, in the PD ideal, closely aligned 
with recipient country strategies (such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – 
PRSP). Programme-based aid can support specific sectors such as education, health 
care, or agriculture in the form of a sector-wide approach (SWAp). Donors 
increasingly seek to contribute to the goals and objectives of a government 
expenditure programme, as well by pooling their aid funds. The aid effectiveness 
agenda argues that programme-based approaches to aid, such as SWAps, facilitate an 
alignment with local systems, may strengthen local capacity and donor collaboration, 
and generally lessen administrative burdens and transaction costs. Therefore:  
(1) A relative increase in programme-based aid over project-based aid agrees 
with the aid effectiveness agenda. 
 
Direct Budget Support: Direct budget support (DBS) is an emerging form of 
programme aid. In DBS, financial aid is provided directly to the central treasury of 
the recipient country “to spend using its own financial management, procurement 
and accountability systems” (DFID 2004). DBS may be provided as general budget 
support (GBS), or may be earmarked for a specific sector as sector budget support 
(SBS). In either version, DBS remains controversial. Critics highlight the potential 
for mismanagement of funds, the difficulty for donors to ensure accountability after 
funds become part of a recipient’s revenue stream, violations of donors’ own budget 
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legislation, and concerns about recipient countries’ capacities in financial 
management.  
The development impact of DBS has proven difficult to measure, as tracing the 
effects of foreign aid on poverty and income levels, once it is added the overall 
budget, is challenging (Riddell 2007, p. 200). These caveats, and the political 
sensitivity of DBS, prevent the PD from explicitly advocating DBS beyond a broad 
endorsement. DBS nonetheless remains integral to the aid effectiveness debate, as it 
is regarded as a modality suited to providing more predictable aid in alignment with 
the budgetary cycle (PD § 26; indicators 5 and 7), to reducing administrative and 
transaction costs (PD § 32 indicators 9 & 10), to increasing national ownership, and, 
ideally, to enabling domestic accountability through democratic processes (de 
Renzio, 2006). The PD advocates the inclusion of all aid in the budget process. 
Although this encompasses more than budget support (OECD 2009, p. 52), it is 
reasonable to conclude that DBS is an aid modality that agrees with the aid 
effectiveness paradigm. Therefore:  
(2) Greater use of direct budget support agrees with the aid effectiveness agenda.  
 
Tied aid: Tied aid is foreign aid earmarked for the procurement of donor or 
specific-country goods, services or technical expertise. The economic and political 
benefits of tied aid for donors are evident. Conversely, tied aid has been criticised for 
being inefficient, as it increases procurement costs for recipients and potentially 
excludes them from the most effective or efficient solutions. It is generally 
considered to decrease the net impact of aid. The call to untie aid precedes the PD by 
several years, and formal recommendations by the OECD-DAC to untie ODA date 
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back as far as 2001 (Goody 2009). Nevertheless, as the PD argues against tied aid 
(PD § 31) and measures it with its progress indicators, one can conclude that: 
(3) A shift in ODA from tied to untied aid agrees with the aid effectiveness 
paradigm.  
 
Technical Cooperation: Technical cooperation (TC) – the provision of skills, 
knowledge, expertise and advice – continues to be a major component of ODA. 
According to OECD statistics, expenditures for TC accounted for 36% of all bilateral 
aid in 2004, and this number still excludes the technical support provided for 
implementation of capital projects (Riddell 2007, p. 202). TC is a central element of 
foreign aid, which may further blur the distinction between project- and programme-
based foreign aid.  
Traditional TC, the transfer of skills and knowledge, is widely seen to have been 
ineffective and recently underwent its own paradigm shift, including shifts in its 
terminology13. Through a series of assessments of TC, including, notably, the 
OECD-DAC Guidelines on Technical Cooperation, TC was found to be too 
fragmented to create sustainable systemic capacity in developing countries, and 
might even have contributed to preventing the emergence of sustained local 
capacities (OECD 2002, pp. 51-61). Consequently, TC has been redirected towards 
“capacity development”, understood officially as “the process whereby people, 
organisations and societies as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain 
capacity over time” (OECD 2006, p. 9). The precise concept of capacity 
development is often no less ambiguous in many respects. The reform impetus, as 
formulated by the OECD DAC, occasionally even risks tautology, as “effective” TC 
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13 A more complete overview of these changes is given by Roger Riddell (2007, p. 202+) 
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is in turn defined via the PD principles and the definition of “capacity development”. 
Nonetheless, a majority of donors have taken steps to reform their TC as a way of 
improving the effectiveness of aid (see DFID 2006, EC 2008). The PD measures a 
shift towards programme-based TC with indicator 4, as well as a reduction in so-
called parallel project implementation units (PIU) with indicator 6. Therefore: 
(4) A reduction in uncoordinated TC agrees with the aid effectiveness paradigm. 
 
4.2.  Mapping Policy Changes Sympathetic to the Paris Declaration 
This section explores available data on foreign aid along the four outlined 
dimensions of (i) project- vs. programme-based aid, (ii) budget support, (iii) tying 
status of aid, and (iv) the use of technical cooperation. The objective is to verify or 
refute changes in the practice of foreign aid over time with respect to the changes 
expected in response to the aid effectiveness agenda. The universe of data for this 
study includes the bilateral aid of the 23 DAC-member countries14 and the European 
Commission. It excludes non-DAC donors (even if they report data to the DAC, as 
in the case with Turkey, Israel and some Easter European states, among others), both 
because there is less data available about them and because this thesis emphasises 
the discursive influence of the OECD DAC and the World Bank on its members. 
Unavoidably, this neglects some aspects and countries – for example, Saudi Arabia, 
which is not a DAC member, though a very prominent donor to the World Bank.  
The DAC member countries included in this analysis contribute the majority of 
global aid. ODA by DAC members peaked in 2010 at about $129 billion USD, 
delivered through 156 bilateral and 263 multilateral agencies (Birdsall and Kharas 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14   The member countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA and the EC 
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2010). In 2011, members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
OECD provided $133.5 billion USD of net official development assistance (ODA), 
representing 0.31% of their combined gross national income (GNI). This was a 2.7% 
drop in real terms compared to 2010. Development aid fell by another four % in real 
terms in 2012, when the members of the OECD DAC provided $125.6 billion in not 
ODA.15 In contrast, the aggregate ODA of non-DAC donors amounts to about $6 
billion USD; with Saudi Arabia on record as the largest non-DAC donor disbursing 
about $2 billion USD of ODA a year. Here, as well, the caveat applies that data on 
aid from emerging donors like China or India is scarce. A total of 21 multilateral 
institutions report their aid to the DAC and appear in its database. Unless otherwise 
noted, this thesis uses data for bilateral ODA (which includes the EC). 
 
4.2.1. A Note on Methodology 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to note important caveats on the data and the 
methods employed in the following sections. The purpose of this chapter is to 
illustrate and describe changes in foreign aid policies in donor countries that may be 
considered to be sympathetic to the provisions of the aid effectiveness agenda.  
It is not the aim of this chapter to use quantitative methods to prove causality 
between the aid effectiveness agenda and these policy changes, for several reasons. 
First, as previously noted, the main emphasis of this thesis is on the formation, 
shape, and nature of the aid effectiveness agenda itself, and not on its impact on 
donor policies. Second, this thesis explores the complex processes that helped shape 
the aid effectiveness agenda in the case studies on the OECD DAC (chapter 5) and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15  OECD ‘Aid to poor countries slips further as governments tighten budgets’, [online]: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/aidtopoorcountriesslipsfurtherasgovernmentstightenbudgets.htm 
(Accessed 30 March 2014)!!
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the World Bank (chapter 6). There is no evident method by which the “strategic 
social construction” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 p. 888) that, this thesis argues, 
underpins IOs’ efforts to shape the aid effectiveness agenda could be distilled into 
one or more quantitative indicators suited for regression analysis. Finally, the 
available data is too limited for any robust quantitative argument. Between 1996 and 
2009, the statistical database of the DAC only provides 14 data points – too few to 
achieve statistically significant results. This chapter cannot demonstrate causality, or 
even correlation. At best, it can demonstrate contemporaneousness of certain policy 
reforms with the aid effectiveness agenda, and even in this attempt the 
methodological tools are limited. A good example here is the attempt to pin down 
structural breaks in univariate time series. More sophisticated tests, such as the Chow 
Test for structural stability (Chow 1960), rely on splitting a time series regression 
into two separate regressions, testing whether two separate models are better at 
explaining the dependent variable than a single model. In the 14-year time series 
used in this chapter, with a “break”, if it exists, expected around 2005/2006, these 
separate models could encompass as few as three data points (2006 – 2009).!
For all these reasons, the scientific value of the description in this chapter should 
not be exaggerated. The discussion found in this chapter aims to provide a sense of 
context for the change commonly referred to in association with the aid effectiveness 
agenda. The latter may be the effect of a variety of causes – indeed, chapter 7 
discusses several possible variants – and neither the design of this chapter, nor the 
quality of the data or the choice of methods employed here, is truly suited to argue 
causality in a scientific sense.!
  
! ! ! %F)!
4.2.2. Project- versus Programme-based aid 
First, once again, a further clarification is required regarding the data employed in 
this section, specifically the data on programme-based aid in this instance. Not least 
as a result of the PD, the DAC reformed and relabelled its Creditor Reporting 
System (CRS) in 2010, introducing new classifications for the types of aid measured 
in its CRS database16. These new classifications include improved measurements for 
programme-based approaches (PBA) and other forms of programme-based aid, 
which are based on donors reporting these directly according to the criteria defined 
by the DAC. The drawback is that this new aid classification, as it exists in this 
format in the CRS-database today, is only available for the years 2010 and after. This 
data is obviously useless for time-series analysis that seeks to analyse trends over a 
longer period, especially over a period covering both the time before the 2005 Paris 
Declaration and after. The time series analysis on programme-aid and project-aid 
presented below thus draws on the old, discontinued CRS classifications for 
programme-aid and project-based aid. These were derived measures (as opposed to 
measures reported directly), and are likely inferior to the new classification. 
However, it is the only data available that allows a longer-term time-series as 
presented here. The data itself is annexed to this thesis (electronic version only). 
The OECD DAC’s CRS database reports an impressive growth in programme aid 
over this time period. Measured in constant 2009 USD millions, programme aid 
multiplied nearly tenfold from about $1.954 million USD, or just 5.7% of bilateral 
ODA in 1996, to $30.048 million USD, or 31,0% of bilateral ODA in 2009. Between 
2006 and 2007, programme aid more than doubled from $11.618 millions USD to 
$24.738 million USD in one year alone. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 http://www.oecd.org/investment/aidstatistics/44479737.pdf (Accessed 30 March 2014) 
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Overall bilateral ODA includes many measures, including humanitarian aid, 
which tends to spike after disasters, debt forgiveness, food aid, and much more. For 
a more accurate picture, therefore, I assess programme aid as a share of only project- 
and programme-based aid as given by the (old) CRS database. Here, likewise, one 
finds both absolute and relative increases in programme-based aid, rising from about 
19.1% of the total of both programme and project-based aid 1996 to over 70.1% of 
the total of both aid-modalities in 2009 (see Figure 3 and Table 4 below). 
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Figure 2   Programme-Based Aid and Total DAC ODA (Bilateral) in Constant 2008 USD Millions 
Figure 3 Programme Aid relative to Programme + Project-Based Aid in Constant 2009 USD 
Millions 
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Year Programme-Aid 
(2009 constant USD 
Millions) 
Project & Programme-
Aid (2009 constant USD 
Millions) 
Programme-Aid as 
% of both 
Programme & 
Project-based Aid 
1996 1954.191767 10178.94707 19.20% 
1997 1395.204443 6889.079308 20.25% 
1998 2515.172768 7144.701107 35.20% 
1999 2929.889554 7231.889868 40.51% 
2000 2873.307399 7248.997075 39.64% 
2001 3700.512941 7397.840292 50.02% 
2002 3867.101525 8269.10931 46.77% 
2003 5741.715837 11389.14172 50.41% 
2004 9424.869094 17197.59325 54.80% 
2005 11325.14216 21952.44628 51.59% 
2006 11618.33492 22579.20085 51.46% 
2007 24738.81066 35394.93439 69.89% 
2008 30044.64221 46624.37188 64.44% 
2009 30048.67 42847.99 70.13% 
Table 4  Programme Aid Relative to Programme + Project-Based Aid in Constant 2009 USD 
Millions (Source of Data: OECD DAC. See Annex 2 [electronic version only]) 
The rapid growth of commitments made to programme aid from 2006 onward 
opens up the possibility of a structural break (Hendry 1995) in 2005, with a 
significant impact on programme aid. This possibility is tested by an OLS regression 
of the programme aid commitments (yt) dependent on overall bilateral ODA (xt) and 
a trend variable (zt) that takes the value 0 for the years leading up to 2005 and adds 1 
for every year thereafter: "#!훼"#$%푥푡#$%푧#&#!!                                                                                    
Estimation method OLS  coefficient std. error       t-ratio p-value  
α0  (constant)  -3198.44 3124.49 -1.024 0.3280  
xt   (bilateral ODA) 
z    (trend variable) 
0.164233 
5504.54 
0.051267
2 
891.024 
3.203 
6.178 
0.0084 
6.93e-05 
*** 
*** 
Mean dependent 
variable 
9644.179  S.D. dependent 
variable 
7438.717 
Sum of squared 
residuals 
063579063  S.E. of regression 2404.145 
R-squared  0.911616  Adjusted R-squared 0.895546 
F(2, 11)  56.72830  P-value (F) 1.60e-06 
Durbin-Watson 1.958347    
Table 5  Time Series Regression (Dependent Variable = Programme Aid) Test for Structural 
Break (Source: Author’s calculations) 
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The model yields a significant-if-small β0-coefficient for the effect of bilateral 
ODA on programme aid of 0.164233, and a not-significant intercept α0. The trend 
variable for the years following 2006 is significant. With an R2 over 0.91, the model 
with trend variable explains a lot of variation in programme aid, pointing to a shift in 
2005/2006. A Durbin-Watson statistic near two suggests no auto-correlated errors. 
Overall – with all the caveats regarding the quality of data and simplicity of 
methods, as outlined in 4.2.1. – there appears to be evidence that programme-based 
aid increased significantly in absolute and relative terms around the time the PD 
started drawing political attention to the advantages of programme aid over project-
based aid.  
A further caveat could be that the data represents a change in reporting by donor 
countries as much as actual changes in aid practices. The latter could well be among 
the reasons why the DAC changed its CRS. However, even if the analysis above 
pictures strategic changes in reporting as much as actual changes, it still 
demonstrates the political impact of the aid effectiveness agenda in donor countries. 
 
4.2.2. Budget Support 
Global trends in using budget support as an aid modality are difficult to measure 
and to interpret vis-à-vis the aid effectiveness agenda. On one hand, direct budget 
support (DBS) has many proponents in the broader aid effectiveness literature (e.g. 
Koeberle et al. 2006, Cordella and Dell'Ariccia 2007); on the other, budget support is 
not explicitly included as one of the PD’s progress indicators for aid effectiveness.  
An important reason for this is that that DBS remains a politically and legally 
controversial subject for many donors, and assessing the true (potential) impact of 
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budget support has proven to be elusive (see Riddell 2007, p. 198+). Consequently, 
some independent rankings chose to include DBS as a measure in their indicators 
(e.g., Knack et al., 2010), while a number of others do not (e.g. Birdsall and Kharas 
2010), preferring instead more inclusive measures such as country programmable aid 
(CPA). As DBS is broadly endorsed by the aid effectiveness agenda, it is explicitly 
included to present a measure for an issue of tension between the aid effectiveness 
agenda and donor preferences. 
As noted above, OECD DAC data on budget support preceding the Paris 
Declaration is scarce and usually based on derived measures. In figure 4 below, 
ODA commitments (not disbursements) marked with the DAC 5 code 510 for GBS 
(OECD 2012a) have been retrieved from the OECD’s aggregated aid database. All 
amounts are in constant 2010 USD millions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Donor commitments to GBS have fluctuated heavily over the past 15 years, rising 
from a low of $435.2 million USD – or 0.92% of all bilateral ODA commitments – 
in 1996 to a peak of $7,430.7 million USD – or 6.76% of bilateral ODA 
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General Budget Support (DAC 5 Code 510)  
Figure 4  General Budget Support (GBS) Committed by DAC Members in Constant 2010 USD 
Millions (Source: stats.oecd.org; access 31/03/2014) 
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commitments – in 2009. Moreover, there appears to be a sharp drop in GBS, both 
absolute and relative, in 2010, which cannot be fully explained by this thesis at this 
point.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
While GBS was recorded in the old OECD DAC data, if only in commitments, 
sector budget support (SBS) is a more elusive aid modality to track. For one, donor 
practices do not truly reflect the DAC’s sharp distinction between GBS and SBS. 
Arguably, it would be more realistic to describe SBS as an intermediate category 
covering the spectrum between GBS and SWAps (Koeberle and Stavreski 2006), 
often with fluid transitions. Indeed, as Handley (2009, p. 12) notes, the DAC’s 
definition of SBS is only one variant of SBS as defined by different donors. 
One way to circumvent this in the data, which predates the year 2010, is to 
calculate SBS indirectly, based on an inclusive (i.e. non-DAC) conception of SBS as 
more-or-less anything between SWAps and GBS in programme-based aid. A 
measure of this type for SBS is calculated below. It starts from bilateral DAC 
commitments for project and programme-based aid (excluding TC, food aid, debt 
relief, etc.) and subtracts total commitments for (i) project aid, (ii) SWAPs, and (iii) 
GBS on the same scale as available on the DAC’s CRS database. The result can be 
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GBS as % of Bilateral DAC ODA Commitments 
Figure 5  GBS as % of Bilateral DAC ODA Commitments 
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seen as an approximation of SBS commitments in constant 2008 US dollars. 
Assuming that the ratio of SBS to overall project- and programme-based aid remains 
constant both in commitments and actual disbursements, an approximation of SBS 
disbursements can be calculated, based on this ratio and the available data. 
This measure of SBS is an approximation at best. It is not independent of the 
measures on programme-based approaches introduced earlier – methodologically 
because it is derived from the same data, theoretically because significant conceptual 
overlaps occur in donors’ definitions of SBS and programme-based aid more 
generally. Even so, with these caveats in mind, there is a significant upward trend in 
SBS committed and (presumably) disbursed after 2006 as shown in figure 6 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The pronounced trend in these data again points towards the presence of a break. 
As before, lacking sufficient data for robust tests like the Chow Test, I test for this 
break by an OLS regression that uses the calculated variable for committed sector 
budget support (yt) as dependent variable and the combined commitments to project 
and programme-based aid (xt) and a trend variable (z) as independent variables.  
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Figure 6  Approximation of Committed and Disbursed Sector Budget Support (SBS) in Constant 
2008 USD Millions (Source: Author’s Calculations) 
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Estimation method OLS  coefficient std. 
error 
t-ratio p-value  
α0  
(constant) 
 5911.49 3161.01 1.870 0.0883 * 
xt   (project & 
programme) 
z    (trend variable) 
-
0.0966206 
6602.93 
0.137474 
1631.88 
-0.7028 
4.046 
0.4968 
0.0019 
 
*** 
Mean dependent variable 6170.698  S.D. dependent 
variable 
5871.347 
Sum of squared residuals 84507296  S.E. of regression 2771.729 
R-squared  0.811429  Adjusted R-squared 0.777143 
F(2, 11)  23.66670  P-value (F) 0.000104 
Durbin-Watson 1.982385    
Table 6 Time Series Regression (Dependent Variable = Committed Sector Budget Support) 
Test for Structural Break (Source: Author’s Calculations) 
As with the previous OLS tests, no robust explanatory model for the changes is 
evident, as no significant independent variable is identified that explains variations 
of the dependent variable. However, the inverse is informative to the degree that 
SBS commitments appear unrelated to project- and programme-based aid 
commitments (though with an intercept ≠ 0), yet are strongly and significantly 
determined by the dummy variable created to test for a structural break in 
2005/2006. As before, a Durbin-Watson statistic close to two suggests no 
autocorrelated errors in the model. 
 
4.2.3. Tied aid  
The call to untie foreign aid today is closely related to the aid effectiveness 
agenda, though it predates the PD. A recent OECD publication defines tied aid as 
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Official Grants or loans where procurement of the goods and services involved 
is limited to the donor country or a group of countries which does not include 
substantially all aid recipient countries. (OECD 2010, p. 275) 
Although the proclamation to untie foreign aid is now a part of the PD (§ 31), the 
first formal recommendation for untying of aid to least developed countries (LDC) 
was first issued by the OECD DAC in 2001. The UK, to name one example, banned 
tied aid with its international development act of 2002. Of all 12 progress-indicators 
of the PD, indicator 8, on untying bilateral aid, is the only one without a deadline or 
benchmark against which to measure. Many indices, such as the Centre for Global 
Development’s Commitment to Development Index (CDI), explicitly include tied 
aid as a negative measure, further stressing the negative association of tied aid. The 
subject is also characteristic of the aid effectiveness debate insofar as the untying of 
aid runs against a straightforward, realist perspective on foreign aid, which would 
assume that states maximise their commercial and political benefits, promote 
exports, and create access to foreign markets for domestic firms through tied aid. 
Conversely, once states such as the UK have unilaterally banned tied aid for 
whatever reason, they have an incentive to bind other counties to the same standard. 
Ultimately, a broad consensus among foreign aid policymakers indicates that tied 
aid is undesirable, usually on the basis of economic models that predict that 
recipients of tied aid will likely be overcharged for the goods they are compelled to 
purchase. However, reviews of the literature, such as by Clay et al. (2009), note that 
“there have been very few empirical investigations into the relative effectiveness of 
untied and tied aid on a comparable basis, or of the impacts of the actual untying of 
aid” (2009, p. 28). More recent studies, notably by Stephen Knack and Lodewijk 
Smets (2012), argue that the inefficiencies and, crucially, high levels of corruption in 
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the procurement routines of developing countries may outweigh the gains of untied 
aid. 
For gauging the prevalence of tied aid, the OECD DAC relies on two different 
measures. One is based on donor commitments recorded in its CRS-database (with 
untied aid between 71% and 91% of bilateral ODA over 15 years), and one is based 
on recipient-country surveys in its monitoring of the PD (with untied aid at 75% of 
ODA in 2005 and 88% of ODA in 2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In preparing for the fourth High Level Forum (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness in 
Korea in 2011, the OECD DAC listed the untying of aid as one of three areas in 
which aid effectiveness made the most progress
17
. Nevertheless, the DAC’s data on 
the tying status of (committed) foreign aid provides little basis for this assessment. 
While the overall share of tied aid has decreased significantly since the 1970s (see 
Easterly 2007), the share of tied aid of DAC members’ bilateral ODA since the late 
1990s has fluctuated, without a clear trend, between 25.43% (1996) and 6.75% 
                                                             
17
 www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_46057868_1_1_1_1,00.html (Accessed 30 
March 2014) 
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Figure 7  Tied, Partially Tied and Untied Aid as % of Total Bilateral ODA Commitments of DAC 
Members (Source: stats.oecd.org; Access 31/03/2014) 
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(2005) of all bilateral ODAC, even increasing again after 2006 (figure 8 below). 
Given the overall rise of bilateral ODA until 2010, the slight rise in tied aid in 
relative terms means, in absolute terms, that tied aid multiplied from $2.345 million 
USD in 2003 to over $13,346 million USD in 2010. 
The strong fluctuations in levels of US-aid in this period, by itself the source of 
over 60% of all tied aid (Clay et al. 2009), makes this a thin empirical base for 
judging larger trends in tied aid. Although untied aid in absolute terms has declined 
rapidly in recent years, its relative share of all bilateral ODA stayed roughly the 
same.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One more reliable indicator that DAC members do indeed pursue a policy of 
reducing tied aid is the rate of growth of untied aid relative to the growth of all 
bilateral ODA. I calculated these measures for the years from 1997 onward (i = 
1997): ሺͶǤͳሻο௜ൌܱܦܣ௜ െܱܦܣ௜ିଵܱܦܣ௜ିଵ ݓ݄݁ݎ݁ܱܦܣ௧݅ݏݐ݄݁ݏݑ݉݋݂ܱܦܣܿ݋݉݉݅ݐݐ݁݀݅݊ݕ݁ܽݎ݅ 
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Figure 8 DAC Untied Aid to All Bilateral ODA Committed in Constant 2009 US$ Millions 
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As seen in figure 9, untied aid only outgrew overall ODA briefly in 1999 and 
again in the years 2002-2003. These latter years coincide with the DAC’s original 
recommendation to untie aid and the UK’s 2002 international development act.  
In conclusion, the PD arguably picked low-hanging fruit in trying to advocate 
untying of foreign aid, an idea already well-established several years before the PD. 
This does not preclude any influence of the OECD DAC in general, as evidenced by 
the positive trend following the DAC’s earlier 2001 recommendation. As tied aid is 
found unevenly among the different donors, with the USA accounting for more than 
half of all tied aid, transatlantic politics, rather than North-South relations or the 
DAC’s advocacy for untied, could well be the key variable for trends in untied aid.   
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Figure 9  ∆ ODA and ∆ Untied Aid Committed in Constant 2009 US$ Millions 
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4.2.4. Technical Cooperation  
Technical cooperation (TC) – especially as freestanding bilateral projects 
unrelated to investments or implemented through parallel Project Implementation 
Units (PIUs), often with weak links to country development strategies – is widely 
cited as a form of foreign aid at odds with aid effectiveness (EC 2008, Easterly and 
Pfutze 2008, Knack et al. 2010). The OECD DAC (2007) repeatedly criticises TC for 
being too donor driven and identifies it as one of “six major priority areas requiring 
the attention of policy makers in the development field” (2007). Signatories of the 
PD committed to implementing the progress indicators 4 and 6 of the PD, which 
relate to TC practice and the use of parallel PIU structures (OECD 2005). 
Consequently, one would perhaps expect a decline in TC following the PD, as TC 
efforts are discontinued or folded into coordinated programmes, as well as a drop in 
the share of overall bilateral aid as other modalities are given preference. At first 
glance, DAC TC indeed drops between 2006 and 2007 after having increased 
steadily (along with ODA more generally) over the previous 15 years, as seen in 
figure 10.  
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Figure 10  DAC Bilateral TC Disbursements in Constant 2008 US$ Millions 
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This can be deceptive however; figure 11, below, shows continuous growth of 
both ODA and TC, as well as the ratio between these two variables.  
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The specifics are even more ambiguous. The wording of the PD’s progress 
indicator is modest enough for the target to have been achieved easily in 2008 
through both minor reforms (World Bank 2008, p. 21) and a sizable reduction in US 
TC at the time. In addition, the dip in 2007 is explained almost entirely by a 
concurrent drop in overall ODA , which is in turn almost entirely due to the effect of 
a drop in US ODA and project assistance (see Annex 2). The ratio of TC in overall 
ODA hovers around a steady average of 23%, declining in recent years from its 
overall peak of 32% in 2001 to about 16% of ODA in 2008. 
While trends in TC are ambiguous at best, an important caveat is that, unlike 
some of its critics (e.g. Easterly 2007), the PD does not advocate phasing out TC 
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entirely. Instead, the principles of the PD call for a transformation of TC from a 
donor- or supply-led activity, which was implemented parallel to the existing 
structures in developing countries, into a more demand-led, integrated. and “country-
owned” modality. For this reason, many reform-efforts by donors (e.g., EC 2008) 
consider the recommended discontinuation of parallel PIUs to be closely related to 
reforming TC more generally. However, neither the integration of TC into recipient-
led, coordinated, and programme-based approaches to aid, nor the reform or 
discontinuation of PIUs, is well-documented. The 2008 survey on implementing the 
PD notes that indicator 4 regarding aligned and co-ordinated TC increased from 48% 
in 2005 to 60% in 2008 (with the target being just 50% by 2010). Likewise, parallel 
PIUs recorded in 33 countries declined from a total of 1817 in 2005 to a total of 
1601 in 2007 (OECD 2008). Lacking other sources of data, especially over longer 
periods, and, given that the aid effectiveness agenda actively encourages donors to 
increase their selectivity and focus to spend foreign aid on fewer recipients and 
fewer sectors (see Easterly 2007), few conclusions about genuine shifts in TC can be 
drawn from these numbers.  
 
4.2.5.  Summary: Mapping Reforms Sympathetic to the Paris Declaration 
In summary, mapping changes in the foreign aid policies of donors sympathetic to 
the aid effectiveness agenda (and monitored by the OECD DAC in its progress 
reports on the implementation of the Paris Declaration [OECD 2006, 2008, 2011], 
provides a mixed but not an entirely inconclusive picture. Notably, there is a decisive 
shift towards programme-based aid and SWAPs over project-based aid. Although no 
explanatory model was presented here, a mock-regression using dummy variables 
also illustrates that the years 2005/2006 constitute an incisive time for these changes. 
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Whatever the cause of these changes, they appear to be contemporaneous with the 
Paris Declaration and its first post-PD cycle of peer reviews and progress-
implementation reports by the OECD DAC. On the other hand, the trend seems to 
extend to general budget support, although a calculated approximation for sector 
budget support (SBS) points to a greater use of this foreign aid modality after 2005.  
The agenda to untie aid proves to be rather more ambiguous. One reason for this 
is the fact that efforts to untie foreign aid were already well-advanced when the PD 
itself was written. Another reason is the heavy distortion of data on tied aid courtesy 
of the fluctuations in the United States’ ODA; the country’s contributions represents 
over a quarter of all DAC ODA, and it is responsible for an above-average share of 
tied aid. A possible reading of the data suggests that much of the persuasion 
concerning the benefits of untying aid already predated the PD and the aid 
effectiveness agenda.  
Finally, the advocated changes to technical cooperation are perhaps the most 
elusive to measure with the available data. First, the precise provisions of the PD 
concerning TC are more muted compared to many of the more openly critical 
accounts of TC found in the academic and grey literature. Rather than reducing TC 
levels, the PD promotes transforming TC into integrated efforts for capacity 
development, a concept notoriously difficult to pin down. Second, little data exists 
outside the scarce numbers found in the OECD’s own monitoring of the PD. These 
monitoring surveys rely on the subjective judgement of donor governments that 
respond to OECD questionnaires regarding their own performance, and they do not 
provide sufficient data to exclude plausible alternative explanations grounded in 
broader geographical or temporal shifts in foreign aid. 
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 Operationalization Observations in the Data 
1) A relative increase in programme-
based aid over project-based aid 
agrees with the aid effectiveness 
agenda.  
Positive findings: A distinct shift, both 
relative and absolute, towards 
programme-based aid is evident, and can 
be linked via tests for structural breaks in 
time series to the years 2005/2006.  
2) Greater use of direct budget support 
agrees with the aid effectiveness 
agenda. 
Mixed findings: There is no evidence for 
increases in GBS, but approximations for 
SBS show distinct change that can be 
linked to the years 2005/2006.    
3) A shift in ODA from tied to untied 
aid agrees with the aid effectiveness 
agenda.  
Mixed findings: A distinct trend to untie 
aid is evident, yet appears to largely to 
predate the Paris Declaration. 
4) A reduction in uncoordinated TC 
agrees with the aid effectiveness 
agenda.  
Inconclusive data: Limited data 
available on the more ambiguous 
provisions of the Paris Declaration 
concerning TC and the significant outlier 
of US ODA prevent any definite 
assessments to be made concerning TC.  
Table 7  Summary of Observations in the Data Concerning Aid Modalities 
 
4.3.  Chapter 4 Conclusion 
Has bilateral foreign aid changed in the last decade? If yes, are these changes that 
align with and could conceivably be related to the provisions of the aid effectiveness 
agenda? Anecdotal evidence found in the literature seems to indicate that the aid 
effectiveness agenda has left a significant mark on the way donors manage and 
implement foreign aid. Hyden (2008), for example, notes that ”many DPs 
[development partners, i.e. donors] have been quite enthusiastic about the new 
modality for dispensing aid. They have tried to put it in place in those countries 
where there is a perceived commitment to poverty reduction and the governance 
record is good enough not to be immediately called into question” (p. 268). 
Chapter 4 of this thesis sought to illustrate this perceived enthusiasm for applying 
the new aid modalities advocated by the Paris Declaration and the aid effectiveness 
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agenda as a whole. Four principles, or provisions, from the PD were highlighted as 
proxies for the larger aid effectiveness agenda: Greater use of programme-based aid, 
greater use of budget support, untying of aid, and less freestanding technical 
cooperation. Subsequently, this chapter investigated changes in foreign aid policy 
along these four dimensions over time, with mixed findings. On one hand, there 
seem to be significant policy changes in agreement with the PD, for example in the 
use of programme-based aid. On the other hand, use of general budget support or 
untied aid did not change as clearly during the years following the Paris Declaration.  
Although this chapter can only provide a descriptive reading of the data, it is clear 
that these changes to foreign aid policy did not unfold evenly across these four 
dimensions. It is likely that complex dynamics, processes and contextual conditions 
are at work. These dynamics and processes are likely related to the difference in the 
constellations of interests in political discourses on foreign aid policy at international 
and domestic levels. In other words, like many international agreements, the aid 
effectiveness agenda – if it played a role in motivating the described changes in 
foreign aid policy – is likely a compromise of different political interests and 
priorities, even as it is presented as a result of concerns transcending politics.  
In summary, then, there is sufficient evidence in this data to support a significant 
amount of policy reform among donors, policy changes that are sympathetic and 
contemporaneous to the aid effectiveness agenda. The other hand the results, 
however, are too mixed and ambiguous to argue for a direct translation of the agenda 
into policy. Instead, the mixed results in the mapping of recent foreign aid policy 
reforms (which mirror the mixed results in the OECD DAC’s efforts to monitor the 
implementation of the Paris Declaration) suggest the need for a closer investigation 
of how the Paris Declaration, the aid effectiveness agenda, and the policy norms and 
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ideas they embody translate (or fail to translate) into donor-country policies. In a 
nutshell, there are too many reforms and changes to endorse the notion immediately 
that the aid effectiveness agenda has had no impact at all. However, the observed 
changes appear too uneven to assert a seamless link between promoted policy 
reforms and actual policy reforms. As noted, a sizable literature has emerged to 
tackle the questions of whether and how donor governments comply with either the 
specifics of the PD or more abstract concepts of effective aid (e.g. Booth 2008, 
Easterly 2008, Knack et al. 2011). 
One omission in this literature is that the nature and origins of the aid 
effectiveness agenda itself are often neglected in research on how well the agenda 
does (or does not) translate into foreign aid policy. If, in the words of William 
Easterly and Claudia Williamson, the agreements that constitute the aid effectiveness 
agenda the result of “a negotiated political process” (2011, p. 5), a crucial first step 
is to investigate this political process shaping the aid effectiveness agenda in its 
current form: Which ideas and principles are parts of the agenda? Which ideas are 
not? In particular, the role of IOs, especially the OECD DAC and the World Bank, in 
helping shape the aid effectiveness agenda deserves a more thorough investigation.  
  
! ! ! %&(!
Chapter 5 – The OECD DAC as “Purveyor of Ideas”!
Chapter 4 illustrated the wealth of foreign aid policy reforms sympathetic to the 
aid effectiveness agenda that have appeared in the past decade. Chapter 5, as well as 
the subsequent chapter 6, step back from the possible effects of the aid effectiveness 
agenda to investigate the agenda itself. To do so, chapter 5 presents a case study of 
the OECD DAC as a political actor and advocate for the aid effectiveness agenda. 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the specific processes through which the 
OECD DAC – in strategic institutional self-interest – helped shape the aid 
effectiveness agenda, and with it the ideational framework of ideas and standards 
that specifies, in the words of Peter Hall (1993), “the goals of policy and kind of 
instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems 
they are meant to be addressing” (Hall 1993, p. 279) in the field of foreign aid today. 
Both case studies in this thesis – in chapters 5 and 6 – provide evidence in support 
of the argument that the aid effectiveness agenda was shaped, in no small part, by the 
strategic agency of both the OECD DAC and the World Bank. This case study, 
chapter 5, explores the ideational artistry and ideational agency (Marcussen 2001) on 
the part of the OECD DAC in shaping and advocating the aid effectiveness agenda.!
Though the focus here is on the OECD DAC (and on the World Bank in the next 
chapter), neither case study makes claims to an exclusive causality. Though the 
political role of these IOs in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda has been mostly 
neglected, their strategic agency – their “strategic social construction” (Finnemore 
and Sikkink 1998) by which IOs help define “the interests that states and other actors 
come to hold” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 162) – must be placed in a broader 
context of international and domestic politics. The importance of this context is 
discussed in chapter 7.!
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The case studies in chapters 5 and 6 are structured into three parts, which are 
designed to mirror the approach to process tracing described in the literature: !
The scholar traces the environmental pressures impinging on certain decisions, 
allowing that at least some of them were relatively unambiguous 
(“intersubjectively present” or, in more positive language, “objective”), and 
concludes that they did not fully determine a choice of action. The implication 
is that we need to interpret the ideas or beliefs or norms or practices that did. 
The author then traces out the logic by which certain ideas connected 
indeterminate environmental constraints and incentives to a specific strategy or 
action. Counterfactual analysis often sketches how the actor might have done 
something different given different ideas. (Parsons 2011, pp. 134-135) !
In line with Parsons’s outline, this case study on the OECD DAC starts by 
investigating environmental pressures, notably those relating to the crises of 
legitimacy experienced by the OECD and the DAC. In the 1990s, after the end of the 
Cold War, broad geopolitical changes undermined the authoritative function and 
legitimacy of the OECD and the DAC in global affairs. The geopolitical changes of 
the late 20th century thus constitute an intersubjectively present change, as Parsons 
termed it, which triggered crises of institutional legitimacy for the OECD and the 
OECD DAC. Changing geopolitics demanded decisions and new strategies from the 
DAC and the OECD. Yet they also provided an opportunity for incisive change 
similar to what historical institutionalism describes as punctuated equilibrium.!
Second, this chapter investigates the specifics of the aid effectiveness agenda as a 
product of ideational innovation by the OECD DAC. It demonstrates how the agenda 
connects indeterminate environmental constraints with pre-existing narratives to 
create a coherent, strategic social (re-) construction of foreign aid in IR. !
! ! ! %&*!
This construction emphasises the DAC’s role as a pivotal institution in the 
international governance of foreign aid. In agreement with recent research on the 
“interpretivist turn” (e.g. Hay 2011) in political and IR investigations, this stresses 
how the agency of the DAC, as a political actor in a specific historical context, is 
directly tied to the diffusion of the aid effectiveness agenda. Rather than considering 
aid effectiveness as a cascading of a policy paradigm without agency, chapter 5 
demonstrates how the ideas and principles embedded in the agenda closely and 
deliberately correspond to the institutional strengths and the specific needs that drive 
the political agency of the DAC, as a part of OECD, at this particular point in time.!
Third, this case study turns from the aid effectiveness ideas, the substance of the 
agenda, towards the ideational agency of the DAC as an institution. I examine the 
specific actions and strategies that the DAC derives from the aid effectiveness 
agenda, especially following the successful adoption of the Paris Declaration, and 
employs in the context of aid effectiveness reforms around the world. With this, the 
process-tracing in this case study turns to the DAC’s active efforts to diffuse the 
ideas of the aid effectiveness agenda among its member states, their policymakers, 
government bureaucracies, and the agencies that deal with foreign aid policy. !
Tracing these mechanisms provides supporting evidence for the hypothesis that 
the DAC is not merely a beneficiary of opportunity and expedient change, but is a 
strategic force that elicits paradigmatic change in global aid relations by its own 
means of expert-based, technocratic influence.!
!
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  5.1. Aid Agenda as Result of Institutional Crisis and Change!
Aid effectiveness is not an abstract policy idea that appeared from nowhere. 
Rather, it is a strategy of social construction employed by IOs to influence the ideas 
and standards defining policymaking in a particular field. This is done in response to 
environmental pressures that result from historical circumstances and political 
change. The genesis of the aid effectiveness agenda specifically is closely tied to the 
strategic agency of two IOs: the OECD DAC and the World Bank. The first, the 
OECD DAC, is central to the story of the aid effectiveness agenda. !
The first part of this case study on the DAC outlines the environmental pressures 
facing this institution, shaping its actions and transformation. In particular, these 
pressures consist of a shift of priorities in foreign aid and, for the OECD DAC, an 
institutional crisis of legitimacy experienced after the end of the Cold War. The aim 
is to illustrate that, while ideas matter, they matter under specific circumstances. The 
circumstances surrounding the earliest precursors of the later aid effectiveness 
agenda were defined by uncertainty, as the OECD – and with it the DAC – faced a 
legitimacy crisis in the post-Cold War landscape of IR. Campbell writes on 
conditions of uncertainty: “In the extreme, actors perceive such situations as crisis. 
[...] Indeed, crises often trigger institutional shifts” (2004, p. 115). For the OECD 
DAC, as an actor specific to foreign aid relations, the profound geopolitical changes 
of the 1990s were both crisis and opportunity. The crisis of legitimacy the DAC 
experienced helped animate and shape its resulting agency, which in turn helped 
define the aid effectiveness agenda as it is known in foreign aid policymaking today.!
Although this study focuses on the DAC in particular, this first historical part 
examines the DAC as part of the OECD. I start with a brief history of the origins of 
the OECD and the DAC. I then turn to the legitimacy crisis of the 1990s and the 
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specific criticisms levelled at the OECD and the DAC during that time. Finally, I 
examine the OECD’s emphasis of its role and mission as a “Knowledge Bank” 
(Authers 2005; quoted in Woodward 2009, p. 81) and “Purveyor of Ideas” (Mahon 
and McBride 2008, p. 3) as a strategic, purposeful response to its crisis. !
!
5.1.1. The OECD, the DAC, and the Aid Effectiveness Agenda !
Today, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is 
an international economic organisation of 34 states. It was founded in 1961 as a 
successor to the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The 
mandate of both the OECD and the DAC, which became a part of the OECD in July 
1961, emphasises their role to counsel member and non-member states on issues of 
economic development and foreign aid policy. For the OECD, the second of three 
objectives laid down in Article 1 of the OECD Convention states that it shall 
promote policies designed:  
[...] (b) to contribute to sound economic expansion in [m]ember as well as non-
member countries in the process of economic development (OECD 1960) 
The origins of the DAC lie with the Development Assistance Group (DAG), 
launched just a year before the DAC’s inception as a part of OECD. The DAC’s 
mandate is:!
[...] to consult on the methods for making national resources available for 
assisting countries and areas in the process of economic development and for 
expanding and improving the flow of long-term funds and other development 
assistance to them. (OECD 2010) !
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Due to its origin, the DAC remains distinctly different from other OECD 
committees. Notably, DAC members are not necessarily OECD members, and the 
DAC is headed by a permanent chairperson, who is considered to be a “semi-
independent official, in but not quite of the OECD, capable of leadership in the 
procedures of the DAC and the policies of its members” (Rubin 1966). Currently, the 
DAC has 24 members, including the European Commission (EC), which acts as a 
full member. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) are all observers. !
At the DAC’s highest level, ministers, agency heads and senior advisers from 
member states meet annually at DAC high level and senior level meetings. At the 
operational level, eight subsidiary working parties and networks bring together 
policymakers and experts from aid ministries and agencies around major thematic 
areas in development. Crucial, for the topic of this thesis, is the Working Party on 
Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF), which is concerned with supporting, facilitating, and 
monitoring the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda. The WP-EFF was 
created in 2003, following a consensus reached at the 2002 International Conference 
on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico. It comprises DAC members, 
as well as representatives from aid-receiving states, IOs, and civil society. The WP-
EFF is central to the inception and evolution of the aid effectiveness agenda.!
The DAC also conducts peer review of the policies of about five to six of its 
member states each year. These peer reviews examine the cooperative system and 
policies in place in bilateral foreign aid. Peer reviews, more generally, are a common 
instrument of the OECD across many policy areas. The biennial Economic Surveys 
on the economic policies of OECD members are the most prominent peer review 
facilitated by the OECD. Yet, unlike the Economic Surveys and other OECD peer 
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reviews, the DAC’s peer reviews of foreign aid policies very explicitly emphasise 
aspects of global governance as they aim “to raise the overall effectiveness of aid 
throughout the donor community” and “analyse the measures the members have put 
in place to make their development co-operation policies coherent with partner 
country agendas and strategies” (OECD 2010a, p. 12). The aid effectiveness agenda 
plays a crucial role in these peer reviews, as the DAC also carries out “mid-course” 
checks, usually two or three years after an initial peer review, to evaluate the relative 
progress governments have made in implementing reforms that strive to improve aid 
effectiveness.     !
The OECD’s Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD) provides research 
and inputs to all areas of the DAC’s work. OECD documents often refer to the DCD 
as serving as a DAC secretariat (OECD 2010a, p. 5), as the DAC establishes the 
work programme for the DCD.!
Finally, the OECD hosts the Development Centre. Based on its own mission 
statement, “the OECD Development Centre helps policy makers in OECD and 
developing countries find innovative solutions to the global challenges of 
development, poverty alleviation and the curbing of inequality” 17  
The Centre does not primarily serve the DAC. The Centre’s president is 
responsible directly to the OECD Secretary-General and Membership of the DCD is 
open to both OECD and non-OECD countries. The primary focus of work and 
research in the Development Centre involves topics specific to development 
cooperation, such as business climate, labour migration or women’s rights, rather 
than aid architecture and the policies of donor countries. Although joint efforts with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 .//0122666593@>59;<2>3#28D>G/32-'2! (Accessed 31 March 2014) 
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the DAC certainly exist, the Development Centre is not discussed or investigated any 
further here.!
The OECD is often noted for its ability to create “soft law”18 and, on occasion, is 
heralded as a leading organ of global governance (Woodward 2009, p. 1). It lacks, 
however, the more tangible “sticks and carrots” that are available to other actors in 
IR, including other IOs. The founding Convention for the OECD (1960) does not 
invest the institution with a system of formal rewards and sanctions that might 
induce cooperation or obedience of states. Rather, the OECD, as well as the DAC, 
pursue their mission by institutionalising cooperation between member states and, 
where appropriate, member and non-member states. !
Studies on the OECD cite two main reasons for the its uniquely broad, unspecific 
mandate and its comparatively weak supranational mechanisms. First, as the 
successor of the OEEC, the role of the OECD was primarily to continue the former 
organisation’s utility as an informal consultative forum. On the other hand, the 
OECD was not tasked with implementing anything specific – anything akin to the 
Marshall Plan for example. Second, the OECD had to compete with the emerging 
European Economic Community (EEC). Several EEC countries (especially France) 
were wary of creating an institution that could undermine the budding European 
integration. Consequently, the OECD has served less as place to coordinate 
international policies. Instead, it has increasingly become a forum in which states 
strive to uncover appropriate domestic policies to meet common objectives 
(Woodward 2009, p. 12). !
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18 In the context of international law, the term “soft law” covers such things as non-treaty obligations, 
statements, principles, codes of conduct or codes of practice, often found as part of framework 
treaties, as well as most Resolutions and Declarations of the UN General Assembly, e.g. the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Attempts to define the term (e.g. Abbott and Snidal 2000) 
see “soft law” as legal arrangements that lack one or more qualities of legally binding obligations 
(“hard law”), such as obligation, precision, and delegation.!!!!
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The OECD, as well as the DAC, were often described as a “consultative forum”, 
“think tank”, or “a pool of statistical and economic expertise” (OECD 2010a), even 
before the OECD’s leadership, starting with secretary-general Donald Johnston, 
actively adopted these characterisations (Woodward 2009, p. 34). The OECD’s self-
depiction of how it operates (see figure 12) emphasises the institution’s services of 
impartial data collection and expert analysis, both of which serve as basis for policy 
debates among its members, through the mechanisms provided by the OECD. !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
As a consequence, the methods, instruments and organisation of the OECD and 
the DAC, along with those of the various Working Parties and the DCD, are 
predisposed to working in ways that guide policymaking through ideas, knowledge, 
and the facilitation of expert networks. In this, the “the OECD epitomizes the 
impartial, technocratic international organization devoted to the production and 
dissemination of scientific knowledge” (Sharman 2006, p. 129).  
 The essence of this case study is to trace the processes of the more conscious and 
active efforts are made by the OECD DAC in its advocacy of the aid effectiveness 
agenda, which is itself as an idea-based instrument to shape foreign aid policy. The 
historical context of the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, is a crucial period 
Figure 12 The OECD’s way of working, from: www.oecd.org/about/whatwedoandhow/  
(Access 03/12/2012) 
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for this. Examining the specific criticisms brought against the DAC and the OECD 
during this time illustrates the various pressures that forced the DAC to reinvent its 
purpose as an institution.!
Conversely, examining the aid effectiveness agenda through the lens of the 
DAC’s agency reveals how the ideas embodied within this agenda serve as a 
strategic social construction in the context of foreign aid politics that responds to 
pressures and criticisms the DAC had to confront. Aid effectiveness, consequently, 
is not simply a policy solution to a set of problems in foreign aid. It is also a strategic 
response by the OECD DAC to its crisis of legitimacy during the 1990s.!
!
5.1.2. Crisis and Struggle for Legitimacy: OECD DAC after the Cold War !
The DAC’s efforts in constructing and advocating the aid effectiveness agenda 
are a consequence of the unique situation facing both the OECD and the DAC during 
the post-Cold War period in the 1990s. This period, broadly speaking, marked the 
end of one geopolitical era and the beginning of another. The geopolitical system 
shifted from the Cold War’s bipolar order to a new structure that was 
“simultaneously unipolar and a nonpolar, networked system of a globalized world” 
(Karns and Mingst 2010, p. 23). A pivotal assumption in this study, drawn from 
institutionalist theory, is that incisive strategic social construction is more likely to 
succeed in times of uncertainty and crisis (Campbell 2004, 2010). After the end of 
the bipolar world, which had given birth to the OECD in the 1960s,  the 1990s were 
such a period of crisis and uncertainty for the OECD, robbing it of its traditional role 
and self-perception in global politics as an “economic counterpart to NATO” (OECD 
2004). Crucially, for this case study, the DAC’s specialised role in the global 
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architecture of foreign aid mirrors the OECD’s crisis. Foreign aid politics likewise 
changed profoundly during this period. 
In its early years, the OECD worked as a part of the global governance landscape 
during the Cold War (Woodward 2009, p. 63). The OECD’s mission was to foster 
economic growth by promoting interstate dialogue and cooperation to improve 
domestic policies. This was seen to complement the West’s stance on military 
deterrence during the Cold War. Many, including the OECD’s secretaries-general, 
viewed the OECD as an integral branch of the Western economic and security 
framework established after the World War II (Masefield 1989). The DAC was no 
exception. !
Nevertheless, portraying the end of the Cold War as immediate cause for the 
crisis of the OECD and the DAC would be too simplistic. Rather, these historic 
changes were crucial, because they triggered new assessments of the OECD and the 
DAC. In a changed geopolitical world, many saw these institutions and their role in 
global affairs in a new light. !
The following outlines three key issues facing the DAC and the OECD in the 
1990s. These are the obsolescence of the OECD’s bureaucracy, a sidelining of the 
OECD and DAC by other IOs and, for the DAC, the lack of a persuasive mandate in 
global aid relations.!
Bureaucratic obsolescence: In the early 1990s, both the DAC and OECD were 
seen as remnant institutions of a bygone time. They were criticised, in the words of 
then secretary-general Jean-Claude Paye, as being “too bureaucratic and not 
responsive” (Friedman 1994). Member states increasingly questioned the OECD’s 
capacity to serve their rapidly changing needs efficiently and effectively. These 
! ! ! %')!
criticisms involved the DAC particularly, as priorities for foreign aid changed at a 
time when aid budgets were generally in decline. !
 After rising continuously for decades, bilateral ODA declined from a peak of 
$55.3 billion in 1991 to a low of $39.7 billion in 199719. The nature and objectives of 
aid shifted due to different geostrategic considerations, as well as a swing in 
emphasis away from infrastructure investments and trade promotion and towards 
efforts in humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and the promotion of democratic 
governance. Adrian Hewitt noted that there generally was!
 [...] the feeling that four decades after the Marshall Plan and three decades on 
from the foundation of the OECD donors’ club, the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), the old mechanisms and policies of aid-giving may be 
anachronistic, especially with a second generation of post-independence leaders 
less attached to the attractions of being aid recipients. In short, a feeling that aid 
may be not merely an instrument of the Cold War, but a relic of early post 
colonialism. (1994, p. 2)!
Shrinking budgets and a staff shortage left the OECD and the DAC struggling to 
re-affirm their relevance in global affairs. The OECD thus launched a thorough 
reform effort to respond to declining budgets, for IOs in general and for the OECD 
in particular. !
At the 1996 Ministerial Council Meeting (MCM), the OECD member states 
explicitly embraced a modernisation of its mandate. Their communiqué instructed 
the OECD to “accelerate the process of structural change [...] with a view to further 
enhancing the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the Organisation” (OECD 
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(Accessed 31 March 2014) 
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1996a). Initial consequences were reforms to create a leaner organisation. Between 
1996 and 2000, the OECD’s budget declined by about 18% in real terms (Woodward 
2009) and regular staff was reduced by about 15% from a high of 1,934 in 1995 to a 
low of 1,632 in 2000 (OECD 2004). A new Executive Directorate was set up to 
supervise support services, simplify management and administrative processes, 
improve the efficiency of support services, eliminate costly fringe services, and 
outsource numerous functions. !
A second consequence was the expansion of OECD membership to new 
countries, including Mexico in 1994 and Korea in 1996. The OECD also aimed to 
engage non-members with initiatives such as the Centre for Co-operation with 
European Economies in Transition and the Emerging Market Economy Forum 
(EMEF), established in 1990 and 1996 respectively. !
Institutional competition: The OECD’s mandate was always unusually broad. 
Likewise, the purpose of the DAC, beyond serving as a forum for donors, has always 
been ambiguous. Although this served both institutions well for decades, it turned 
into a challenge for them when both the OECD and the DAC started facing more 
competition from other institutions and IOs, often with more precise mandates and 
more robust governance mechanisms. !
Most notably, the European Community, which included a majority of OECD 
members, “sapped the moral and quality of the OECD secretariat as talented 
personnel, lured by the relative lucidity of purpose and supranational vocation, 
departed for the European Commission” (Woodward 2009, p. 29). The 1986 Single 
European Act accelerated this trend by revitalising the integration process and the 
prospects of a single European market. Likewise, the WTO eclipsed the OECD’s 
role in the multilateral trade system (Wolfe 2007), where it had a mandate “to 
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contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis 
in accordance with international obligations” (see OECD 1960).!
Within its purview of development aid, the DAC was similarly beset. In its early 
years, a core product of the DAC and its OECD secretariat was its statistical 
expertise, along with interpretation of research and analysis based on newly available 
data on international aid and development finance. However, the OECD and the 
DAC’s relevance for data collection and analysis in the field of development were 
soon overtaken by other organisations. In the early 1980s, the World Bank 
established itself as the leading provider of “much of the necessary research, 
coordination, setting of standards, goals, etc., that came mainly from the DAC a 
decade ago” (Woodward 2009, p. 29). The advent of non-governmental and civil 
society organisations, which both implemented development activities and brought 
their political voice to bear on issues of foreign aid policy, challenged the DAC’s 
traditional, government-focussed instruments of technical interchange and peer 
review. While the OECD and the DAC competed for influence with other actors in 
global affairs, both old and new, more and more doubts were raised concerning the 
need for either organisation.  !
Mandate of the DAC: The DAC has long struggled to legitimise its work in 
monitoring, reviewing, and advising foreign aid policy. Crucially, the heart of the 
DAC’s initial mandate was a vision of a “common aid effort” (Rubin 1966). The 
Working Group on the Common Aid Effort, created in 1961 at the Tokyo session of 
the Development Assistance Group (DAG), was the first working party of the DAC. 
This group was responsible for initiating the DAC’s annual aid review, starting in 
1962, which quickly became the DAC’s core procedure for assessing aid politics 
(Rubin 1966, p. 71). Nevertheless, the DAC ultimately disburses no funds and its 
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shared aims for bilateral aid have long rested, as Goran Ohlin (1968) notes, on the 
margins of national policy: !
But it must be remembered that bilateral aid to developing countries is usually 
bilateral for some good reason. To a large extent, it springs from historical 
circumstance or some particular interest. This is why the work of DAC must to 
a large extent be an exploration of the margins within which a joint or common 
policy exists or can be created. (Ohlin 1968, p. 235)!
The DAC’s concern with the so-called common aid effort was a reflection of the 
OECD’s overall role as an institution during the Cold War. A pivotal notion that 
legitimised the DAC’s early work was the idea of “burden-sharing” (Ohlin 1968) 
among the DAC members in their efforts to promote economic development abroad. 
Burden-sharing required a joint effort and, as a consequence, rules for sharing (Ohlin 
1968). This joint effort, for the USA in particular, was largely seen in the use of 
foreign aid as an instrument in competing with the USSR for the allegiance of newly 
independent developing countries:  !
The US planned to use the DAC to encourage European countries (and, later, 
Japan) to increase their foreign aid as their balance of payments positions 
improved, in part to offset expected cuts in American contributions as the 
country’s balance of payments position weakened. (Porter and Webb 2004, p. 
3)  !
Burden-sharing, as an idea, underpinned much of the DAC’s early work. A 
notable example is the DAC’s 1969 definition of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA). This provided the first shared definition of aid that could be used to compare 
aid among countries, as well as distinguish it them from “Other Official Flows” 
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(OOF). ODA was quickly established as a standard (Führer 1996) and remains the 
basis for the DAC’s analysis of data on aid flows to this day. Its exact definition, 
however, was revised several times.!
Although the DAC successfully restored its legitimacy with what is today the aid 
effectiveness agenda, the “common aid effort” in bilateral aid, as described by Rubin 
(1966), lost much of its purchase in the early 1990s for two reasons. First, burden-
sharing, and with it, the DAC concepts of aid harmonisation and coordination, 
pursued largely quantitative ambitions against now-shrinking aid budgets. Second, 
the requisite joint-effort element was lost when Cold War politics ceased to influence 
the organisation’s relationships with developing countries.    !
Evidence for this is found in the DAC’s 1989 Chairman’s Report on Development 
Co-operation in the 1990s (OECD 1989). This report reaffirms the importance of 
donor co-ordination for effective aid. However, the underlying logic of the report 
differs markedly from today’s aid effectiveness agenda. Currently, the widespread 
fragmentation of aid efforts is considered a detriment to effective aid, as it needlessly 
strains and exhausts the capacity of aid recipients to handle the bureaucratic 
procedures of different donors, credits and grants. Consequently, the assumption 
today is that donor coordination improves the quality of aid. In contrast, the 
underlying logic during the 1990s, as evidenced by the chairman’s report, drew 
strongly on the development theorem of a “big-push” of aid as a means to trigger 
lasting positive change (Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney 2010). Donor co-
ordination was seen as an effort to increase the quantitative impact of aid:!
National development assistance efforts must be seen as part of a larger 
international effort. No individual donor country has an aid programme large 
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enough in any single developing country to achieve significant development 
objectives on its own. (OECD 1989; quoted in Führer 1996, p. 52) !
Second, the joint, often US-led efforts to employ foreign aid as an instrument in 
the competition for political allies among developing countries lost its relevance 
after the end of the Cold War. The 1990s’ large drop-off in overall spending on 
foreign aid has been attributed to this depoliticising of foreign aid. If burden-sharing 
requires the assumption of a joint effort, then the lack of a coherent political 
objective consequently deprived the DAC of a unique, overriding concern that 
legitimised its effort to monitor and coordinate bilateral aid as a multilateral body. In 
short, without any shared objective for bilateral aid among its members, no demand 
would exist for the DAC to facilitate any kind of joint effort.!
To summarise, both OECD and DAC were founded in the 1960s and endowed 
with a broad mandate. For the DAC, the task it assumed up until the 1990s focused 
on monitoring and analysing data on foreign aid flows around the loose but distinctly 
Cold-War-related concept of burden-sharing. This was largely invalidated in the 
post-Cold War period by the geopolitical shift towards what Karns and Mingst 
termed “a nonpolar, networked system of a globalized world” (2010, p. 23). The 
DAC also faced competition within its traditional purview of research expertise on 
development from other IOs, including the World Bank. The 1990s also saw more 
knowledge production by NGOs, think tanks and thematically specialised 
organisations. As an organisation, the DAC, like the OECD, seemed increasingly out 
of touch with the rapidly changing demands of its member states, as well as too 
expensive and bureaucratic for the services it provided. As an institution, the DAC 
experienced a severe crisis of legitimacy. !
!
! ! ! %(%!
5.1.3. The OECD and the DAC as Purveyors of Ideas and Knowledge!
As I argue later in this chapter, the shifts in foreign aid policy of the 1990s 
triggered a crisis, but also created an opportunity for the DAC to reinvent itself, and 
the idea of aid effectiveness was pivotal in the DAC’s reinvention. My aim is to 
trace, with emphasis on the DAC, “the logic by which certain ideas connected 
indeterminate environmental constraints and incentives to a specific strategy or 
action” (Parsons 2011).  
Before discussing the DAC specifically, I conclude this section by noting how the 
OECD, more broadly, responded to its post-Cold War crisis by emphasising its role 
as a knowledge-based organisation committed to building expertise, intelligence, and 
guidance for informed policy action (Johnston 2004). This strategy has been 
continued by Secretary-General Angel Gurría in his efforts to reform the OECD into 
a “knowledge bank” (Authers 2005).!
The conscious effort of the OECD to reshape itself more fully into a knowledge-
based organisation is important for two reasons. First, it underscores the 
methodological approach to this study of the DAC as a “most-likely” case for 
successful idea-driven policy change. Second, it gives weight to the assumption of a 
strategic purpose underpinning the OECD’s mode of operation. Martin Marcussen 
(2001) pointedly describes this as “the idea game”: !
The idea game [is] a question about formulating, transferring, selling, and 
teaching, not formal regulation, but principled or causal beliefs helping to 
constrain or enable certain types of social behaviour within the OECD area. 
(2001, p. 3)!
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Therefore, and despite the fact that the origins of the aid effectiveness agenda lie 
in the more recent past, it is important to note that both the OECD and the DAC have 
long specialised in the purveyance and diffusion of ideas, norms, and policy 
paradigms. Indeed, their founding mandates tie both organisations closely to this 
mode of operation. !
Recent work on the OECD emphasises its authority through ideas. Robert Wolfe 
writes “[...] the most important thing that changes because of the OECD might be the 
thinking of the people from technical officials to ministers who attend its meetings or 
participate in its peer review process. The ideas it develops can have influence far 
beyond the organization” (2007, p. 17). Similarly, Per-Olof Busch (2009) develops 
three overlapping categories for the type of knowledge diffused by the OECD, 
including (a) the “informative knowledge” of accumulated data, (b) the “conceptual 
knowledge” that describes a shared understandings of problems and issues, and (c) 
the “analytical knowledge”, which “refers to collective wisdom about the best 
policies to tackle problems” (cp. Woodward 2009, p. 66).  !
Nevertheless, considering the OECD – and with it the DAC – as very consciously 
“knowledge-based” organisations should not imply that their success in advocating 
policy paradigms, including the aid effectiveness agenda, and in shaping 
international affairs, including global aid architecture, came easily or automatically. I 
describe the two crucial aspects of (a) the knowledge-base idea itself and (b) the 
strategy and actions taken by the DAC to advocate it by drawing on Marcussen’s 
OECD-specific concepts of (a) an ideational artist, and (b) an ideational agency. The 
former emphasises how the institution “incessantly invents new ideas” (ibid. 2001, p. 
16). The latter shows how it gains credibility “by constantly operationalizing ideas 
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which are already in demand [...] and by helping member states to concretely 
implement diffuse ideas” (ibid. 2001, p. 3).!
!
5.2. ‘Shaping the 21
st
 Century’ and the OECD DAC as Ideational Artist!
How was the aid effectiveness agenda conceived? How did it address the political 
pressures and the crisis of legitimacy facing the DAC in the 1990s? How did it allow 
the DAC to reinvent itself in a new role suitable to a new political context? !
I address these questions by tracing the aid effectiveness agenda from its origins. 
Here, the focus is explicitly on the DAC as an ideational artist that develops “new 
ideas on old policy areas” (Marcussen 2001). This serves to highlights two pivotal 
aspects. The first is how the aid effectiveness agenda is built from ideas, concepts 
and narratives prevalent among both aid experts and officials at the time. The second 
is how the aid effectiveness agenda addresses both policy problems and 
environmental pressures facing the DAC. I argue that, in discourses on foreign aid 
policy, the aid effectiveness agenda thus satisfies Campbell’s definition of a 
paradigm, which is a “cognitive background assumptions that constrain decision 
making and institutional change by limiting the range of alternatives that decision-
making elites are likely to perceive as useful and worth considering” (2004, p. 94).   !
Evidence is provided from two main sources. The first is a series of interviews 
conducted by the writer, mainly in Paris, with current and former members of staff at 
the DAC, who were closely involved with the work on aid effectiveness. The second 
source is documents, memos and studies on aid effectiveness by the DAC from the 
1990s onward that I examined and interpreted. One key document here is the study 
Shaping the 21
st
 Century (OECD 1996b), which was prepared for the DAC High 
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Level Meeting in 1996, along with a statement adopted in 1995 entitled Development 
Partnerships in the New Global Context (OECD 1995). Together, these two 
documents constitute a vital milestone for two reasons. First, they form the first 
OECD publication that collects and explicitly connects the core ideas of the future 
aid effectiveness agenda. The DAC’s recent report (Wood et al. 2011) on the 
evaluation of the PD thus places Shaping the 21st Century among the founding 
influences of the aid effectiveness discourse. The second reason that these 
documents are vital is that the reception of Shaping the 21st Century led directly to 
the establishment of a DAC’s ‘Task Force on Donor Practices’ (Carey, R. personal 
communication, March 17, 2011), arguably the first nucleus in the DAC to work 
explicitly on the policies and practices of donors. !
 Shaping the 21st Century, as a policy documents, advocates four main issues. 
These are (a) the need for unified global development objectives; (b) a global 
compact for a development partnership; (c) provisions for making aid work better; 
and (d) a call for policy coherence beyond the policy field of foreign aid. The second 
and third issues, which were to become key parts of the larger effort to rethink the 
fundamentals of foreign aid, are what make Shaping the 21st Century such a crucial 
precursor to the aid effectiveness agenda. !
The efforts outlined within Shaping the 21st Century to operationalise 
development objectives is frequently seen to have “kindled the process toward the 
MDGs flowing from the Millennium Declaration signed by 189 countries in 2000” 
(Woodward 2009, p. 40) under the aegis of the UN. In contrast, the fourth issue – 
policy coherence across sectors of OECD states in dealing with developing countries 
– failed to gain much purchase until very recently (OECD 2011b). !
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Three key ideas of the budding aid effectiveness agenda, first spelled out in 
Shaping the 21
st
 Century, that are crucial to its success of the aid effectiveness 
agenda are (i) the shift of focus from aid quantity towards aid quality, with the latter 
dependent on multilateral oversight; (ii) a new emphasis on foreign aid as instrument 
for managing global issues in a time defined by globalisation; and (iii) the notion of 
a global aid partnership as a prerequisite for better aid.!
The following examines each with emphasis on (i) their connection to topical 
concerns and broader discourses in the field of foreign aid and development policy at 
the time; (ii) the associated ideational shift in the DAC’s work and publications; and 
(iii) the implications for the DAC as institution facing a crisis of legitimacy.!
!
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Figure 13  Sources for the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Wood, R. et al. 2011, p. 2) 
! ! ! %(*!
 5.2.1. Quality of Aid: Adapting to Shrinking Aid Budgets!
Today, aid effectiveness is near-synonymous for quality of foreign aid. The 
agenda revolves around “more development bang for the foreign aid buck” (Bigsten 
et al. 2011, 44). Crucially, by defining the problem in a way that casts quality of aid 
as crucially impaired by a structural lack of coordination among donors, it suggests 
multilateral coordination as remedy. The DAC’s concern with quality of aid, and the 
inferred solution of donor harmonisation, was both topical and timely for the 
discourses on foreign aid of the 1990s, notably those asking why foreign aid had, in 
previous decades, fallen short of its expectations for development and poverty 
alleviation after decolonisation. Evident as it may be from today’s perspective, a key 
innovation in the aid effectiveness agenda was that effective development 
cooperation needed to be concerned with the quality of foreign aid as much as with 
quantities of ODA. As a staff member of the DAC said “It is just an observation, 
during all the ‘90s, that in the aid dependent countries, aid was certainly part of the 
solution. But it had certainly also become part of the problem” (de Milly, H., 
personal communication, April 14, 2011).  
The DAC was not unique in its concern with aid quality. The highly public 
criticisms of structural adjustment programmes and the Washington Consensus 
animated most multilateral and bilateral development institutions to focus explicitly 
on fighting poverty. The UN launched the Human Development Index in 1990. For 
the World Bank, almost every World Development Report since 1990 attempted to 
identify means to reduce poverty (Yusuf et al. 2009, p. 75). In the absence of the 
geopolitical framework of the Cold War, assessments of what development 
cooperation and foreign aid had achieved since the end of World War II and the days 
of decolonisation were generally critical of its results. However, what distinguishes 
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the idea of aid quality, as embedded in the aid effectiveness agenda, from other 
debates on improving aid, was that the DAC came to emphasise the low quality of 
foreign aid as a negative externality of the highly fragmented foreign aid efforts on a 
global level.!
 It is seen as an issue of donor coordination; avoiding too many different 
frameworks, too many different templates, a country having to report the same 
thing in 20 different templates. This exists because of growing administrative 
entropy. If you do not really make the effort to coordinate, then by themselves, 
they [donors] evolve differently as each one has its own bureaucracy. That was 
the main thinking in Rome20. Please let’s try to harmonize procedures. (de 
Milly, H., personal communication, April 14, 2011)  !
The DAC thus located a cause impairing the quality of foreign aid within its own 
purview of coordinating (mainly bilateral) foreign aid. What was different was the 
shift in the rationale for bilateral aid coordination. Where the DAC’s previous key 
notion of “burden-sharing” was founded on the theorem of a “big push” of foreign 
aid as a necessity to kick-start effective development, the new discourse on aid 
quality instead stressed the concept of “absorptive capacities”. The latter emphasises 
the diminishing marginal utility of foreign aid due to the finite abilities of aid 
recipients to deal with administrative complexities in foreign aid:    !
It is generally recognized that the transfer of a given amount of development 
assistance takes a long time [...]. This happens because of administrative 
complexities on both sides [...]. All these factors make up what is generally 
referred to as ‘absorptive capacity’ of the borrower country, although it is clear 
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20 Rome Declaration from the DAC High Level Forum on Harmonization in Rome in February 2003.   
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that the modus operandi of the donor institution itself contributes to the 
limitations on resource absorption. (Tendler 1975, p. 86)!
Neither the concept of a “big push” to kickstart economic development nor the 
limits of “absorptive capacities” were entirely new ideas in the 1990s. The academic 
debate on both concepts remains lively to this day (Guillaumont and Guillaumont 
Jeanneney 2010). Consequently, the shift in the DAC’s position from the former to 
the latter cannot be explained as one of these concepts simply subsuming the other. 
Rather, with public criticisms of previous aid efforts combining with a waning of 
ODA in the 1990s, the emphasis on improving foreign aid over increasing foreign 
aid became topical both at the DAC and within the transnational community of 
experts and officials who regularly met there. Without the rationales of Cold War 
politics and in light of criticisms of past aid efforts the idea of burden-sharing no 
longer mobilised sufficient political commitment.!
The logic of a “big push” still featured prominently in the chairman’s report on 
Development Co-operation in the 1990s (OECD 1989). References to absorptive 
capacity first appeared at the 1994 High Level Seminar of the DAC and the World 
Bank on Improving the Effectiveness of Technical Co-operation in the 1990s (OECD 
1994b) and in the DAC Orientations for Development Co-Operation in Support of 
Private Sector Development (OECD 1994a). The latter is among the first connecting 
absorptive capacity with the idea of donor coordination: “Donors recognise that co-
operation is especially important at the country level, in particular as regards local 
absorptive capacity and the terms at which resources are provided.” (OECD 1994a). 
Shaping the 21
st
 Century (OECD 1996) links both donor coordination and absorptive 
capacity with the idea of a development partnership (see below). Ultimately, donor 
governments committed publically to “harmonise the operational policies, 
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procedures, and practices” in the Rome Declaration on Harmonization in 2003 
(OECD 2003).!
How does the ideational shift in the DAC’s reasoning in favour of donor co-
ordination, away from a quantitative pooling of aid and towards a qualitative 
allowance for limited absorptive capacities in aid-receiving countries, address the 
pressures facing the DAC itself? !
In short, this ideational shift is an element of the agenda because it addresses 
perhaps the most pressing challenge the DAC faced in the 1990s: the lack of a 
unique and compelling mandate within its purview of expertise. Indeed, the aid 
effectiveness agenda is so strongly tied to the DAC today that it finds itself on the 
defensive against criticisms of dominating the agenda and thwarting the agenda’s 
broader application (Atwood 2011; Glennie 2011). !
The DAC’s reconstructed post-Cold War mandate builds on the observation that a 
lack of donor harmonisation causes aid quality to suffer on a systematic level, 
mainly due to different bureaucratic procedures and different political priorities. 
Consequently, there is demand for a body with a bird’s-eye view. The DAC is an 
ideal institution for this sort of oversight, mainly due to, first, its aid-specific 
expertise and, second, its unique political impartiality. On the first point, collecting, 
monitoring, and analysing foreign aid data are historically the core competences of 
the DAC. The highly specialised expertise of the DAC and its staff on aid statistics 
makes it an authority, not only on the data itself, but on policy action based on the 
data. As for the second point, the DAC occupies a unique institutional role as “a 
donor club, but not a donor” (de Milly, H., personal communication, April 14, 2011). 
This benefits the DAC with a position of impartiality beyond “objective rule- and 
method-driven expertise” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Its exclusivity as part of the 
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OECD “club” lends it credibility in advocating changes in donors’ domestic policies 
without the influence of politics found, for example, in the UN. !
!
5.2.2. Foreign Aid as Policy Instrument for Global Objectives!
A second key aspect of the ideational change in the DAC’s work and thinking is 
the outspoken emphasis on development cooperation as a policy instrument for 
achieving global objectives and addressing global problems. In line with the growing 
prominence of globalisation and debates on global governance in research and 
politics during the 1990s, the DAC started to characterise foreign aid as an 
instrument for a joint global effort to address problems and achieve objectives that 
surpassed the capacities of individual countries, even of those organised within the 
OECD. These issues include population growth, environmental sustainability, 
migration, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and fragile states, as well as coping with 
the growing economic interdependence of states at a global level. Although the 
emphasis on global issues, as ideational innovation, is less-prominent on the aid 
effectiveness agenda today, it was a key stepping stone for the DAC in portraying 
the continued purpose and need for (coordinated) foreign aid in the 1990s and 
provided a base for the DAC’s efforts to advocate the need for global development 
objectives (see Woodward 2009, p. 1) and a development partnership between 
donors and recipients (below).   
The report on development co-operation in the 1990s by DAC chairman Joseph 
Wheeler offered first reactions to the observation on how “with breathtaking speed 
the vocabulary of the development dialogue has shifted” (OECD 1989, p. 11). The 
report highlighted both prospects of democratisation throughout the developing 
world and the role of aid in addressing global problems. For the latter, Wheeler 
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looked ahead to the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1992. !
The two topics of democratisation and environment became important drivers for 
major work streams within the DAC. They are visible in reports such as 
Development and Environment or Participator Development and Good Governance 
(Führer 1996, p. 59). They also featured strongly in the DAC’s 1993 revision and 
reform of the ODA concept “...in light of [a] changing international aid scene” 
(Führer 1996, p. 64).!
The idea of (coordinated) aid as an instrument of global governance or global 
policy-making permeates Shaping the 21st Century: “Academically, the motivation 
behind ‘Shaping the 21st Century’ was the idea of global development as a beneficial 
global good.” (Carey, R., personal communication, March 17, 2011). Not 
surprisingly, the document goes on to outline specific targets and changes that would 
mark the achievement of a successfully ‘shaped’ 21st century. Most are keyed to the 
year of 2015. They include halving world poverty, reducing child mortality rates, 
universal primary education, and access to clean water and healthcare, as well as 
goals for environmental sustainability and regeneration derived from the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (OECD 1996b). It is not difficult to 
see why they are widely considered precursors to the Millennium Development 
Goals. !
The notion of foreign aid as an instrument of global governance was doubtless 
crucial to the DAC, as it was to other multilateral organisations, in justifying and re-
affirming its role in foreign aid. Nevertheless, unlike coordinating the bilateral aid of 
donors, which remains closely related to the DAC as an institution (see above), and 
the idea of a development partnership, which has proven the defining ingredient of 
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the aid effectiveness agenda (see below), setting global objectives as the overall 
(shared) aim of policy-making in foreign aid helped create an intersubjectively 
shared focus. This type of focus brings meaning to a concern with improving 
processes of foreign aid – such as donor coordination – and to mobilising public and 
political support for foreign aid beyond humanitarian motives. Shaping the 21st 
Century (OECD 1996b) refers to the latter as enlightened self-interest:!
Development benefits people not only in poor countries, but also in the 
industrialized donor countries. [...] Development co-operation is one way that 
people from all nations can work together to address common problems and 
pursue common aspirations. (p. 6)      !
 One interviewee (Isenman, P., personal communication, March 17, 2011) noted 
that the aid effectiveness agenda, at a fundamental level, addresses tensions intrinsic 
to the conflicts between inherently divergent donor bureaucracies and a common 
objective, and between inherently divergent donor politics and a common objective. 
The DAC’s “mission” of improving the effectiveness of foreign aid therefore only 
makes sense if donor countries sign up both to shared global objectives, ultimately in 
form of the MDGs, and to an intersubjectively shared understanding that the 
structural inefficiencies involved in achieving these objectives are a result of 
divergent procedures and political priorities. Without “conceptual knowledge” 
(Busch 2009) of a shared objective, as well as a shared understanding that this 
objective is best achieved through cooperation, the divergent bureaucratic procedures 
or politics of donors would likely not be perceived as problems on a crowded 
political agenda.  !
This makes this particular ideational innovation a key element in the effort to 
trace the origins of the aid effectiveness agenda for three reasons. First, it provides a 
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legitimate cause to investigate donor practices and procedures as part of a 
transnational aid discourse. Shaping the 21st Century would surely not have been 
written in this form without this motivation and, in turn, a DAC task force on donor 
practices might never have seen the light of day. Second, it derives meaning for the 
aid effectiveness agenda from the broader contemporary trends and discourses in 
foreign aid. Even though I examine the DAC’s aid effectiveness in this chapter from 
a rather narrow focus, its ideas and its cascade are closely linked to complementary 
trends in how experts and academics conceived of foreign aid, including, not least, 
the success of the 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in focussing minds 
and politics on shared objectives. Third, it provided a necessary, intermediate step 
for the later concept of a development partnership between aid donors and aid 
recipients (see below). Even though the development partnership, as expressed in the 
PD and much of the contemporary discourse on aid effectiveness, focuses on 
domestic reform in aid-receiving countries, the idea gained traction first on the 
intellectual basis of a primarily global focus on development cooperation in which 
“issues can no longer be divided into “domestic” and “international” (OECD 
1996b).   !
!
5.2.3. Foreign Aid and DAC Advocacy for a Development Partnership!
The third and final key idea behind the aid effectiveness agenda is the notion of 
foreign aid as a shared commitment and partnership between foreign aid donors and 
recipient countries. The emphasis on a reciprocal commitment and relationship 
between donors and recipients allows the DAC to expand its role as a broker of 
information and communication, not only among OECD members, but also between 
members and non-members. The current broad membership of the WP-EFF reflects 
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this expansion. Moreover, the notion of a development partnership also gives an 
added layer of legitimacy to donor coordination, insofar it is aligning the 
coordination effort with the priorities of aid recipients. The weight placed by the aid 
effectiveness agenda on institutional reform, political agency, and “ownership” in 
recipient states agrees with the 1990s’ emphasis on good governance and political 
transition. 
The DAC’s emphasis on a partnership relates to specific trends in development 
policy and research in the 1990s. Efforts at democratisation and its less-politicised 
cousin, good governance, became a central topic in post-Cold War thinking about 
development. This was largely a response to a series of regime transitions in 
primarily (but not exclusively) post-socialist countries, a trend that Samuel 
Huntington famously described as “the Third Wave” (1991). !
Huntington and his contemporaries revived a historicist notion of development 
that ties social and economic progress to a political bias for democratisation, and 
emphasised agency by political elites in developing countries as a precursor to 
change and progress. Promoting good governance and strengthening democratic 
institutions became prominent topics for bi- and multilateral donors. Economists, 
including those at the World Bank, began investigating links between the 
effectiveness of foreign aid on one hand, and politics or institutional quality on the 
other (e.g. Boone 1996, Knack and Keefer 1995). Broadly speaking, “...there has 
been increasing recognition that aid flowing to governments implementing 
ineffective policies is wasteful, in line with research findings since the early 1990s” 
(Kaufmann 2009).!
The DAC published an early call for a “Donor/Recipient Partnership” in their 
1991 Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance. Although written in the 
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context of a “mandate to strengthen the volume and developmental effectiveness of 
aid” (OECD 1991), it invokes a notion of ownership and partnership that would not 
seem out of place today: !
Development assistance is a co-operative partnership exercise between donors 
and recipients. [...] development assistance can only be subsidiary and 
complementary to the efforts of the developing countries themselves. Aid 
supports activities for which developing countries have final responsibility and 
ownership. (OECD 1991)!
In subsequent years, the DAC increasingly invoked the partnership idea, not as a 
relationship between donors and aid recipients meant to advance reforms in aid-
receiving countries, but as a premise for development assistance seen as a concern 
with global objectives (see above):  !
[...] we need to go beyond “aid” to North-South partnerships, to reciprocal 
responsibilities North and South, including partnerships in forging regional and 
global goals [...]. We must integrate global concerns for environment, 
population and disease control, and migration with national development 
priorities [...] (OECD 1994a)!
This focus on global concerns carries over to the Development Partnerships in the 
New Global Context of 1995, which is annexed to Shaping the 21st Century. The 
latter stresses both the global perspective and the domestic element of ownership. It 
thereby reflects 1990s research investigating factors that contribute to either effective 
or ineffective aid: !
 [...] to give substance to our belief in local ownership and partnership we must 
use channels and methods of co-operation that do not undermine those values. 
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Acceptance of the partnership model, with greater clarity in the roles of 
partners, is one of the most positive changes we are proposing in the framework 
for development cooperation. (OECD 1996b, p. 13)!
The idea of a development partnership was clearly present in discourses on aid 
effectiveness from the start. However, the concept’s final permutation was the result 
of an institutional opening of the DAC through the creation of the WP-EFF after the 
Monterrey Consensus and the subsequent institutionalised participation of aid-
receiving countries. This final change constitutes the priorities of aid-receiving 
countries for development and poverty alleviation in their countries as the principal 
orientation for a coordinated aid effort: !
[After the Rome Declaration] the group [WB-EFF] changed and turned to 
partner countries, which were becoming more vocal. It included more partner 
countries. And relatively cleverly, the concept changed a bit. The harmonizing 
among donors would be easier, and more politically correct, if you actually 
aligned on country systems. It makes life easier. (de Milly, H., personal 
communication, April 14, 2011)!
It is precisely this trend of placing greater emphasis on a development partnership 
and attributing a distinct role to the political priorities of aid-receiving countries, that 
came to define the WP-EFF and aid effectiveness discourse in the aftermath of the 
Paris Declaration, leading up to the subsequent High Level Forums in Accra, Ghana 
and Busan, Korea.  !
I think the OECD [DAC] has changed enormously. After the Paris Declaration, 
they broadened this working party [WP-EFF]. They said it could not be just 
about the 23 or 24 DAC members. It has to be wider. It should be widened to 
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include 23 partner countries, which were to be not just to represent themselves, 
but to coordinate with other partner countries in their neighbourhood. Brining 
that representation to the table was a major change. (Hammond, B., personal 
communication, May 6, 2011)  !
The same significant changes, however, make this particular aspect of the aid 
effectiveness agenda more difficult to interpret with a view towards the DAC as 
institution. This is especially true with respect to the institutional self-perception of 
the DAC, as it shifts from an exclusive forum for aid experts and officials from 
OECD member states towards a role as an “honest broker” in a global development 
partnership of its own making. The partnership idea is thus the most incisive aspect 
of the aid effectiveness agenda. It consciously departs from the DAC’s and the 
OECD’s tradition as exclusive, value-centred “clubs” for a limited number of states. 
The implications that follow, both from the prominent introduction of the 
development partnership and from the DAC’s role a “broker” in this partnership, 
indicate a new institutional purpose for the DAC. This purpose pivots notably around 
the task of facilitating communication between aid recipients and OECD member 
states. !
To provide a contrast, the DAC’s bias for donor coordination (under impartial, 
multilateral monitoring) to improve and assure the quality of foreign aid also 
constitutes an ideational change. However, unlike the development partnership, it is 
a change that simply re-legitimises, within a new political environment, the 
traditional role of the DAC as a forum, node, and facilitator among the more 
exclusive group of OECD donor states. The partnership idea forces the DAC to walk 
a political tightrope. It has to balances its credibility as a donor club against its 
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legitimacy as a broker endorsed by a broader constituency of countries, risking the 
loss of credibility for either. So what advantage does the DAC draw from this? !
This apparently odd squaring of the circle by the DAC – aiming to act both as an 
exclusive donor forum and as a platform for an inclusive global development 
partnership – serves to anchor the work on aid effectiveness firmly with the DAC as 
an institution. !
The Paris Declaration’s inclusive Statement of Resolve that “[w]e, Ministers of 
developed and developing countries responsible for promoting development and 
Heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions [...] resolve to take far-
reaching and monitorable actions to reform...” (OECD 2005) thus provides the DAC 
with a broad mandate that goes beyond the DAC’s bureaucratic expertise in ODA. !
The DAC’s institutional advantage is that it allows it to hedge its purview for the 
aid effectiveness agenda against potential competition from other institutions, as well 
as affording it the necessary independence, legitimacy, and credibility to continue 
negotiating the agenda vis-à-vis its own member states.!
In many ways, the ambiguity of the DAC’s mandate in aid policy reform as, on 
one hand, an exclusive forum for policy experts and, on the other, an inclusive 
policy-discourse broker fills this role better than any new IO of specific design likely 
could.     !
!
5.3. Diffusing the Aid Agenda: the DAC as Ideational Agency !
So far, this case study has contrasted key ideas of the emerging aid effectiveness 
agenda against environmental pressures facing the DAC in the 1990s. This 
highlights the changes and innovations undertaken by the DAC, acting as an 
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ideational artist that constructs and frames the political issue of ineffective aid from 
the vantage point of its own expertise in analysing bilateral aid !
 Expertise, in this fundamental sense, alerts individuals to the problems that 
exist in the world, the connections between these problems, and the appropriate 
solutions to these problems. (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 67) !
The above analysis shows how aid effectiveness is an ideational paradigm that 
draws both on the DAC’s own expertise relating to ODA and on many very 
prominent issues that shaped policy discourses on aid and development cooperation 
during the early and mid-1990s. The ideas embedded in the aid effectiveness agenda 
suggest policy solutions to perceived problems, yet do so in ways that specifically 
(re-)constitute the DAC with a renewed legitimate purpose in the global governance 
of foreign aid. This is an immediate result of the observation that the aid 
effectiveness discourse itself has strong roots in the DAC’s own soul-searching and 
internal debates, which followed from its institutional crisis in the years after the 
Cold War. The aid effectiveness agenda is thus biased in favour of the DAC’s 
perspective as a political institution and the DAC, as ideational artist, is pivotal to its 
creation.    !
However, the main objective of this thesis is to investigate the aid effectiveness 
paradigm as an intersubjective agreement on the nature of a specific policy problem 
and on the appropriate policy responses. The changes in aid policy described in 
chapter 4 suggest that aid effectiveness successfully shaped policymaking in most 
DAC member states. Examining the DAC as an ideational artist does not yet explain 
why the aid effectiveness agenda successfully “cascaded” to become a widely shared 
paradigm for aid policymaking.     !
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Consequently, the final third of this case study turns from tracing the DAC’s role 
as an ideational artist to tracing its role as ideational agency. Instead of viewing the 
DAC (only) as an institution, which “incessantly invents new ideas” (Marcussen 
2001, p. 16), a study of the DAC as ideational agency must also focus on its role in 
disseminating its ideas. In the terminology of the “interpretive turn in IR theory” 
(e.g. Hay 2011), if ideational artistry parses the conceptual, even narrative self-
representation of an institution from a structural view, then ideational agency, in 
contrast, covers the “translation” (Freeman 2009) of the latter into strategic action 
from – as the name implies – a perspective of agency.  !
Such an agency perspective serves to assess three crucial aspects. First, ideational 
agency in global governance focuses on actions taken to diffuse ideas through 
transnational networks and communities of policymakers. Second, the ideational 
agency of IOs is responsive to the demands and needs of policymakers. Just as 
ideational innovation of expert-based IOs must be responsive to existing ideas, 
themes, and discourses, expertise-based agency can only succeed if it meets existing 
demands and creates convergences of interests. Third, ideational agency serves the 
purpose of the agent by, ultimately, reflecting legitimacy back on the agent. 
Ideational agency of policy paradigms, including the aid effectiveness agenda, only 
succeeds if the subjacent ideas are eventually shared by the various stakeholders of 
the ideational agent, and if the implied, legitimate function of the agent as an 
institution is thus equally intersubjectively agreed upon. Successful ideational 
agency thereby allows IOs as agents to reinvent their purpose and legitimacy. 
Quoting Susan Strange (1998), Marcussen (2001) emphasises this observation with 
respect to the OECD:   !
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By studying the OECD as an ideational agency, one may better understand why 
international organizations so rarely die away (Strange, 1998). Each time an IO 
confronts a new crisis, it is able to reinvent itself in a new from that fits well to 
the political context. (2001, p. 17)   !
There are three elements to the DAC’s ideational agency for aid effectiveness. 
First are the DAC’s efforts to connect communities of practitioners and expert 
networks, thus spreading discourse on aid effectiveness to different policymakers. 
Second is the DAC’s effort to monitor and evaluate the progress of DAC member 
states in implementation of the PD. Both the cyclic and public monitoring of PD 
indicators by the DAC and its assessments of the reform of aid agencies are essential 
in sustaining the momentum of the aid effectiveness agenda. Finally, there is the 
assistance of the DAC in implementing aid effectiveness principles in foreign aid 
practice. The DAC and, notably, the WP-EFF have been active not only within the 
OECD’s traditional purview in policymaking, but increasingly also in policy 
implementation.!
!
5.3.1. Connecting Communities of Practitioners and Expert Networks !
As an ideational agency, the OECD and the DAC are famous for acting as a node 
and an intermediary for policy discourse. In this function, they (i) facilitate the 
diffusion of ideas; (ii) anchor and expand transnational networks of government 
officials as well as (with the WB-EFF at least) non-professionals and experts from 
beyond the public sector; and (iii) link separate communities of practice with 
existing or emerging policy discourses. Evidently, acting in this function helps ideas 
to become intersubjectively shared norms and paradigms of policymaking among a 
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broader group. Beyond merely sharing knowledge, agency in this sense also seeks to 
create convergences of interests across institutions and national borders.    
Since, initially at least, agents may not share information and understanding, 
and have interests that are not immediately commensurable, the politics of 
network governance must therefore concern, in some measure, the forging of 
relationships between agents and the bringing about of a convergence of 
interests. (Finlayson 2007, p. 545)!
A caveat to this observation is that the institutional architecture of the OECD and 
DAC, often described as a “consultative forum,” a “think tank,” or “a pool of 
statistical and economic expertise” (Woodward 2009, p. 3), brings together officials 
and experts only from the select segments of member state governments and the 
international community who are working on a given policy field. In the case of aid 
effectiveness, these would largely be officials and experts concerned with 
international financial flows designated as ODA. !
Two short examples illustrate how the DAC, as an ideational agency, has moved 
beyond this role as a consultative forum, think tank or pool of expertise by actively 
working to expand and connect the aid effectiveness discourse to different spheres of 
politics and policymaking outside the narrow field of aid experts. The first shows 
how DAC peer reviews, at the domestic level of DAC member states, actively strive 
to include different government sectors and line ministries in the debates on 
reforming foreign aid, in particular following the 2005 PD. The second shows how 
the DAC’s purposeful engagement of other transnational communities working on 
other issues of global governance seeks, at an international level, to anchor insights 
and principles of aid effectiveness outside the discourses specifically concerned with 
ODA. An example of the latter is recent work (starting about 2009 and gaining 
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traction with the 2010 Bangkok Call for Action) by the DAC on applying aid 
effectiveness principles to international, non-ODA finance to combat climate 
change. These efforts exemplify how the DAC strives to bring about a convergence 
of interest for the aid effectiveness agenda. They extend the legitimacy and support 
for the agenda beyond the immediate convening of foreign aid policymakers at the 
DAC and into the political economy these foreign aid officials and experts face 
domestically or internationally.    !
First, the interviews conducted for this thesis with DAC staff responsible for peer 
reviews show they explicitly consider the domestic political economy in DAC 
member states – beyond foreign aid institutions and policymakers, who are their 
immediate counterparts – to be a key subject to address for any successful 
implementation of aid effectiveness reforms:      !
But one other thing we noticed collectively [in peer reviews] when reviewing 
lots of different countries and speaking to people is the soft, practical side to 
implementing a political commitment. Countries obviously sign up to things in 
2005 and it all sounds excellent. The [Paris] principles make sense to most 
logical people in theory. But sometime implementing that with issues like 
having a domestic annual budgeting system or getting domestic auditors on 
board to change the way that you’re programming your money and things like 
that [...] Practical things often mean what they’ve achieved from commitments 
they made in 2005 or 2008. (Jackson, P., personal communication, January 17, 
2011)  
Consequently, the DAC peer reviews on foreign aid policy deliberately and 
consciously strive to do more than monitor reform progress. Peer reviews, in a DAC 
ideal, are themselves instruments that allow domestic policymakers to leverage their 
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issues vis-à-vis other actors in domestic politics with the added authority of 
international peers and the DAC behind them.    
In the country I finished reviewing, the agency in-charge of development had 
convened a meeting with anyone from any of the other ministries involved in 
development, of which they were quite a lot in this case, to just to discuss aid 
effectiveness with us. So, in the peer review, they were making sure that 
everyone that they would interact with really understood the principles of aid 
effectiveness. [...] They used the opportunity to raise awareness outside of their 
agency. Because – the whole thing as it is surrounded by jargon – people 
outside of development, but who are actually probably involved in development 
cooperation and activities, may not have been involved and have awareness of 
these discussions. (Jackson, P., personal communication, January 17, 2011) 
The DAC recently took steps to systematise the use of peer reviews and to create 
support for aid effectiveness in the broader context of domestic politics of its 
members:     
For years, we always had one chapter just on aid effectiveness in the peer 
reviews. But one reason why I mentioned practical issues is because we 
decided that we would ask every donor when we did the reports last year, what 
they found were practical reforms that had helped them to implement and make 
progress on the agenda and what practical obstacles were in their way. 
(Jackson, P., personal communication, January 17, 2011)     
The DAC, as ideational agency, acts purposefully within the context of domestic 
national policy processes. Published guidelines, such as Managing Aid: Practice of 
DAC Member Countries (OECD 2009), include chapters that explicitly address how 
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aid agencies might better raise public awareness of and political support for reforms 
in line with the aid effectiveness agenda. Ultimately, the DAC seeks to create 
convergences of interest among bilateral aid agencies, line ministries, policymakers, 
and the DAC itself as a political actor for global governance. This draws on the 
authority of the DAC and the aid effectiveness agenda to strengthen their position in 
domestic politics. The DAC itself benefits from a greater disposition of political 
preferences towards its own interest in the aid effectiveness agenda and in its 
institutional legitimacy to influence aid policymaking as a multilateral IO. !
At the international level, there are efforts by the DAC to link different expert 
communities with the aid effectiveness discourse and the ideals behind the agenda. !
We work closely with the UNDP Bangkok office and they’ve been exemplary 
in organizing sort of these dialogues. I can give you an example of climate 
change, for instance. [...] There is a huge amount of financing going into 
climate change. And yet, many of the lessons of aid effectiveness are not being 
learned, because it is a different type of community. (Fyson, S., personal 
communication, January 17, 2011)!
In contrast to the DAC’s indirect engagement with domestic politics through 
advice and support for bilateral aid officials, experts, and policymakers, the DAC 
takes a more direct strategy in linking the aid effectiveness discourse with political 
dialogues on climate finance. For example, the DAC actively established dialogue 
with the transnational community of experts centred around the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC):!
In UNFCCC discussions, aid effectiveness is very... well, it’s a struggle to get 
the Paris Declaration or the Accra Agenda mentioned in these particular arenas. 
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There is a real disconnect between climate-change financing people and aid 
effectiveness practitioners. So what we've done is bring the two communities 
together, for the first time in Malawi. Then, the UNDP, through its Bangkok 
office, organized a series of consultations in different countries mainly in Asia. 
And we came up with this Bangkok Call for Action21, which is kind of a 
commitment around how to use the aid effectiveness principle for climate-
change financing. (Fyson, S., personal communication, January 17, 2011)!
Potential benefits for the DAC as institution from expanding the aid effectiveness 
discourse are largely hypothetical at this point. Evidently, the 2010 Bangkok Call for 
Action and the debates on applying aid effectiveness principles to international 
climate finance are comparably recent developments. Nevertheless, the potential 
scope of the DAC’s expert-based authority grows as a shared understanding of aid 
effectiveness extends to new policymakers. As Barnett and Finnemore (2004) 
observe on the IMF’s expertise-based authority, “[p]ersuasion and education of this 
kind depend on reducing information asymmetries, not exploiting them, to exercise 
power” (p. 48). Also analogous to observations at the IMF, staff at the DAC sees 
their recommendations as objectively warranted and the aid effectiveness principles 
as objective improvement, not just for ODA, but all international monetary transfers 
for achieving shared objectives or safeguarding global public goods.  !
!
5.3.2. Monitoring and Measuring!
The 2005 Paris Declaration (PD) is the keystone document for the aid 
effectiveness agenda. One pivotal feature, which sets the PD apart from other 
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21  Bangkok Call for Action: http://www.oecd.org/dac/environmentanddevelopment/46517810.pdf  
(Accessed  26 April 2014) 
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documents on aid effectiveness and affords it such a prominent place in the aid 
effectiveness discourse, are the  PD’s 12 progress indicators “to be measured 
nationally and monitored internationally” (OECD 2005). Adopted, along with the 
PD, by the signatories, these indicators and the targets set for 2010 have since been 
the basis for the DAC’s monitoring of reform progress.    
I absolutely think of that as the difference between the Paris Declaration and a 
lot of other wordy declarations. It did have twelve targets, which were 
monitorable and it had good indicators developed. (Hammond, B., personal 
communication, May 6, 2011) !
Ironically, many experts regard the indicators to be methodologically weak. Yet 
the value of these indicators is not entirely in their technical quality, but in the 
monitoring routine they launched. As one interviewee told me, “at least it gave the 
Paris Declaration something to do, to monitor something”. Unlike peer reviews, 
which are used throughout the OECD, the system of monitoring the Paris indicators 
is unique to the DAC. It was created, partly, as an alternative to the peer review 
process for the WP-EFF’s expanded development partnership.   !
So, yes, there is this possibility of the peer reviews being used by reformers to 
help the reform. But that is among donor countries. The spirit of the working 
party [on aid effectiveness] was a bit different. [...] The originality was that we 
opened this group of participants and it became an international partnership 
with 80 members or partner countries and donors. You cannot have the same 
kind of specific and detailed evaluation of each member as we have with the 
peer review mechanism. This is why we have this system of the [Paris] 
Declaration with indicators and the monitoring system, which is 
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methodologically weak. (de Milly, H., personal communication, April 14, 
2011)!
Yet even if the resulting progress indicators and the system for their monitoring 
were unintentional, the actual multilateral monitoring of the PD in the 2006, 2008, 
and the final 2011 surveys on the Paris Declaration (see OECD 2011a) greatly 
contributed to the widespread diffusion of the aid effectiveness agenda among 
policymakers. Compared to established OECD practices, especially the peer reviews, 
the PD’s progress indicators and its system of national measurement for a 
multilateral monitoring have two distinct advantages. First, they established a shared, 
common set of goals for signatories of the PD to work towards through their reforms 
of foreign aid. Second, the actual monitoring surveys led to distribution of 
questionnaires throughout the aid agencies and government bureaucracies concerned 
with foreign aid. The monitoring of the PD thus allowed the pursuit and 
establishment of a far more universal agenda compared to the selective and often 
country-specific focus of OECD peer reviews. It permeated the donors’ aid 
bureaucracies and systems far more thoroughly than the limited interviews and 
investigation of a peer review ever could.   !
First, the success of the DAC in getting donors to agree on measurable targets and 
indicators for the aid effectiveness agenda was, to a large degree, only possible 
because the whole effort was a joint aim that transcended boundaries and 
responsibilities of individual states. Even though this is, in no small part, a result of 
concessions to countries (especially the USA, according to my interviewees) that 
were unwilling or unable to sign up to individual, bilateral targets, it does little to 
stop assessment of the performance of signatories.   !
! ! ! %*-!
In particular, the Paris targets were collective. Therefore, some donor countries 
said “oh yeah”, we like that target. They are not individual targets for us. [...] 
They were not taken to be something that applies country by country, 
institution by institution. That said, it is of course not difficult to understand 
what the position is of country X or country Y vis-à-vis each collective target. 
Are they ahead or behind average? Have they made more or less progress? 
(Hammond, B., personal communication, May 6, 2011)!
The DAC was not primarily striving to reform the foreign aid policies and 
systems of individual donors. Rather, DAC staff mostly see their efforts as a 
contribution to reforming the transnational institutional architecture for foreign aid, 
which could deliver more effective development results by transcending bilateral 
interests and diverging bureaucratic path dependencies. As noted earlier, the DAC’s 
self-perception remains firmly rooted in the notion of a common aid effort. This 
common aid effort runs through the concept of the “burden-sharing” of aid distilled 
from the bipolarity of global politics during the Cold War through to the 1990s 
effort. It reconstructs aid as an instrument to secure, as Richard Carey, author of 
Shaping the 21
st
 Century and former DAC chair, called it, “global public goods” 
(personal  communication, March 17, 2011). Within this common aid effort, the 
DAC enjoys a central function in foreign aid policy, far more so than the OECD 
does in other policy fields, such as education or health policy. In these fields, the 
OECD has, at best, a supplementary role in helping policymakers achieve better 
results. In the case of aid effectiveness, the DAC itself is instrumental in achieving 
better results. !
Second, the widespread distribution of questionnaires through national agencies 
and bureaucracies concerned with foreign aid, as a means of assessing the progress 
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on the PD “measured nationally and monitored internationally”, helped to create a 
much more homogenous pool of knowledge and expectations regarding the aid 
effectiveness agenda. The reforms recommended by a peer review could – and often 
are – subject to the unique challenges of a country and tailored to the needs of a 
particular government. In contrast, the monitoring of the PD creates a far more 
standardised assessment. A rationale for this lies in the intent of the DAC to assess 
individual country reforms, as well as to monitor a given country’s individual reform 
efforts with respect to the multilateral, common effort to reform global aid 
governance as a whole. The result is a more pervasive diffusion of the aid 
effectiveness idea throughout the community of people working in the institutions of 
foreign aid in the DAC member states.!
!
5.3.3. Facilitating the Position of Aid-Receiving Countries!
This ideational agency of the DAC is not limited to facilitating discussions of 
foreign aid among experts and policymakers. In the years after the signing of the 
Paris Declaration, the DAC increasingly found a role assisting with the 
implementation of aid effectiveness reforms and in serving as an impartial broker: 
 [The advantage of] the secretariat and the working party [WB-EFF] is that we 
can be seen as a broker, as an honest broker if you will in this process, because 
we are not a donor. We don’t provide any aid to these countries, only represent 
a community that is broad based. (Fyson, S., personal communication, January 
17, 2011) !
If diffusing aid effectiveness principles among policymakers in donor countries 
addresses the “supply-side” of foreign aid – the question of what foreign aid policy 
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should try to achieve – the efforts of the DAC to bring in and represent aid-receiving 
countries deal with a “demand-side” of foreign aid. They forge and strengthen 
complementary and congruent expectations among aid recipients and, crucially, aid 
agency staff in the field on how effective aid should be implemented. They also 
strengthen the DAC’s position in aid effectiveness discourses from one of mainly 
“expert authority” to one imbued with elements of “moral authority” (Clegg 2010, p. 
477), representing the interests of aid recipients vis-à-vis the DAC donor states. 
From a perspective of mechanisms, the DAC expanded its repertoire of traditional 
knowledge-based mechanism with forms of persuasion that include “both something 
akin to communicative action AND something more normatively coercive, entailing 
shaming” (Johnston 2001, p. 13). !
This most closely resembles the DAC’s innovation, in acting as an ideational 
artist, when it advocates a development partnership. This sort of (ultimately global) 
development partnership is the DAC’s most visible departure from its established, 
traditional role as an exclusive forum for its members. It is also the most incisive 
departure by the DAC as ideational agency from its traditional work with 
policymakers in DAC member states, as it approaches aid recipients and aid agency 
staff in the field. Both innovations are related to the idea of a development 
partnership and both extend the authority of the DAC and the WP-EFF. Conversely, 
they are also the reasons why alternatives are sometimes considered that would 
detach the WP-EFF from the institution of the OECD DAC (see Glennie 2011).!
Two brief examples illustrate the work and internal changes of the DAC and the 
WP-EFF. First is a series of workshops run by the DAC in ODA-receiving countries. 
Their aim is to establish a greater, shared understanding of key concepts in the aid 
effectiveness agenda. Second are organisational changes within the WP-EFF that 
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seek to create space for discussions and concerted opinions by aid receiving states in 
the policy discourses on foreign aid.   !
The DAC’s aid effectiveness workshops and seminars in aid-receiving countries, 
address aid effectiveness at the level of policy implementation, not policymaking. 
Compared to the DAC’s core activities, these regional workshops are relatively 
minor, limited to approximately a handful a year22. They are noteworthy, as 
implementation of policy ideas into practice can change things in many ways, 
especially if implemented by a multitude of organisations and countries: !
When we act to implement a policy, we change it [...]. Implementation will 
always be evolutionary; it will inevitably reformulate as well as carry out 
policy. (Majone and Wildavsky 1984 p. 177, 179-180; quoted in Freeman, 
2009, p. 431)    !
It illustrates how the DAC and the WP-EFF are “constantly operationalising ideas 
which are already in demand among member states and by helping member states to 
concretely implement diffuse ideas” (Marcussen 2001, p. 3). As noted, reducing 
information asymmetries and establishing a shared body of pertinent knowledge and 
expectations is a crucial aspect of the DAC’s engagement:!
The other big change has been to make much more use of regional workshops 
on all the topics on aid effectiveness. They [DAC staff] issue these workshops 
on procurement, on public financial management, on fragile states, etc... . All 
these are happening in the developing world. So that gives more pertinence to 
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22  A precise quantification is difficult, as there is no standard format. Some regional workshops, such 
as the 2007 Latin American and Caribbean Regional Workshop on Harmonisation and Alignment, 
address aid effectiveness topics very explicitly. Others, such as the more recent 2012/2013 series 
of African Regional Workshops on Green Growth and African Development Bank Partnership 
focus on different topics (e.g. green growth), with the DAC managing only part of the programme.  
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dialogue. It is not happening in Paris. It is actually happening in these 
countries. (Hammond, B., personal communication, May 6, 2011)!
These workshops by the WP-EFF go beyond education on relevant specialist 
subjects. Within the respective topic areas, they contribute to bringing the 
implementation of foreign aid policy in line with the principles of aid effectiveness. 
The following is a topical example of the WP-EFF’s work on the subject of the use 
of country systems, as encouraged by the PD:  !
Ghana, for instance, had a problem with country systems in the sense that the 
last survey showed that it had increased quality of its systems, but donors 
reduced the use of these systems by 10%. There wasn’t a correlation between, 
as put in the survey, ‘strengthening of country systems and their use by donors’. 
And there was a problem in the country with donors not necessarily 
coordinating with the government on these issues. So, what the working party 
[WP-EFF] did is we organized a dialogue with the government to look at what 
they thought were the main blockages when it came to using country systems. 
And then we organized a similar dialogue with the partners – the local donor 
representatives in Ghana. (Fyson, S., personal communication, January 17, 
2011)!
As ideational agency, the DAC thus reaches beyond a function as consultative 
forum. With these workshops, it takes an active hand in translating the agenda into 
implementation. !
The second aspect of the work and internal changes of the DAC and the WP-EFF 
encompasses the changes designed to give aid-receiving countries a better 
institutional voice. These seek to ensure representation from all sides in a 
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development partnership in the institutional architecture for aid policy debates on the 
DAC and WP-EFF:!
So the donor stakeholders were well represented in the process [of drafting the 
Paris Declaration]. I am not sure about the developing countries. They were not 
as well represented certainly in setting the targets. But they have been more and 
more vocal indeed since Paris. Their participation in the structure and the 
monitoring has increased. They have parity of numbers. So their views are 
being much more listened to. (Hammond, B., personal communication, May 6, 
2011)  !
The recent restructuring of the WP-EFF has the explicit objective “to move [it] 
from a working party to the international partnership of aid effectiveness”23. This 
includes creating of a member category for states receiving ODA, as well as a 
category for states that are both donors and recipients of aid. For the process leading 
up to the fourth High Level Forum on aid effectiveness in Busan, Korea in 
November 2011, specific focus groups were created that would by chaired by a DAC 
co-chair from an aid-receiving country (at the time Egyptian economist Talaat 
Abdel-Malek). They explicitly meet without the involvement of donors.!
 They [meetings of the focus group] are facilitated in the sense that we [WP-
EFF] get them a meeting and then we make sure that they meet. We invite them 
to the meeting, but we do not attend the meeting, because it is entirely for 
partner countries. We are not actually in the room. (Fyson, S., personal 
communication, January 17, 2011)      !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23   www.oecd.org/document/23/0,3746,en_2649_3236398_43415127_1_1_1_1,00.html (Accessed 10 
April 2014) 
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In line with the development partnership, this ideational innovation implies a new, 
changed role for the DAC, acting increasingly as honest broker between donors and 
aid recipients. This extends the role of the DAC beyond serving as a consultative 
forum, a role more similar to the functions commonly associated with the OECD. 
The DAC’s efforts support this new institutional role in two ways. First they reduce 
information asymmetries among different stakeholders involved in the aid 
effectiveness discourse. This agrees with observations by Barnett and Finnemore 
(2004) on IOs’ authority through expertise. This aids the social construction aspect 
of the aid effectiveness agenda in that an increasingly large audience operates on its 
shared assumptions and terminology. Second, and perhaps more notably, the DAC’s 
efforts create complementary expectations in aid-receiving countries and aid agency 
staff regarding how foreign aid is delivered. This second aspect has made the aid 
effectiveness agenda an increasingly relevant instrument to help aid-receiving 
countries manage their relationships with donor states in the international politics 
associated with foreign aid.  
!
5.4.  Chapter 5 Conclusion!
The aim of this case study is to trace the aid effectiveness agenda from its origins 
and genesis to its eventual diffusion and cascade in transnational policy discourses 
on foreign aid, making it an authoritative policy paradigm. The aid effectiveness 
agenda thereby constitutes a significant shift in line with John L. Campbell’s 
assessment that: !
[...] it comprises a wholesale shift in policymakers’ perception and 
understandings of the problems they confront and the solutions available. In 
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turn, this entails significant shifts in assumptions regarding the instruments and 
settings that they prefer and believe to be appropriate. As a result, paradigm 
shifts constitute a new policy-making logic. (Campbell 2004, p. 48) 
Chapter 4 provides a descriptive illustration of the changes in foreign aid that 
reflect the provisions of the aid effectiveness agenda. This case study then presents 
evidence for the hypothesis that aid effectiveness needs to be considered as a policy 
paradigm that is integral to global aid politics. In both content and implication, the 
aid effectiveness agenda is tied closely to the institutional history and eventual crisis 
of the OECD DAC as well as to its resulting ideational artistry and agency. The 
emergence of the agenda as a functional policy paradigm is thus shown to be an 
example of the sort of process that Finnemore and Sikkink have famously termed a 
“strategic social construction, in which actors strategize rationally to reconfigure 
preferences, identities, or social context” (1998 p. 888).!
In considering the above, one should nevertheless not conclude that the aid 
effectiveness agenda, the PD with its principles, or any other part of this evolving 
discourse is a mere cynical self-service without any grounding or substance. 
Evidence and support certainly exist for many of the provisions of the PD. Indeed, as 
noted, its principles and prescriptions have their roots in research and debates that 
precede the PD and the aid effectiveness agenda. Similarly, none of the persons I 
interviewed in the course of my research, especially at the DAC, questioned the 
potential benefits and gains that might ideally be realised with aid effectiveness in 
general. When doubts were raised, they most often revolved around fears that the 
current aid effectiveness agenda is not extensive or comprehensive enough to realise 
its ambitions.!
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However, as the main argument of this thesis asserts, a “good idea” on its own 
does not sufficiently explain such a reconfiguration of preferences, identities, or 
social context. A pivotal cause of successful social construction is, in the words of 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), the rational strategising of actors – or, as the case 
presented here suggests, a combination of critical factors that allow actors to 
strategise successfully in their rational interests. In the case of the OECD DAC and 
the aid effectiveness agenda, there were several critical factors. First, there was the 
opportunity for incisive change in a path-dependent IO in times of crisis. Second was 
the successful ideational artistry that combines existing narratives and topical ideas 
in ways that meet the prevailing problems and demands of the time. Third were the 
capacities and mechanisms for an authoritative, active agency for policy ideas and 
paradigms. These last factors not only diffuse the paradigm itself, but also diffuse the 
new paradigm’s implied legitimate role and function as the ideational agent that 
thereby “reinvents itself in a new form that fits well to the political context” 
(Marcussen 2001, p. 17). Thus, in this particular case of the OECD DAC, we find 
that its crisis of legitimacy called into question the institution’s purpose and function 
in the global governance of foreign aid. Its efforts as an “ideational artist” 
reconstructed and redefined its traditional concern as an IO with a common aid effort 
to the new and changed political landscape of the post-Cold War period. Finally, its 
ideational agency ensured that its own self-perception, or perhaps self-construction 
of its legitimate role, became intersubjectively shared among the broader community 
of foreign aid experts and officials. Through a convergence of interests, the DAC 
was then supported by its member-base and constituency, which consists, 
traditionally, of foreign aid donors and, latterly, of foreign aid recipient 
governments, as well as other stakeholders.!
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Chapter 6 – The World Bank!
Chapter 6 presents the second case study in this thesis. Similar to the case study 
presented in the previous chapter, this case study traces processes of internal 
formulation and external advocacy for the aid effectiveness agenda by an 
International Organisation (IO). In this chapter the World Bank (also “the Bank”). 
Chapters 5 and 6 do not present truly independent case studies. Rather, both case 
studies trace processes, which helped shape the emergence of the aid effectiveness 
agenda as the framework of ideas and standards that helps define many problems 
perceived to be in need of political solutions, and even policies considered 
appropriate to addressing these problems. Doing so, both case studies purse the 
research question of this thesis: How did IOs help shape the emergence of the aid 
effectiveness agenda? They also investigate the context and motives that defined 
these IOs strategic interest, as well as external and internal limits that constraining 
them as institutions in their efforts to shape the aid effectiveness agenda. This case 
study on role of the World Bank in shaping the aid agenda reveals both similarities 
and differences to the case study on the OECD DAC. Though these are noted in the 
following, the aim is not to make an argument based on a comparison across cases.   !
Noteworthy similarities include the inception of key ideas, which would later 
define the aid effectiveness agenda, (i) within a context of legitimacy crisis and 
organisational reform, through (ii) a process of internal ideational renewal conceived 
as a strategy of adaptation to changing external circumstances and expectations, and 
(iii) the engagement in external ideational agency as a complementary mechanism to 
(re-)legitimise the role of the institution and function in global affairs. As with the 
DAC in the previous chapter, the latter often carries elements of ex-post 
legitimisation for pre-existing activities of the World Bank. !
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Important differences are (i) the observation that aid effectiveness at the Bank 
never gained traction in the form of a dedicated institutional body or department, as 
it did with the DAC’s enthusiastic adoption of the paradigm in the OECD. Moreover, 
the observation that (ii) the Bank’s diverse operations in lending, financial services, 
and technical assistance make it a more full-fledged development and financial 
institution than the DAC, fundamentally shaping the Bank’s perception on aid 
effectiveness. Finally, that (iii) the Bank’s interest to actively drive the aid 
effectiveness agenda forward appears to have declined sharply in recent years. !
This case study is structured in three parts. The first part of this chapter 
investigates both external, environmental pressures and constraints the World Bank 
faced in the 1990s and the ideas and efforts for reform it in response to changing 
geo- and aid politics. Notably, these are the internal reforms and the external 
advocacy efforts initiated by Sir James David Wolfensohn as ninth president of the 
Bank between 1995 and 2005. As with the DAC, historical and institutional context 
defines both the internal germination of aid effectiveness ideas and their external 
advocacy. The second part focuses on the ideational processes that shaped the World 
Bank’s take on the aid effectiveness agenda. Aid effectiveness, ultimately, became 
an international agenda, established not least through the Rome (2003), Paris (2005) 
and Accra HLF (2008), all co-chaired by the DAC and the Bank. Nevertheless, the 
two institutions emphasised different aspects of the aid effectiveness agenda, 
especially in the formative years before the agenda spread more widely to become a 
truly global policy paradigm. Pre-existing narratives and discourses within the Bank 
and among its staff strongly determined both the Bank’s concern with aid 
effectiveness and the efforts undertaken by the Bank to advocate the agenda. The 
third part of this case study shifts from an internal perspective to an external 
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perspective to trace the Bank’s evolving relationship with the aid effectiveness 
agenda, with the core principles of the agenda, with the main stakeholders, with the 
client countries and, not least, with a broader audience of the international 
community of foreign aid experts and policy makers. As noted, the Bank’s recently 
cooling relationship with aid effectiveness, as a political agenda, provides a stark 
contrast to the political engagement of the OECD DAC. Where the DAC’s 
identification with the aid effectiveness agenda has itself become an issue of 
controversy leading up to the latest HLF in Busan (e.g. Atwood 2011; Glennie 
2011), the Bank’s involvement with the agenda has, on a level of global governance, 
notably chilled. Accounting for this divergence is an important focus in the final 
third part of this chapter. !
!
6.1. Crisis and Reform of the World Bank in the 1990s!
Aid effectiveness is not merely an abstract policy idea, but the product of a 
strategy of social construction pursued by – as argued in this thesis – IOs as they 
respond to environmental pressures; such as those resulting from historic or political 
change. As one of the key architect that helped shape the aid effectiveness agenda in 
its early stages, this is as true for the World Bank as it is for the OECD DAC, even 
though the Bank is clearly a different kind of organisation. However, like the OECD 
in general and the OECD DAC specifically, the Bank, as an institution, had to 
confront a crisis of legitimacy in the 1990s, with both its “moral authority” as 
politically neutral, unbiased IO, and its “expert authority” (Clegg 2010, p. 477) to 
deliver development results efficiently and effectively were called into doubt. This 
crisis, and the Bank’s efforts to adapt to it, defined the Bank’s approach to aid 
effectiveness. !
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Even more so than the OECD, the Bank, throughout its history, was repeatedly 
forced to adapt to changes to its authorizing environment. In its earliest years, the 
Bank faced a direct challenge to its post-World War II reconstruction mandate from 
the Marshall Plan. Decolonization and the surge of newly independent countries in 
Africa and Asia, which were largely not eligible for loans from the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), led to the creation of the Bank’s 
“soft loan window”, the International Development Association (IDA). The 
repercussions of the 1970s’ oil crises on the Bank’s client countries proved catalytic 
for its adoption of “structural adjustment” as a new paradigm for development. !
In all these episodes of change, the Bank adapted to new challenges by re-
defining its function and mission in foreign aid. Outclassed by the Marshall Plan in 
the reconstruction of post-World War Europe, it began emphasising its “secondary” 
mandate for development. Faced with the deep-seated problems of the many newly-
independent developing countries in the 1960s, the Bank moved away from a self-
conception as a bank, first and foremost, to become a more broad-based development 
institution. As oil shocks shattered the “implicit assumption of a fairly orderly, linear 
progression towards greater prosperity – for individual countries and the world” 
(Marshall 2008, p. 39), the Bank became increasingly concerned with transforming 
basic economic structures in the countries that were borrowing from the World 
Bank, and far less focused on financing investment projects.!
Like OECD, the 1990s saw the Bank caught up in sweeping geopolitical changes. 
Facing tough criticisms and direct challenges to its legitimacy, the years surrounding 
the Bank’s golden jubilee in 1994 are considered by scholars and Bank staff alike to 
be the Bank’s most incisive crisis yet. Katherine Marshall quotes an anonymous task 
force leader saying “the Bank faced a choice between failure to change, leading to 
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obsolescence and death, and a major revamping that could make it the world’s 
premier development institution” (2008, p. 49). The Bank responded to the crisis 
with internal reforms and extensive intellectual soul-searching, trying to re-interpret 
its role for a changed world. Grappling with aid effectiveness was a part (though not 
all) of the Bank’s effort to re-define itself in the global aid architecture after the Cold 
War. This link is examined in two parts. The first part briefly outlines the World 
Banks history as an institution. This provides the basis for an outline of the external 
environmental changes and the resulting criticisms that the Bank, along with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), had to confront. Though the Bank’s crisis in the 
1990s was more complex, I highlight three issues that were central to the criticisms 
voiced at the time and to the subsequent reform efforts by the Bank. They are (i) 
development results, (ii) a shifting intellectual conception of development and (iii) 
demands by stakeholders and activists – as a result of its 1990s crisis – for more 
transparency, accountability and responsiveness from the World Bank.!
The second part focuses on initiatives launched to respond to the crisis and to 
reassert the Bank’s role for the 21st century. Specifically, I look at two initiatives 
launched under the Bank’s ninth president, James Wolfensohn. These are (a) the 
1997 Strategic Compact and (b) the Comprehensive Development Framework 
(Wolfensohn 1999), which Wolfensohn presented to the Board of Governors in 
1998. Though broader in scope than aid effectiveness, these two initiatives 
emphasised topics that would later define the Bank’s vision of aid effectiveness. A 
third issue, though not entirely of World Bank origin, is the use of poverty reduction 
strategy papers (PRSP) as a central policy and planning instrument for countries 
negotiating debt relief and, increasingly, development assistance in general.  !
!
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6.1.1. The World Bank’s Post-Cold War Legitimacy Crisis  
The Bank is a multilateral financial institution. It provides financial and technical 
assistance for economic development and poverty reduction in low- and middle-
income countries. Financial support is allocated through low-interest loans and 
grants, which it provides for a wide range of sectors, including health, education, 
infrastructure, public administration, financial and private-sector development or 
agriculture.  
The Bank has two main funds, often called lending windows: the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International 
Development Association (IDA). A broader term, “The World Bank Group”, 
includes these two lending and grant-making activities and three separate entities: 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which provides finance to private 
companies in the developing world; the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA); and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
(see Ottenhoff 2011). The focus of this thesis rests on the two main windows, the 
IBRD and the IDA. Specifically, it rests on key aspects of the aid effectiveness 
debate within the Bank, which includes the discourses on country ownership and 
poverty reduction strategies, donor coordination and aid harmonization (Eriksson 
2001, Thornton, Kolkma and Fostvedt 2010) and highly aid dependent countries 
with a strong donor presence. These issues usually fall under the purview of the 
IDA.     
The IBRD was established at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. It is the 
“original” World Bank. The IBRD is structured much like a cooperative, which is 
owned and operated for the benefit of its currently 187 member countries. The IBRD 
raises most of its capital on capital markets, where it benefits from its excellent 
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status with credit rating agencies. Profits on commercial lending, plus investment 
earnings generated by accumulated capital, cover the IBRD’s administrative costs. 
This resulting financial independence of the IBRD “give[s] it flexibility and leeway 
that many other development institutions lack” (Marshall 2008, p. 4).    !
The IDA, established in 1960 as subsidised lending window, provides assistance 
to countries that do not qualify for or cannot afford the conditions of IBRD loans. 
IDA assistance is often referred to as “soft”, as it provides both grants and 
concessional credits (as opposed to IBRD loans) without interest for periods of up to 
35 or 40 years. While the IBRD raises funds on capital markets, the IDA is funded 
by contributions from donor governments, who convene usually every three years to 
replenish IDA funds. Additional funds come from the IBRD's income and from 
repayments of earlier IDA credits. For the period from July 2011 to June 2014, 51 
countries contributed a total of US$ 49.3 billion for IDA’s 16th replenishment. 
Today, the IDA serves 81 of the poorest countries, 39 of which are in Africa. !
Given these differences, it is evident why aid effectiveness concerns prevail in 
countries served by the IDA. In these countries, foreign aid more often makes up a 
significant portion of a country’s budget and donors thus often hold a greater amount 
of political influence. The government’s capacities to lead the design and 
implementation of aid programmes are more likely to be weak. In IBRD client 
countries, foreign aid tends to be more marginal. !
Since 1944 and up until the 1980s, the World Bank – including the IDA since 
1960 – has steadily grown in both absolute and real terms. For the IBRD, evolution 
in lending volumes in the 20th century has been divided into three distinct phases by 
Dilip Ratha (2005). The first phase, beginning with the IBRD’s first loan of US$ 250 
million to France in 1944, lasted until FY 1979. It was marked by steady increases in 
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investment lending. Adjustment lending was introduced in the second phase, which 
starts in 1980, to address structural balance-of-payments difficulties emerging in 
many developing countries in the wake of the 1970s’ oil crises. The third phase 
begins in the 1990s, after the resolution of the debt crisis and the end of the Cold 
War. Dilip Ratha (2005) comments the underlying reasons for these changes: !
As governments embraced market economies and embarked on privatization 
drives, there was a surge of private capital flows to developing countries. In this 
phase, IBRD lending commitments exhibited volatility around a rather flat 
trend line. [...] these fluctuations came almost entirely from adjustment loans 
[...]. (p. 411)     !
The trend for the IDA is broadly similar. The initial replenishment in 1960 
provided US$ 1.1 billion, including US$ 900 million from donors and US$ 210 
million transferred from IBRD net income. In subsequent decades, IDA’s supply of 
financial resources increased by about 6% per year in real terms, or about 9.5% in 
nominal terms. Since IDA6 (FY81-84), resources for IDA have been flat in real 
terms (World Bank 2007) and declined steeply with IDA11 (FY96-98), largely 
because China graduated from IDA-eligibility (Moss and Leo 2011). Demand for 
IBRD loans and IDA replenishments grew steeply again early in the 21st century.  !
The combination of the demand for IBRD loans reaching a plateau and the IDA 
replenishments stagnating can be seen as a mirror to the 1990s’ broad decline of 
foreign aid (see chapter 5). Catherine Weaver identifies shrinking support and 
demand for the Bank as the catalyst for its institutional crisis: !
Dramatic shifts in the authorizing and task environments in the early 1990s 
stimulated widespread pressure for reform in the Bank. The most prominent 
! ! ! %,*!
catalyst came in the form of a shift in the preferences of major donor states 
regarding their financial support for, and demands on, the Bank. Much of the 
political rationale for development aid disappeared after the collapse of 
communism in 1989-91. Domestic budget constraints and waning public 
support for foreign aid compelled governments to cut back commitments and 
streamline their multilateral development banks. (2008 p. 143)!
Despite the Bank’s relative financial independence, stagnating demand and 
budgets were symptoms of a crisis. More substantive aspects of the crisis were 
qualitative challenges to its legitimacy and raison d’être as the world’s premier 
development institution. One characteristic of the Bank’s 1990s crisis was that it was 
beset by critics from opposing ends of the political spectrum with often 
irreconcilable or conflicting demands. In 2000, Nancy Birdsall, a former senior Bank 
staff member, wrote on the occasion of anti-Globalisation and anti-Bank protests: !
[T]he World Bank [was] caught in a squeeze [...] Those on the left say that the 
Bank is a vehicle for globalization that is run by finance and corporate insiders, 
imposing austerity and “conditionality” [...] that hurts the poor. Those on the 
right say the Bank is crowding out private lending in middle income countries 
and using loans to grease the wheels of wasteful and corrupt Government 
practices (quote in Phillips 2009, p. 36).   !
This assessment of the Bank’s criticism from 2000 holds true for much of the 
1990s. Most literature on the Bank’s crisis and on its subsequent reform efforts has 
therefore approached the subject from the predicament of seemingly irreconcilable 
external demands (Phillips 2009, Pincus and Winters 2002, Ritzen 2005). Catherine 
Weaver in particular identifies “organized hypocrisy” (2008, p. 34) at the Bank as a 
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way for the Bank to resolve conflicts between external demands on one hand and its 
internal institutional configurations on the other. !
This thesis argues that the political motives of the Bank’s critics are not really 
what matters. The criticism, in that particular historical context, was sufficient to 
tarnish the Bank’s legitimacy. As a crisis of legitimacy, it is the contents of the 
criticisms levelled at the Bank, which went to the core of the Bank’s legitimacy, 
which is – as Jacqueline Best describes – attributed from outside on a basis of 
“perception and belief” (2007, p. 472) for an IOs’ authority. !
Three criticisms stand out. The first criticism was doubt cast on the Bank’s ability 
to effectively deliver development results commensurate with the resources it 
invests. The second consisted of challenges to the World Bank’s (and the IMF’s) 
intellectual leadership on development issues by broad shifts in development 
(policy) thinking in the 1990s. The third took the form of public protests against the 
Bank during the 1990s which cast severe doubts on the Bank’s motives and on its 
accountability for its actions; its “moral authority” (Clegg 2010, p. 477) as apolitical 
expert bureaucracy. These criticisms directly challenged core aspects of the Bank’s 
(self-) perception and legitimacy as an effective, expertise-based and impartial, 
technocratic, accountable global bureaucracy. I discuss each of these in turn.!
Development Results: A perception that foreign aid was not producing the hoped-
for development results, along with the problem of (easily) demonstrating the 
outcomes of foreign aid, became key issues in the 1990s. This was amplified by 
critical studies from the Bank itself, including task force report known as Wapenhans 
Report (1992) leaked to the public in 1992. Catherine Weaver (2008) explains. 
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The report uncovered shocking statistics regarding the effectiveness of the 
Bank’s programs. Specifically, the number of projects judged unsatisfactory at 
completion had jumped from 15 percent in 1981 to 37.5 percent in 1991. The 
share of projects with major problems had grown to 20 percent in 1991. 
Moreover, borrowers’ compliance with conditionality agreements reached an 
all-time low, with only 22 percent of all legal agreements fulfilled in 1991. (p. 
147)     
As early as 1992, the Wapenhans Report highlights problems in the performance 
of World Bank projects and the Bank’s use of conditionalities. It also draws attention 
to the importance of stakeholder participation and country ownership as prerequisites 
for successful aid projects. After being leaked to the public, the negative, self-critical 
diagnoses found within the Wapenhans Report were widely publicised and become – 
as remembered by Kapur, Lewis and Webb (1997) – part of the criticisms levelled 
against the Bank as it approached its 50th anniversary:  
The approach of the Bank’s fiftieth anniversary raised its profile rather 
awkwardly. [...]. “Fifty years is enough” became a rather shrill theme. [...] And 
the World Bank [...] was given little credit for self-criticism. The press lionized 
the negative findings of the report of the task group on portfolio management in 
1993. (1997, p. 33) 
While the Bank’s 1994 jubilee marked the height of the Bank’s crisis in public, 
concerns about its performance lingered. A 1996 report by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) argues that the Bank continually misdirected aid away 
from the countries that were most in need, promoted loans based on poor analysis 
and did not take enough effort, during implementation, to resolve problems. In 2000, 
the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission of the U.S. Congress, 
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chaired by Allan H. Meltzer, published a report known as the Meltzer Report (2000). 
It also was highly critical of the Bank’s performance.     
A further side to the contentious issue of results from foreign aid was the 
widespread perception that the Bank itself was a bloated, overstaffed institution. 
Though such assessments of massive bureaucratic waste at the Bank – at least in this 
severity - do not always hold up to closer scrutiny (cp. Phillips 2009, p. 34), the 
perception was clearly there: “More stakeholders starting asking: Is their money well 
spent? Was the Bank delivering ‘value for money’?” (Phillips, T., personal 
communication, October 24, 2011) 
In summary, legitimacy from outcomes (Best 2007, Bodansky 1999) became far 
more crucial for the Bank (and foreign aid in general) after the end of the Cold War. 
Delivering results became a more central concern for the Bank’s staff and leadership, 
just as internal and external scrutiny cast severe doubt on the Bank’s ability to 
deliver results.     
  Intellectual Leadership: The Bank’s extensive 1997 reform, the Strategic 
Compact (see below), was launched because “the development paradigm was 
shifting, and the Bank risked losing its leadership role” (World Bank 2001, p. 1). As 
noted in chapter 5, development policy discourses were shaped by a new 
appreciation with institutions, governance and democratisation, a greater focus on 
transnational and global problems and – more specific to the Bank than the DAC – 
the importance of increasingly liberalised global capital markets. 
The transition of countries emerging from the end of the Soviet Union (Stiglitz 
1999, p. 577), many joining the Bank, and the concern at the time with 
democratisation (Huntington 1991; Fukuyama 1992) gave centre-stage to institutions 
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and governance in development thinking. Its most zealous critics increasingly saw 
the World Bank on the wrong side of a “Markets vs. Democracy” divide (Danaher 
2002). A calmer, but no less vexing, conundrum was raised by studies linking the 
“success” of foreign aid with good policies and governance, just as studies following 
the Wapenhans Report cast doubt on the ability of conditionalities to induce just 
these sorts of favourable conditions from the outside (Dollar and Pritchett 1998). 
There was an acute sense of “failure of aid given to dictators in the 1980s” (Dethier, 
Jean-Jacques, personal communication, October 24, 2011) in the Bank, along with 
demand for greater aid selectivity (Dollar and Levin 2006).  
Development discourses also shifted to topics such as environmental 
sustainability, population growth, migration, nuclear proliferation and fragile states. 
“Global public goods” became a much-debated concept at the Bank, as it did with 
the DAC (e.g. OECD 1996b). Despite this, topics such as environmental protection 
made only slow headway in the Bank initially (see Rich 1994). Other global 
institutions, notably the UN, were more visible and active in addressing these topics. 
 Finally, the 1990s saw great increases in foreign direct investments (FDI) to 
emerging markets and developing countries following a liberalization of capital 
markets:  
FDI is possibly the strongest factor in contributing to development [...] in the 
1990s. By the end of the decade, FDI has reached a level of at least five times 
the flow of Official Development Assistance to poor and middle-income 
countries. (Ritzen 2005, p. 77) 
In many ways, this vindicated the emphasis placed (not least by the World Bank) 
on liberalization and free markets in development during the 1980s. Yet critics of the 
! ! ! %-%!
Bank also made the intuitive case that the Bank was then no longer needed to 
provide capital or facilitate foreign investment (Weaver 2008, p. 145), since 
countries eligible for IBRD loans increasingly benefitted from unprecedented access 
to capital markets. Along with the Bank’s new emphasis on combating poverty, this 
is likely a factor in what Devesh Kapur calls a “creeping constitutional coup” (2003, 
p. 8), which sidelines the IBRD in favour of the IDA.   
In summary, the intellectual climate in foreign aid was shifting rapidly in the 
1990s. An extensive literature scrutinises the Bank’s organisational culture (e.g. 
Weaver 2008) and its bias for neoclassical economics (Stiglitz 1999). In many ways, 
the Bank’s strong focus in this area turned out to be a handicap for agilely 
incorporating new policy agendas such as governance (Miller-Adams 1999). It thus 
lost some of its analytical and intellectual “edge” in international development, just 
as the Bank’s traditional strength in financial assistance as a defining feature was 
rapidly declining in importance to many of the Bank’s client countries. 
Accountability and Responsiveness: Many of the above criticisms converged in 
public criticisms of the Bank by Civil Society Organisations and protest movements, 
most of which made efforts to influence the Bank’s authorizing political 
environment; i.e. the (constituents of the) governments on the Bank’s board. The 
vocal group24 dedicated to 50 Years is Enough (Danaher 1994), as the Bretton 
Woods Institutions approached their fiftieth anniversary in 1994, is likely the best 
known, representing “a view among certain groups that these institutions [World 
Bank and IMF] had done at least as much or more harm than good” (Stiglitz 1999, p. 
577). Their arguments extended beyond the above criticisms, which saw the Bank as 
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24  A loose alliance of Northern NGOs led informally (at least for the highly critical groups) by the 
San Francisco-based Global Exchange, founded by anti-globalisation activist Kevin Danaher (and 
others) in 1988.  
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ineffective or irrelevant. Rather, these groups argued that the existence and work of 
the BWI itself was harmful, possibly malicious in intent. Though 50 Years is Enough 
faded from the public after 1994, it is still remembered by members of the Bank’s 
staff. Many of my interviewees named it as the mark and the peak of the Bank’s 
crisis, as well as being an important trigger for the Bank’s efforts to reform. Three 
main themes ran through 50 years is Enough and its contemporaries.  
A first a common claim was that the World Bank and its staff were out of touch 
with the realities and causes of poverty in poor countries. Living in Washington, they 
allegedly visit client countries on missions in an insulated bubble of luxurious 
flights, hotels and conference centres, and readily fall victim to the biased perception 
of client countries through their often exclusive contact with ministers, senior civil 
servants and the countries’ ruling elite. Whether accurate or not, the unflattering 
picture stuck, expediting later efforts to decentralise more of the Bank operations to 
the field. These criticisms also were a backdrop for efforts to encourage more 
participatory mechanisms for planning and programming foreign aid. 
A second prominent claim was that – by design or as a consequence of the Bank’s 
biased access and approach to client countries and their ruling elite – its work 
effectively represses democratisation and perpetuates established power relations. 
Adjustment loans and conditionalities were often criticised for this (e.g. Danaher 
1994, p. 4). Structural adjustment programmes were also an inviting target. The 
(early) adjustment loans often The Bank’s stabilization and structural adjustment 
programmes were thus accused of aggravating the problems of poverty in many 
countries, rather than solving them (Budhoo 1994, p. 20). Structural adjustment, as a 
term, quickly became a near-synonym for failed and even harmful foreign aid 
interventions (Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 2002).  
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Finally, the World Bank was portrayed as an instrument for perpetuating global 
dependency and inequality. Laced with concepts of world systems (Wallerstein 
1974, Shannon 1996) and dependency theory (Ferraro 2008, p. 58-64), these literally 
accusations saw the Bank working at a cross-purpose with its mission of lifting 
people out of poverty. In addition, they portrayed the Bank as contrary to the idea of 
aid a assistance for developing states of – in world systems theory analogy – the 
“periphery” to catch up with the industrialised countries of the “core”. In this 
reading, the IMF and the Bank not only imposed costs on the poor and vulnerable in 
developing countries, but did so to “bail out” U.S. and European banks or investors, 
who “recycled” surplus petrodollars in emerging and developing countries. 
 
6.1.2. World Bank Reform during Wolfensohn’s Presidency  !
The World Bank in the 1990s faced a crisis of legitimacy, manifested in 
challenges to the Bank’s (i) efficiency and effectiveness in producing outcomes; (ii) 
its specialised expertise as the basis of rational, technocratic decision-making; and 
(iii) its political impartiality. The Bank responded with internal reform efforts and 
with re-thinking its role and function as a key element of the global financial 
architecture, and of foreign aid in particular.  
Exemplary for these efforts were the 1997 Strategic Compact (hereafter the 
Compact) and the 1998 Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF). Both were 
launched on the initiative of James D. Wolfensohn during presidency of the Bank 
from 1995 to 2005. Though there is a danger of drastically oversimplifying a decade 
of institutional changes by casting it through these two initiatives, the Compact and 
CDF are iconic for the issues and debates pervading the Bank in the 1990s. They are 
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exceedingly well-researched initiatives (e.g. Phillips 2009, Pincus and Winters 2002, 
Ritzen 2005, Weaver 2008). They exemplify the topics and discourses that formed 
the backdrop for the Bank’s approach to aid effectiveness. !
The Compact encapsulates many ideas for internal change that prepared the way 
for a more emphatic concern with aid effectiveness issues. These include, among 
others, efforts to decentralise the Bank’s hierarchy, emphasis on country ownership 
and broad stakeholder-consultation in the design of country strategies, as well as 
support for a more “result-based” working culture among Bank staff.  !
Despite being initially drafted by Wolfensohn on his own, the CDF in contrast 
epitomises key aspects of the Bank’s externally oriented, post-Cold War vision for 
development cooperation. Notably, it identifies the two issues of “poverty alleviation 
and development effectiveness” (Wolfensohn 1999, p. 2) as key concerns. For the 
former, it aims to marry macroeconomic concerns as the BWIs’ traditional focus 
with “structural, social and human aspects” (1999, p. 3). For the latter, the CDF 
highlights demand for donor coordination and country owner- and leadership, both 
key principles of the later aid effectiveness agenda.!
A third building block was poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP). PSRPs had 
initially less grounding within the Bank itself, but were an instrument advocated in 
the context of campaigns calling for debt relief for highly indebted poor countries 
(HIPCs). PRSPs eventually became a mechanism adopted by the Bank, which it used 
to translate the new and still largely theoretic emphasis on ownership, partnerships 
and donor coordination into standardised operational working processes.   !
The Strategic Compact, launched in 1997, was a response addressing many of the 
above criticisms through comprehensive reform of the Bank itself. Its aim was  
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“fundamentally transformed institution – quicker, less bureaucratic, more able to 
respond continuously to changing client demands and global development 
opportunities, and more effective in achieving its main mission – reducing poverty. 
(World Bank 1997, p 1) !
Even within the Bank, the Strategic Compact was seen “as a response to the 
diagnosis that the institution was under substantial stress and in possible decline” 
(World Bank 2001, p. 1). ‘Effectiveness’ is a key term found throughout the 
Compact, which itself carried the sub-title Renewing the Bank’s Effectiveness to 
Fight Poverty (World Bank 1997, p. 1). Originally budgeted at US$ 400 million, the 
final costs for the reform amounted to about US$ 576 million for the entire 30-month 
reform initiative (Xu and Weller 2009, p. 88). Scope and urgency of the Compact 
demonstrates how important the need for a thorough re-imagining of the Bank as an 
organisation was to the Bank’s leadership and stakeholders.   !
The Strategic Compact was divided into four pillars known as (1) refuelling 
current business activities of the Bank; (2) refocusing the development agenda; (3) 
retooling the Bank’s knowledge base; and (4) revamping institutional capabilities. !
At the heart of the Compact were a decentralization of staff and a shift of 
decision-making away from Washington DC to the Bank’s offices in client 
countries, most notably relocating most of the Bank’s country managers. Under 
labels such as ‘client responsiveness’ and ‘shifting resources to the front-line’, the 
Bank’s organisation was reformed to be more responsive to priorities of its client 
countries. Moreover, the second and fourth pillar of the Compact represented efforts 
by the Bank to hire staff, build expertise and develop products and services in the 
new thematic areas dominating the development agenda in the 1990s, including 
“social dimensions of sustainable development, financial sector development, Africa 
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capacity building and anti-corruption” (World Bank 2001c). The Bank responded to 
“the environmental lobby” (Phillips 2009, p. 26), the new focus on institutions in 
development thinking, and to criticisms of its neglect of the social aspects of poverty 
reduction. The Compact’s third pillar urged the Bank to truly become a ‘knowledge 
bank’ – which is itself a reaction by the Bank to its declining role, relative to global 
capital markets, in financing investments. Training programmes were expanded and 
a “knowledge-sharing infrastructure” (World Bank 2001c) set up to create and share 
knowledge with expert communities outside the Bank. A later, iconic initiative for 
this was the Global Development Network. Moreover, efforts were made to improve 
evaluations and to consolidate the Bank’s varied activities, while simultaneously 
offering expertise and services for a growing portfolio of topics.!
In conclusion, there are clear link between key criticisms directed at the Bank in 
the 1990s and the Compact’s emphases for reform. They are readily apparent even in 
internal Bank documents, and the Bank reacted very consciously to its legitimacy 
crisis. Scholars such as Catherine Weaver (2008) perceptively emphasise the 
contradictory aims of the Compact, which she sees as result of an “external goal 
incongruence” of the Bank’s various critics, to stress this very nature of the Compact 
as a response to exogenous demands: !
The reform [...] produced mixed results because it adopted contradictory goals. 
This was a result of divergent environment pressures and the preferences of 
external actors upon whom the Bank depends for critical resources and 
conferred legitimacy (p. 172)!
There are certainly contradictions in the Compact, especially if assessed purely as 
a reaction by the Bank to the changing political interests of the Bank’s stakeholders. 
Yet, the Compact was not only a passive response. It was an offensive move, which 
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succeeded, not least, in acquiring several hundred million dollars for technology 
(such as video conference infrastructure to link the Bank’s HQ with the newly 
empowered country offices), staff training and administrative costs in a period of 
foreign aid austerity and widespread criticism of the Bank. The Compact, in many 
ways, truly was a deal presented to the Bank’s largely sceptical board, promising a 
‘new Bank’ in return for a sizeable investment. For this, emphasis was placed on 
‘client orientation’ – in the language of corporate reform – or broader “partnerships 
for development” (World Bank 1998), as it became known in foreign aid – as a 
precondition for “Renewing the Bank’s Effectiveness to Fight Poverty” (World 
Bank 1997). On paper, the partnership idea reconciles any “external goal 
incongruence” (Weaver 2008) by stakeholders insofar as it claims to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness of Bank operations (and, in theory, foreign aid in 
general) through emphasis on responsiveness and country ownership. The Compact, 
though oriented inwards, incorporating elements of a “strategic social construction” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 888), which was subsequently elaborated and 
refined in the Bank’s more outward-oriented work, including the CDF.          !
The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) is one of the stranger 
documents from the World Bank’s history. Written, as noted by Wolfensohn’s 
biographer Mallaby (2005), by Wolfensohn himself in his winter retreat, the CDF 
(initially ‘New Development Framework’) was hardly a ‘Bank product’ at all. The 
circulation of ‘Wolfensohn’s CDF’ within the World Bank’s senior staff and the 
political community raised consternation and, according to Mallaby, even near-revolt 
within the institution, both for the in parts self-aggrandizing tone of the document 
and for its failure to acknowledge prior incarnations of several core ideas, which 
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blended Wolfensohn’s “own instincts with the intellectual fashions of the moment” 
(Mallaby 2005, p. 234).!
Nonetheless, the CDF highlights key issues of policy discourses on foreign aid at 
the time. It calls for countries to take charge of their own development and to set 
their own priorities. It calls for breaking with imposed conditionalities, whose 
effectiveness had been refuted by studies building on the Wapenhans Report (e.g. 
Collier 1997; Dollar and Pritchett 1998). It stresses the pivotal role of governance 
and institutions for development and emphasises transparency and “accountability 
for performance” (Wolfensohn 1999). For the latter, it proposes a two-way aid 
partnership of donors and recipients (similar to Shaping the 21st Century (OECD 
1996) and the Bank’s own Partnership Initiative [World Bank 1998]). The CDF 
discusses aid coordination as a central concern. For this, Wolfensohn again drew on 
the idea of a ‘management matrix’, except now applied on a country-wide scale to 
encompass all donors and stakeholders, with the aim of creating an overview of what 
all donors in a given recipient country are doing “to create real chances of achieving 
longer term targets in an effective and accountable manner” (Gulrajani 2007, p. 53).!!
More than previous concept papers, the CDF gave unprecedented profile to these 
issues, not least because of Wolfensohn’s own empathic lobbying for the framework. 
As a later review of the CDF notes, “While the [CDF’s] principles are not new, 
bringing them together as a unified concept and championing the package as 
important to the global development community is an important innovation” (Elliot, 
Eriksson and Fostvedt 2003). !
As an indicator of the changes that were afoot in the Bank, the CDF is arguably 
even more important than the Strategic Compact. The Compact takes on many, if not 
most of the aforementioned criticisms that were directed at the Bank at the time. 
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Doing so, however, the Compact largely starts from the assumption of a 
dysfunctional World Bank and promises to “deliver a fundamentally improved 
institution in the future” (World Bank 1997). The CDF, in contrast, starts from the 
assumption of a systemic dysfunction of the global foreign aid architecture in its 
entirety. For this, the CDF draws strongly on the budding consensus that the way 
foreign aid is delivered and implemented, not just its volume, determine the 
effectiveness of foreign aid. The CDF commends the World Bank, as a successfully 
reformed institution “that is results-based and not volume- or procedure-based” 
(Wolfensohn 1999), for a special role and as a guiding example for the proposed 
reforms to the global aid architecture more broadly. This narrative shift is an 
underappreciated innovation of the CDF. A few years earlier, the World Bank was 
widely criticised as exemplary of a dysfunctional aid system, offering reforms such 
as the Compact to improve itself. With the CDF, the Bank now presented itself as a 
dynamically reforming institution, whose experiences offer intellectual leadership on 
the question of how to tackle the systemic dysfunctions of the aid system as a whole. !
Despite internal and external controversies surrounding the introduction of the 
CDF, it rapidly became a key reference for the Bank’s conceptual work on country-
led partnerships, aid coordination, harmonization of procedures and result-oriented 
management (e.g. World Bank 1999; 2002a; 2002b). For the years, the World Bank 
treated the CDF as a near-synonym for an emerging development consensus, which 
emphasised partnership, country ownership and participation (Gulrajani 2007, p. 52). !
However, the CDF lacked operational guidance or even broad indicators 
providing direction as those later included in the PD. As a consequence, the various 
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‘CDF pilots’25, initiated within months of the CDF and on the back of the Bank’s 
newly decentralised organisational structure, still in flux after the Strategic Compact, 
gave entrepreneurial Bank staff in countries such as Vietnam, Bolivia (Gulrajani 
2007), Uganda (Mallaby 2005, p. 207-231) and the Kyrgyz Republic (Jacobs 2005) 
unprecedented leave to test different approaches to this new aid paradigm in different 
countries. The CDF pilots thus became experimental laboratories for key tenets of 
the future aid effectiveness paradigm, long before aid effectiveness had developed 
into a broader policy agenda. The CDF pilots were also heavily discussed by various 
multilateral agencies in the Working Party on Donor Practices, coordinated by the 
DAC (World Bank 2000).Two topics raised from CDF pilots were (a) transaction 
costs of foreign aid in the absence of working donor coordination and (b) the need 
for harmonizing the operational procedures, such as procurement, of aid institutions.   
Despite the incisive role the CDF played in pioneering concepts such as donor 
coordination (to reduce transaction costs) and harmonization within the World Bank 
and beyond, references to the CDF are increasingly missing in the Bank’s recent 
work on aid effectiveness (for an exception see Wood et al. 2011, p. 2). Many 
concepts covered by the CDF – such as development partnerships and managing aid 
for development results – were later subsumed in the aid effectiveness agenda. The 
CDF as a frame of reference for aid policy eventually drifted into obscurity.!
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers were a third ingredient to define the Bank’s 
1990s shift in approaching development. The Strategic Compact principally sought 
to improve the quality and effectiveness of the Bank’s operations by reforming its 
organisation. The CDF turned many of the criticisms directed towards the Bank into 
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25  The World Bank country offices piloting the CDF were Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican 
Republic, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Morocco, Romania, Uganda, 
Vietnam, West Bank and Gaza.  
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virtues as it emphasised the need for a long-term, holistic and country-driven effort 
to reduce poverty to achieve development results. PRSPs, finally, offered the Bank 
an instrument to implement aid in a coordinated, anti-poverty-oriented, government-
driven fashion. PRSPs, however, were not originally a Bank invention.    !
Rather, PRSPs gained prominence in connection with the 1990s’ second HIPC 
debt-relief initiative, led in particular by the Jubilee 2000 movement. They were 
inspired by specific country experiences, notably those made in Uganda in the early 
1990s. Uganda’s relative success in fighting poverty had been lauded and publicised, 
emphasising the Ugandan government’s strong dedication to the cause 
(“ownership”), as well as the thorough reform efforts launched to strengthen public 
institutions and budget procedures, thus ensuring that public and foreign aid 
resources could be spend reliably on development priorities. “Uganda’s Myth and 
Miracle” (Mallaby 2005, p. 206) was an important influence for the CDF and its 
emphasis for putting countries in “the driver seat” (Wolfensohn 1999). The fruitful 
cooperation of Uganda’s government with the Bank’s director for East Africa, Jim 
Adams, who went on to become a strong advocate of ownership and country-led 
development in the Bank (Xu and Weller 2009, p. 109), served as a blueprint for the 
CDF. Campaigners for debt-relief pointed to Uganda as an example of a country 
capable of reform and willing to tackle poverty, yet crippled by crushing debt that 
needed to be serviced at the expense of investment into fields such as education or 
health. In the HIPC-process, Uganda established a Poverty Action Fund in 1998 to 
direct funds made available from debt relief into key areas of social infrastructure.  !
To the economists at the World Bank, the Poverty Action Fund [in Uganda] 
was a gimmick. It ignored the elementary point that money was fungible. [...] 
To get out of this hole, the Bank and the finance ministries and the Jubilee 
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campaigners borrowed a bit more from Uganda. Candidates for debt relief 
should come up with development strategies that covered the waterfront of 
public spending, [...]. The model for this broad strategy was Uganda’s Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan. (Mallaby 2005, p. 252)!
The result, ultimately, was the introduction of PRSPs, which were initially 
modelled on the Ugandan Poverty Eradication Plan. In 1999, the IMF and the IDA 
adopted them as instruments for their foreign aid efforts (IMF/IDA 1999). For IDA 
especially, PRSPs quickly grew beyond debt relief and became a central tool for 
almost all its operations:  !
To summarise, the new millennium found the Bank in a unique position with 
respect to the increasingly global efforts to improve the effectiveness of foreign aid 
through reform of the international aid system. Driven by painful criticism in the 
early 1990s, and to a lesser degree the need to distinguish itself from the IMF as the 
global custodian of macroeconomic prudence (see Mallaby 2005, p. 207-211), the 
Bank had launched thorough organisational reform to improve its result-orientation 
and its responsiveness to client countries’ demands. With the CDF, it began 
broadcasting its vision of how the new aid system should function. CDF pilots in 
client countries allowed the Bank to collect unparalleled experience on the 
challenges and pitfalls, as well as the potential of the emerging new agenda in 
practice. With embracing the PRSP process, the Bank moved towards taking the lead 
on an instrument that promised to translate CDF ideals such as country-ownership 
into the day-to-day realities of foreign aid practice in the recipient countries.!
!
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6.2. The World Bank and Aid Effectiveness!
The World Bank’s efforts to promote the aid effectiveness agenda in the early 
years of the 21st century, alongside the DAC, were driven by several trends. These 
trends emerged within the Bank against the backdrop of changes brought by the 
Compact, the CDF and the adoption of PRSPs as described above. Three topics were 
of particular importance. The first is the Bank’s ‘harmonization agenda’, which was 
strongly motivated by efforts to develop universal standards for procurement and, 
later, other operational procedures and practices (World Bank 2001a; 2002b). Bank 
staff contributed insights from their work in these fields to the efforts within the 
DAC’s Task Force on Donor Practices. Ultimately, the Bank’s ‘harmonization 
agenda’ motivated the 2003 HLF in Rome on Harmonization (OECD 2003) with, as 
an interviewee said, “the OECD as a junior partner [...] from the perspective of the 
Bank” (Soe Lin, personal communication, October 26th, 2011). Second is the World 
Bank’s emphasis on donor and aid coordination at a country level. The World Bank 
evidently has a strong presence in virtually all developing countries and usually 
benefits from greater flexibility and better political access than to other donors. It 
almost always heads, chairs or co-chairs PRSP processes that frame countries’ 
development policy agenda. Consequently, the Bank is often well placed for a 
leading role in coordinating donors at a country level. Third, the Bank worked to 
build support and diagnostic tools for advancing the use-of-country-systems 
principle to support a risk-management approach to foreign aid. Ideally, this 
approach would facilitate a transfer of authority for foreign aid to aid recipients, 
while addressing the legal and fiduciary concerns of donor government.  !
Against the backdrop of the changes in aid policy thinking during the 1990s, these 
three topics all share common qualities. First, they ranked high on the agenda of 
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Bank staff, mainly as a result of the Bank’s efforts to decentralise and its CDF pilots. 
Second, these concerns lacked the higher, political forum that was necessary to make 
progress with other donors, organisations and agencies. Regulation cannot be 
harmonised unilaterally. The same is true for improving selectivity of foreign aid. 
Furthermore, aid coordination, even if implemented at country level, requires basic 
agreements at the political level to achieve the desired gains in efficiency and 
effectiveness. Third, these concerns reflect not only the principles of the emerging 
aid paradigm, but areas where the Bank saw its comparative strengths and 
possibilities for providing its services and its know-how as an institution.!
!
6.2.1. Harmonization and Procurement Reform !
The fairly bureaucratic, specialist issue of procurement reform is an unlikely 
successor to the CDF’s sweeping visions of eye-to-eye development partnerships 
between aid donors and aid recipients. Yet precisely the technical, operations-based, 
and politically low-key qualities make procurement reform an exemplary for the 
Bank’s post-CDF approach to aid effectiveness. The issue gained prominence from 
the conflicts and difficulties that came with the decentralisation of Bank operations 
to borrowing countries and with the Bank’s partnership efforts. Here, the new, 
decentralised decision making clashed with existing standards and rules to ensure 
fiduciary compliance, which were designed to ensure a vertical oversight through the 
hierarchy from the field offices all the way up to, ultimately, the Bank’s 
stakeholders. Procurement reform was thus launched in the 1990s to reflect:  
[...] the changing development paradigm, particularly the importance of sound 
country policies and institutions and the Comprehensive Development 
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Framework goals of country focus, partnerships, and harmonization. As a 
result, the centre of gravity of procurement fiduciary work has shifted from 
project-level assessments to institutional ones, and from portfolio focus to a 
diagnostic focus. This increased country and institutional focus [...] has placed 
significant pressures on procurement staff and financial resources. (World Bank 
2002d, p. 1)     !
In the shortest of summaries, Bank efforts for procurement harmonization went in 
two directions. First, the Bank pursued ‘external harmonization’ with partners at the 
global, regional and country level. Notably, a forum for Heads of Procurement (HoP) 
from MDBs was established and meets biannually. The aim was to streamline and 
standardise procurement across institutions. Second, the Bank pursued an ‘internal 
procurement’ agenda, with operational and research units working on diagnostics, 
trainings and capacity-building efforts. !
Efforts to harmonise procurement in the 1990s were anchored in the Bank’s 
procurement network, located under the Operations Policy and Country Services 
(OPCS) vice-presidency. However, the ambitions of this network were quite 
explicitly to branch out and to include other parts of the Bank in their work. 
Likewise, collaboration and harmonization efforts with other institutions at the 
global, regional or country level, including an MDB HoP working group and inputs 
from bilateral donors through the DAC. They were fed back to OPCS and OPCS, in 
turn, drew on these experiences for a series of highly influential reports to the Bank’s 
board, ultimately recommending the organisation of a HLF on harmonization.!
The shift within the Bank towards an aid-partnership and a greater county-focus 
had launched procurement and other operational procedures up the agenda, as these 
regulations sat at cross-purposes with the anticipated new aid agenda. In an 
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interview, Homi Kharas noted, “They [joint aid programmes] could not be 
implemented in practice if agencies would not give up their own practices” (Kharas, 
H., personal communication, October 20th, 2011). Joint or co-financed programmes 
were often unable to proceed, unless they received a “waiver” from their respective 
board or leadership to refer to one of a multiple set of rules from the different 
institutions. According to Ian Nightingale, a procurement expert from the Bank, 
obtaining waivers of this sort would “generally take several months”. Moreover, he 
notes that “procurement tends to be used as the ‘show stopper’. It is often a front for 
other issues” (Nightingale, I., personal communication, October 25th, 2011).!
With its global presence, the Bank encountered procedural obstacles to 
implementing joint aid programmes worldwide. Faced with the proliferation of other 
donors’ efforts, the Bank even saw a need for “Harmonizing the Harmonization 
Process” (World Bank 2001b). Moreover, despite the seemingly technical nature of 
procurement, auditing and other operational procedures, they often touched on 
politically sensitive issues, such risks of corruption or (disputed) perception of 
biased procurement procedures by aid organisations themselves – for example, that 
the World Bank favours U.S. companies while the Asian Development Bank favours 
Japanese companies. A consensus quickly emerged in board reports on 
harmonization that sustained “high-level political support” (World Bank 2001b). 
Ultimately, the OPSC reports to the Bank’s board started promoting the idea of:!
[...] convening and participating in a high-level forum early in 2003 [...] to 
consolidate the work completed on the harmonization action plan, [...] and 
facilitate the preparation of implementation plans in donor agencies and 
partner countries, closely aligned and coordinated with CDF/PRSP processes. 
(World Bank 2002c, p. 12)!
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Simultaneously, the DAC Task Force on Donor Practices, which received its two-
year mandate in December 2000, launched a sub-group to work on pre-
implementation stages of aid projects, which included work on procurement. The 
eventual 2003 High Level Forum (HLF) on Harmonization was held in Rome and 
was co-chaired by the Bank. It produced the Rome Declaration on Harmonization 
(OECD 2003) and prepared the way for the 2005 Paris Declaration.!
 The Bank’s ‘harmonization agenda’ is an excellent example for an ‘inside-out 
process’ of an IO’s internal discourses shifting into efforts of external advocacy, 
which would in turn advance an internally evolved agenda by involving crucial 
actors beyond the IO itself. In this case this meant promoting the Bank’s 
harmonization agenda among a broader range of political decision makers. People I 
spoke to in Washington unanimously considered the OPCS reports on harmonization 
and the work that went into preparing them as a “germ of the idea” (Soe Lin, 
personal communication, October 26, 2011) of the political aid effectiveness agenda, 
which is seen as being inaugurated in Rome in 2003 as much as in Paris in 2005. !
The Rom Declaration was an important milestone for the later aid effectiveness 
agenda. For the World Bank itself, and its specific concerns, the Rome Declaration is 
viewed more critical. Though there has been progress since 2003, there is yet no true 
‘cross-procurement’ between MDBs, much less between multi-lateral and bilateral 
donors. Many people in the Bank consider the progress made in harmonizing 
procurement, audit and similar operational procedures to be the results of work, 
which was done largely in parallel to the aid effectiveness agenda since 2003, by 
procurement experts from the different MDBs. One former staff member stated:!
Rome [High Level Forum] was flawed in many ways. There were no CSO 
[Civil Society Organisations], no parliaments, etc... . In Rome, the focus was on 
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good practices of aid, which [...] gave a boost to the OECD to build the Task 
Force on Donor Practices into an expanding Working Party on aid 
effectiveness. [...] It challenged perceptions of aid and built the foundation for 
Paris [High Level Forum]. It side-stepped intractable topics: Procurement for 
example. (Soe Lin, personal communication, October 26, 2011) 
!
6.2.2.  Aid Coordination and the World Bank !
The World Bank traditionally plays a prominent role in aid coordination, 
especially at the country level. As a development institution, it differs from most 
other aid agencies, especially bilateral ones, by its conscious efforts in the field of 
aid and donor coordination, even before the Rome and Paris Declarations. Aid and 
donor coordination became an important topic in the World Bank in the 1990s as (i) 
up-scaling of project-level aid to sector-wide and programme aid was increasingly 
seen as crucial to improve the impact of aid and (ii) the recipient country’s 
governance and the capacity of institutions – along with the administrative burdens 
placed on these institutions by donor procedures – received more attention in foreign 
aid research and policy discourse. Finally, (iii) coordination of donor efforts was 
increasingly considered a prerequisite for aid recipient-country ownership – for aid-
receiving countries to be “in the driver seat” (Wolfensohn 1999).  
Thanks to Wolfensohn’s proposal of a “Matrix of Development Activity” (1999, 
p. 24), the CDF was widely, and controversially, perceived as attempt “to show that 
the World Bank could be a global leader in coordination” (Kharas, H., personal 
communication, October 20, 2011). Moreover, not unlike the Bank’s ‘harmonization 
agenda’, the concept of aid coordination made headway in CDF pilot countries. 
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Vietnam is an often-cited case and appears in several studies on “Transaction Costs 
of Aid” (Brown et al. 2000), which sought to better define and, ideally, quantify the 
“cost” of insufficient coordination in monetary values. Just as the PD would later 
advocate, the initial view was that the responsibility for aid coordination should 
ideally be transferred to developing countries themselves. However, this came with 
two caveats. First, donor coordination was also seen as an instrument of donors to 
improve their chances of inducing reforms and compliance. Second, among the 
poorest countries in particular, the very issue of uncoordinated aid was mainly 
problematic because it strained limited capacities and institutions. Concerning the 
first, John Roome from the World Bank noted on his experience with these concerns 
from, mainly, South- and South-East Asia: !
A lot of coordination was getting a common donor position on tough 
governance issues. [...] What happens if country X does Y? How can donors 
formulate common positions around politicized issues? (Roome, J., personal 
communication, October 24, 2011)!
On the latter, the Bank’s Operations Evaluations Department (OED) described the 
effect as “Aid-Bombardment Syndrome”:  !
This syndrome (an unintended consequence of poor aid coordination) is 
apparent in countries where the sheer volume of resources and number of 
donors, activities, and complex and inconsistent procedural requirements 
overwhelm the government’s capacity to plan, budget, manage, monitor and 
evaluate. (World Bank 1999, p. 14)!
The implication with either was that, even if “increasing government ownership 
of the co-ordination function” (Brown et al., 2000) was the long term ambition, the 
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responsibility for coordinating donors could be expected to rest with a ‘lead-donor’ 
in most countries for the foreseeable future. The Bank adopted this role in a great 
number of countries early on:!
World Bank-led aid coordination mechanisms and processes [...] expanded 
substantially over the past four decades. They cover a wide gamut of 
development issues and participants, and include some 60 recipient countries 
and 50 official donors. In a context of declining per capital aid disbursements 
for most countries, the Bank’s support for aid coordination has helped to 
protect the level of resources mobilized for individual countries and to achieve 
a greater aid focus on development priorities. (World Bank 1999, p. xi)!
A later survey (2011) shows that in IDA countries after 2005 “the Bank is heavily 
engaged in AC [aid coordination] fora, participating in 542 of the 638 reported fora, 
or 87%. [...] about 17% of the reported AC fora are either chaired or led by the Bank, 
and participation is substantial in an additional 37%. The World Bank’s 
chairing/leading role is highest in budget support fora [...]” (World Bank 2011a).!
In many aid-receiving countries, the Bank continues to be well placed to provide 
its services as an institution specializing in aid and donor coordination at the country 
level. Moreover, the Bank also capitalises on its lynchpin role in many partnership 
approaches to aid (including PRSP). In the latter, the Bank tends to benefit from its 
often-close relationship with the aid-receiving governments and from its ability, as 
relatively independent financial institution, to provide aid with greater fungibility 
across sectors and topics than most donors.!
One of the things IDA can do is take a view on country priorities across sectors 
and move resources in significant volumes. [...] If you have a donor 
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coordination mechanism that allows donors to choose a sector, [then] IDA can 
move money around to balance. IDA thereby has a ‘natural’ coordination 
position and can take a country view. [...] Say a country wants to focus on 
Health and Malaria. If IDA knows they do this reliably, IDA can do something 
else. (Roome, J., personal communication, October 24, 2011)!
The idea is strikingly similar to Wolfensohn’s “Matrix of Development Activity” 
(1999). Additionally, while the CDF is rarely cited today, the Bank advocates donor 
and aid coordination in the context of both the aid effectiveness agenda and the 
PRSP process. The latter, anchored at the country-level, has been given a greater 
focus by the Bank today, if with frequent references to the principles of the PD.!
It [PRSP] is supposed to be a vehicle for coordination and harmonization 
among donors and reduces the costs of donor fragmentation. [...] In many 
countries, the PRS process has become the main forum for donor coordination. 
(Dethier 2008, p. 19)!
!
6.2.3. “Use of Country Systems” and the “Risk-Management-Approach”!
A third interest of the Bank that can be traced from both the 1990s’ paradigmatic 
changes in development thinking is the idea of ‘use of country systems’ for foreign 
aid to reduce the use of parallel structures and implementation units in foreign aid. 
Today’s prominent concern in foreign aid with ‘use-of-country-systems’ is 
difficult to imagine without the 1990s shift towards emphasising institutions, the 
criticism towards conditionalities, and demands for greater aid selectivity. From 
these, a realisation grew that foreign aid implemented by international experts, often 
heavily insulated from aid-receiving countries to comply with the financial 
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management standards of donors, was often not sustainable and, in many cases, 
leeching qualified staff from the national institutions. The OECD states:!
However, over the last decade the international community has come to 
understand that country systems, like muscles, must be exercised if they are to 
grow stronger. [...] Strengthening and using country system, therefore, is an 
essential component in development effectiveness. (OECD 2009, p. 18)!
As pointed out, not least by the Wapenhans and Meltzer Reports, conditionalities 
of adjustment lending usually failed to induce the hoped-for reform dynamics. 
Moreover, the replication, or scaling-up, of successful approaches often failed 
because recipient countries frequently lacked the expertise or routine to effectively 
translate experiences made by donor projects into their own policies. The response, 
as advocated by the CDF, was to reduce the reliance of foreign aid on parallel 
structures and external experts. The idea was to give recipient countries greater 
responsibility, exercising their institutional “muscles”, as well as increase selectivity 
of aid on the basis of governance criteria to induce or reward reform. !
Taken to its conclusion, donors would provide sector or general budget support to 
the best performing countries for their poverty reduction efforts. PRSPs would 
safeguard against fungible uses of aid, ensure participation and set objectives, for 
which countries could be held accountable. In practice “the unfortunate truth was 
that many of the Bank’s client countries lacked the institutions and conditions to 
assume this responsibility” (Mallaby 2005, p. 259).!
Thus, there remains a discrepancy between the ideal of transferring responsibility 
for aid to aid recipients and the challenges resulting from weak institutions, lack of 
transparency, often unrealistic PRSPs, as well as insufficient capacities for managing 
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aid to the fiduciary standards demanded by donors and IFIs. Therefore, the Bank 
favours a sequenced approach (as do other donors) that ties the use of country system 
and the transfers of responsibility to parallel efforts in ‘risk-management’. Soe Lin 
described this idea to me as follows:  !
A risk-management-approach starts with assessments of the [country] system to 
identify weaknesses. The Bank makes use of the system on a step-by-step basis 
and addresses crucial reforms as it moves along. Measures are implemented to 
protect the Bank. [...] Even in the Bank it was difficult to get agreement for this 
approach. What if things go wrong? Who will be responsible? (Soe Lin, 
personal communication, October 26, 2011)!
Soe Lin also point out one of the biggest caveat to this approach. Bound by strict 
regulations to ensure the proper use of funds, few donors are willing, or even 
allowed from a legal perspective, to compromise on stringent fiduciary standards. As 
a result, the Bank often adopts the role of an intermediary. !
In summary, the Bank emphasises bureaucratic, rule-based neutrality as its 
qualification for representing recipient countries’ priorities vis-à-vis donors. As one 
interviewee from the office of the Bank’s U.S. executive director noted:  !
It is easier for a multilateral to take the “country-perspective”. For a bilateral 
donor it is hard to be thoroughly country or demand-based, because it is tied to 
parliamentary processes. To take a “country-perspective”, it helps to be de-
politicised and have a rules-based approach. (Phillips, T., personal 
communication, October 24, 2011)!
Moreover, the Bank often highlights its expertise in analytics and country 
diagnostics. This builds on the demand that, in order to be ‘used’, country systems 
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need to satisfy the operational principles of the donors. Above all, this concerns the 
public financial management (PFM) systems of aid recipients. Anecdotic country 
experiences from the 1990s, notably those of Vietnam and Uganda (Mallaby 2005, p. 
207+), are still used as illustrative cases where thorough reforms of PFM-systems 
were implemented and afterwards considered pivotal preconditions to these 
countries’ development successes at the time. Yet, to apply the idea systematically 
on a global scale requires standardised PFM diagnostics:        !
Undertaking a periodic performance assessment of a country’s PFM system is 
one of the key elements in donor’s decisions to use that system in the delivery 
of their aid. [...] Overall, PFM assessments are crucial to donor considerations 
on use of country systems. (OECD 2009, pp. 55-56)!
The Bank strongly advocates this logic, with “PFM in particular being area of 
trial and error” (Soe Lin, personal communication, October 26, 2011). Strikingly, 
indicators 2 and 5 of the Paris Declaration (OECD 2005), which measure progress in 
PFM reform and use-of-country-systems, make direct use of the Bank’s Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). CPIA is one of several diagnostic tools 
developed by the Bank in the late 1990s to expand its analytical work beyond 
macroeconomics to factors such as the quality of institutions, in this case in public 
financial management (PFM), as a response to the shifts in development thinking in 
the 1990s and the Bank’s effort to set itself apart as a ‘knowledge bank’ vis-à-vis the 
IMF. Next to CPIA, similar diagnostic tools are the Bank’s Public Expenditure 
Reviews (PERs) and Country Financial and Accountability Assessments (CFAAs). 
With these, the Bank developed a suite of services for foreign aid donors. It 
promotes these, for example, through its work in the DAC’s Joint Venture on PFM. 
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In this joint venture, the World Bank and the European Commission, still by far the 
largest donor for direct budget support, hold prominent positions. !
To summarise, the Bank’s engagement with aid effectiveness in the early 21st 
century was rooted in technical and operational concerns, which had grown from its 
own attempts to deal with its legitimacy crisis in the 1990s. However, the Bank’s 
interest in the agenda, while keen and likewise driven by a strategic institutional 
interest, was more facetted, even fractured, in comparison to the strategic agency 
for the aid effectiveness by the OECD DAC. 
!
6.3. The World Bank’s Disenchantment with Aid Effectiveness Politics!
Last but not least, the Bank’s work on aid effectiveness is set apart from the 
DAC’s work in this field by the Bank’s relative declining interest in the political 
‘high-level’ agenda on aid effectiveness, which is marked – above all – by the High 
Level Forums (HLF) in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and most recently 
in Busan (2011) in South Korea. !
A commonly heard opinion at the Bank is that “Rome was a World Bank meeting. 
In Paris, there was a rebalancing toward the DAC” (Quesnel, B. personal 
communication, October 26, 2011). Following the Paris Declaration, as the aid 
agenda gained political momentum, the focus of the HLFs expanded. At the same 
time, the Bank slowly shifted from a leadership role to becoming ‘simply’ one 
participant among many. The Accra HLF in 2008 greatly expanded on the idea of 
bringing the voices of NGOs, civil society and aid-receiving countries into the 
discourse at centre stage. This matched not only the widespread criticism of the PD 
as being too narrowly focussed on donor governments, but also agreed with the 
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Bank’s emphasis on partner-led development. In contrast, the key themes shaping 
the Busan HLF in 2011 were efforts to reach beyond the DAC member states and to 
include new, non-DAC donors, most notably China. Ideas were also piloted on 
working more closely with non-ODA sources of international finance, for example 
as those dedicated to combat climate change (see Chapter 5.3.1.). The Bank played a 
key role in organizing the Accra HFL, both logistically and in preparing its key 
themes. Its contribution in Busan, in contrast, was more limited, consisting mainly of 
thematic inputs to a select few topics, which were considered to be of crucial 
importance within the Bank. Procurement reform, for example, was one of them. !
That the Bank’s shift away from a leadership role in the HLFs to a more moderate 
participation should not be seen as negligence or as an expression of disregard. As 
the Bank distances itself, consciously, from leading the aid effectiveness agenda, this 
parallels other past initiatives where the Bank’s leadership was crucial initially, 
before it took a step back (but not out) to let new dynamics and actors take on a 
greater role. A good example here is the Global Development Network (GDN), the 
seeds of which were sown by entrepreneurial Bank staff. It was supported by the 
Bank in its efforts to become a “knowledge bank” (Stone 2003) before the GDN split 
in 2001 to become a non-profit organisation of its own. The Global Development 
Learning Network (GDLN)26 is a similar, World Bank-coordinated partnership. !
Indeed, the majority of Bank documents and Bank staff are highly reflective and 
aware of the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the World Bank; and of the 
benefits and drawbacks associated with different courses of action. It is one of the 
qualities, that makes the World Bank, as a political actor in world affairs, a good 
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26 http://gdln.org/about (Accessed 25 February 2013) 
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example for the “strategic social construction” Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) 
identify as important driving force for cascading norms and paradigm changes. !
Consequently, the Bank’s increasingly distant relationship with the aid 
effectiveness agenda (at the international level) must be traced with respect to its 
strategic priorities. The gradual disconnect of the Bank with the agenda is, this thesis 
argues, a consequence of the Bank’s more implementation-based approach to aid 
effectiveness, as outlined above. While the work of the DAC emphasises political 
commitment, transnational discourse and policy ideas, the Bank focuses on its role in 
the practical application of foreign aid under the premises of a re-conceived foreign 
aid landscape. Its advocacy as IO focuses explicitly on the country level. As the aid 
effectiveness agenda cascaded as an policy agenda among donors, while 
simultaneously passing over many of the technical or procedural specifics, many of 
which were the Bank’s most immediate concerns, the World Bank increasingly move 
moved away from an active leadership role. People working at the Bank clearly 
recognise the need for creating political consensus within the aid community, though 
their opinions also strongly reflect that policy discourses of this sort are not at the 
core of the Bank’s mission, nor fully reflect the entirety of aid effectiveness as 
perceived by the Bank through its operational focus: !
The substance of the agenda has shifted. On the Working Party [WP-EFF] 
itself. Again, it is a little odd that it is held in Paris, in the OECD conference 
rooms, with OECD rules of behaviour, which are perfect for the OECD when 
they get together and talk within their membership. But it doesn’t work very 
well when you have NGOs and multilaterals and partner-countries and you 
have little flags that say “France”, “United States”. That is not really how we 
work. It’s a bit of an odd fit now. [...] The agenda needs a much more realistic 
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context, one it doesn’t have now. (Lee, B. telephone interview, October 28, 
2011) 
Highlighting this ambivalence created by the aid effectiveness debate within the 
Bank, I sketch the tensions resulting from the current aid agenda within the Bank. 
On one side of this ambivalence is the success of the agenda, most notably in the 
form of the PD. Today, DAC donors (i.e. excluding donors like China) and, 
increasingly, aid recipients rarely need persuasion to pursue the ideal of coordinated, 
harmonised and aligned foreign aid in a recipient-country driven development 
partnership. As one Bank staff member notes for the issue of aid coordination: “It 
has become ‘politically correct’ to do aid coordination. You have to be seen doing 
this” (Roome, J. personal communication, October 24, 2011).   !
On the other side are (i) disappointment with the lack of progress on harmonizing 
operational procedures; (ii) the perceived burden and ‘tax’ on staff capacities in 
managing aid coordination; and (iii) controversy on the prospects for realizing 
country-led aid management, The mechanisms of the DAC’s inter-governmental 
policy dialogue are, I argue, thus ultimately less amenable to the specific interests of 
the Bank for aid effectiveness. In contrast to the DAC, which thrives in the aid 
effectiveness discourse, the World Bank’s primary focus (next to lending) as a 
service provider in aid relations at the country level, arguably is better served by 
more specialised, more technically minded platforms. 
 
6.3.1. Harmonization  
A first source of ambivalence comes from the Bank’s mixed assessment of its 
own efforts to harmonization operational procedures. The Rome Declaration 
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(OECD 2003) was clearly a success in mobilizing political attention for the broader 
topic of aid effectiveness. It also is, with good reason, considered the predecessor 
for the 2005 Paris Declaration and an important source for the momentum that led 
DAC donors to sign up to the PD in 2005. Yet, a view persists among experts in the 
Bank that considers the Rome Declaration a missed opportunity for finding 
solutions to many of the operational challenges that had, from a Bank perspective, 
animated the HLF in Rome in the first place. To return to the sub-theme of 
procurement as an example, the Bank’s ambitious agenda to achieve greater 
openness in international competitive bidding (ICB) has largely run aground and 
“[t]he Bank deemed the piloting program a failure and had discontinued the 
program” (World Bank 2011b, p. 4). 
Other aspects of the Bank’s original harmonization agenda, such as joint 
diagnostics, assessments and evaluations, as well as the use of programme-based 
approaches in foreign aid, are similarly sidelined. Recent evaluations on the progress 
made with the PD (OECD 2011) reveal lacklustre results in these fields in particular. 
Regarding coordinated donor missions, the total percentage of joint donor missions 
rose from 20% in 2005 to 24% in 2007 before dropping back to 22% in 2010, far 
from the target of 40% set for 2010 by the PD. Likewise, co-ordinated country 
analytical work remains at around 44% in 2010, unchanged from 2007 and only 
slightly ahead of the 2005 baseline of 41%. The original target for 2010 of 66% 
appears overtly ambitious in retrospect. Direct budget support and programme-based 
approaches, which would in theory rely on joint assessment missions and 
diagnostics, have similarly increased very little between 2005 and 2010:!
The global target of providing 66% of aid through programme-based 
approaches was not met in either the 32 baseline countries or the full group of 
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78 countries participating in the 2011 Survey. Only 45% of aid captured in the 
2011 Survey was provided in the context of PBA. [...] Direct budget support 
[...] accounted for almost half of all aid provided through PBAs, and in share of 
total aid to the countries participating in the survey has remained constant since 
2005. (OECD 2011, p.63)!
!
6.3.2. Aid Coordination as “Coordination Tax” !
Aid coordination is a topic of ambivalence and tension within the Bank. As seen 
above, initial concerns with aid effectiveness were raised in part by World Bank staff 
working in country offices. In their work, they were confronted directly with the 
dizzying confusion of different aid projects, efforts and initiatives, suffering from 
very little communication between donors and all too often working even at cross-
purposes. Therefore, the Bank’s own reports, even ahead of the CDF, note that “the 
overarching conclusion [...] is that the development community has been well served 
by the Bank’s support of aid coordination” (World Bank 1999, p. xi). The Bank’s 
self-perception as a service provider in aid coordination is reflected in the Bank’s 
strategic recommendations, particularly for the IDA: 
Endorse a global role for IDA in donor harmonization. [...] The World Bank, as 
a preeminent multilateral development institution, is in a unique position to 
exercise global leadership in working with other development assistance 
agencies towards meaningful harmonization. [...] IDA should convene a 
conference of the leaders of multilateral and bilateral development assistance 
organisations to seek agreement. (Eriksson 2001, p. vii)!
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Yet, perhaps due to a change in guard of the staff serving in country offices, there 
is also a commonly encountered sense of frustration and discontent with aid 
coordination in the Bank: !
Donors often cause more headaches than the [partner] government. In 
government, I know who I deal with, where they come from, and why they are 
doing it. It may be frustrating to deal with them from time to time, but you are 
not wasting your time. This comes with the territory. The same cannot be said 
about donor community [sic]. I think all of us who have to spend a lot of time 
on donor coordination and donor management find that it is often not 
productive at all in working with donors who try to drag the coordination to 
their own direction. (anonymous, quoted: Xu and Weller 2009, p. 121)!
An allegory used frequently at the Bank is that of a “donor coordination tax” 
(Gelb, A. personal communication, October 21, 2011), which is figuratively imposed 
on limited staff time and resources. Allegories like this contrast with the lack of 
coordination, which has been similarly described as a “tax” on the capacity of aid 
recipients. This shift in perception can be attributed both to a lack of appreciation 
and incentives for Bank staff to work on donor coordination and to a spreading sense 
that early visions for donor coordination may have been overly ambitious.!
On the first, Bank staff, particularly among Bank staff working in field offices, 
experience tensions between the Bank’s internal incentives and performance 
monitoring on one hand, which focuses strongly on lending, projects and analytical 
work, and, on the other, the often time-consuming work on coordinating with other 
donors. An evaluation by the World Bank states:!
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The evaluation finds that internal incentives facing Bank staff and management 
play a role in implementing H&A [Harmonization & Alignment], but such 
incentives are not very strong in the Bank. Bank staff, in particular sectors staff, 
coordinate with other partners mostly because coordination is needed for their 
tasks, and less because they value coordination as important in and of itself. 
(World Bank 2011b, p. xvii)!
On the second, the same evaluation qualifies benefits of aid coordination. While 
the general view is positive, advanced joint programmes and strategies are seen as 
failures (World Bank 2011b, p. xii)5!Finally, progress in transferring responsibility 
for donor coordination to aid-receiving countries is, despite positive exceptions, 
considered to be unsatisfactory by the Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). 
This mirrors the view of researchers like Woods, who writes that “[s]imply put, the 
donor’s agenda and attention become focussed on inter-donor relations and 
negotiations. Consultative group and country coordinating mechanism meetings take 
place, in which the country’s representatives listen to donors argue (2011, p. 123).!
!
6.3.3. Donor Coordination and Recipient Country-led Aid!
A further ambivalence palpable at the Bank’s offices in Washington DC concerns 
the viability of the aid effectiveness agenda to realise country-led foreign aid. 
Notably, while the aid effectiveness agenda was successful in raising political 
awareness for the problems associated with donor fragmentation and the 
administrative burdens of aid for recipient countries, its success has been more 
limited in realizing the envisioned ideal of a foreign aid based on recipient country-
leadership, ownership and a widespread use of country-systems. Recent surveys on 
! ! ! &&'!
implementing the PD (OECD 2011) show that many of the targets set out in Paris for 
2010 have, globally, not been achieved. Specifically, the evaluation notes:   
Donors are not systematically making greater use of country systems in 
countries where these systems are more reliable. [...] At the global level the 
relationship between the quality of a country’s PFM system and donor’s use of 
them is at best weak. (OECD 2011, p. 50).!
Within the Bank, this is matched by the perception that the aid effectiveness 
agenda failed to institute a truly ‘country-led’ aid architecture, remaining trapped in 
intra-donor dealings and concerns. Explicitly, one staff member said, “The World 
Bank introduced ‘country-led’ development. But it failed” (Rogers, P., personal 
communication, October 19, 2011). Another interviewee noted that, in county-led 
development, “donors, as well as the World Bank, have time and again moved the 
goalposts” (Stout, S., personal communication, October 19, 2011). !
While little disagreement exists in the critical view of the progress made since the 
PD, or even its predecessors, such as the CDF, there are different opinions, including 
within the Bank, on the causes for the slow progress and on how to address them. 
One sees the problem in overloading the agenda with new issues before the PD’s 
original aims have been achieved. Soe Lin noted that “In Rome and Paris we fought 
hard to keep the agenda focussed on aid effectiveness and not to expand the topic” 
(Soe Lin, personal communication, October 26, 2011). In a stark simplification, there 
is a sense that the central aims of the PD runs the risk of being diluted by an ever-
expansive aid effectiveness agenda, which tries to do much more, arguably too 
much, and thus risks achieving very little at all. !
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The other side however, with advocates both outside and, increasingly, within the 
Bank, sees a cause for the mixed progress precisely in the fact that the aid 
effectiveness agenda had an overtly narrow focus, was too (DAC-)’donor-centred’, 
and not responsive enough to aid recipients, third parties, and measurable 
improvements in delivering development results. Here, a more inclusive agenda is 
seen as a remedy to the perceived limitations of the PD:!
Inclusiveness is now what the agenda is all about. [...] You cannot have the 
country absent from the discussion. So we put a lot of emphasis on things like 
country-led aid management, rather than donor harmonization. On one hand, 
the donors say countries have to be in the driver seat. On the other hand, they 
create structures where donors-only are welcome to come and discuss among 
themselves. That is a rather extreme way of painting it, but that is very much 
how I think the substance of the agenda has shifted, as this inclusiveness has 
become more accepted. (Lee, B, telephone interview, October 28, 2011) 
Part of this division within the Bank can be attributed to a change in guard among 
the staff in charge of the Bank’s contribution to the aid effectiveness agenda. People 
who made crucial contributions in the late 1990s and early 2000s have, in many 
cases, moved on, climbed the Bank’s hierarchy or retired. With the responsibility in 
new hands, new ideas are inevitably brought into the debate.! In other way, this 
division also reflects criticisms of Bank related to PRSPs (see Cling 2002). Michael 
Wang and Frances Stewart (2003), for example, note that the Bank tended to impose 
further conditionalities on countries and modify existing PRSPs through the 
supporting Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits (PRSCs) or through Letters of 
Development Policy (LoDP). They argue that the Bank thereby undermines the 
principles of ownership that PRSPs are meant to operationalise.!
! ! ! &&)!
In effect, ambivalences concerning ‘country-led’ foreign aid highlight many 
inherent contradictions and limits of the Bank’s approach to aid effectiveness. They 
are in no small part grounded in the institution’s potentially contradictory roles as (i) 
a bureaucratically neutral broker, (ii) an intermediary service provider (for donors, 
more than aid recipient countries), and a multilateral donor itself. The Bank itself 
recognises these difficulties:!
Despite the general consensus on the importance of ownership, [...] [i]t has not 
been possible to move matters beyond theory. The challenge [...] is to find ways 
to foster strong country ownership, and at the same time provide adequate 
assurances to both multilateral and bilateral sources of financial assistance that 
their resources will not be wasted. (World Bank 1998, p. 10)!
 As with the other World Bank ambivalences outlined, it became apparent that the 
issue of country-led aid was unlikely to progress much on the global stage as a part 
of the aid effectiveness discourse. The reason for this are partly that the challenges 
for implementing country-led aid went over and beyond “mere” concerns about 
donor’s domestic accountability for financial assistance and aid recipients’ 
capacities. Rather, determinants for successful country-leadership are often found 
with more local, bilateral characteristics, including a recipient country’s ability to 
shape the political discourse with their donors or to employ the various instruments 
of foreign aid, including PRSPs, to their benefit. Therefore, the natural forum for the 
Bank would remain at the country level. Perhaps even more so now, as a general 
global political consensus has largely been achieved as a consequence of the Paris 
Declaration, but national implementation remains lacking. !
Moreover, as the DAC’s WP-EFF expanded and aid recipients (and NGOs) 
became better organised, better represented and better able to articulate their position 
! ! ! &&*!
in the global aid effectiveness discourses, the need diminished for the Bank to 
represent arguments for ‘country-led’ aid-partnerships at the global level to the 
degree it may have done in the past.!
To conclude, ambivalences were identified around three key themes, which 
defined the Bank’s approach to aid effectiveness since the 1990s. The first is the 
Bank’s privilege for the technical over the political, as in the debates on the 
harmonization of operational policies and procedures. Closely related to the first is 
the Bank’s strategic outlook towards benefits and costs to the Bank and to its staff as 
a financial lender and service provider in international development. This is 
evidenced by the continuous ‘cost-benefit’ calculations that colour the Bank’s strong 
involvement in aid coordination. The latter is a role that the Bank as institution has 
very actively sought out, has presented itself as a global leader in aid coordination 
and has advocating its unique institutional qualifications for the task. Finally, in aid 
effectiveness debates at least, the Bank exhibits a signature country-level 
perspective. It can partly be considered a result of the mixed success of the 
decentralization efforts of the Strategic Compact and the Bank’s own experiments 
with novel forms of partnerships following the CDF. The latter in particular, though 
strongly shaping the Bank’s operational policies for a time, had arguably fewer 
lasting reverberations outside. The Bank has since repeatedly emphasised its 
capacity to communicate and represent the priorities of aid recipient countries:  !
We [the World Bank] bring that country level reality up to the global 
conversation in a way that many others cannot because they don’t have the field 
presence and frankly, even if they have a field presence, they don’t have access 
to government as we do. [...] We can bring that kind of partner-country-
perspective in a way that the bilateral donors cannot. I think that has been a 
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huge comparative advantage of the Bank. (Lee, B. telephone interview, October 
28, 2011) 
!
6.4. Chapter 6 Conclusion!
Paralleling the previous case study chapter, this second case study set out to trace 
the aid effectiveness agenda, starting from its original roots, through its cascade in 
transnational policy discourses on foreign aid, all the way to its institution as an 
authoritative paradigm for foreign aid policy. Where the focus rested OECD DAC in 
the previous chapter, this chapter’s case study traced the same cascading paradigm 
from the perspective, or lens, of the World Bank. The Bank is explicitly and, 
historically, quite visibly the second multilateral institution with a pivotal leading 
role in shaping and advocating the aid effectiveness agenda. !
As in the first case study, this chapter presents evidence supporting the main 
hypothesis of this thesis: that the aid effectiveness’s successful cascade as a policy 
paradigm is the result in IR of what Finnemore and Sikkink named a “strategic social 
construction, in which actors strategize rationally to reconfigure preferences, 
identities, or social context” (1998, p. 888). !
The context shows the Bank to be a prominent actor in the global discourses on 
foreign aid policy, which faced a severe crisis of legitimacy. Evidence for the Bank’s 
response to crisis in efforts of strategic social construction were shown and discussed 
in three exemplary fields. !
The first of these fields covers efforts by the Bank to reform operational 
procedures, most notably the harmonization of procurement across MDBs and other 
aid institutions. Interest in harmonised operational procedures clearly relates to the 
! ! ! &&,!
Bank’s unique role of acting, in aid-receiving countries worldwide, as a conceptual 
and managerial leader of aid programmes, which it does not entirely finance itself 
(and only rarely does the Bank delegate these tasks to another donor for a 
programme financed largely World Bank funds). These efforts were shown to be 
direct precursors and even triggers for the HLF on harmonization 2003 in Rome. !
Second is the Bank’s emphasis for the need for aid and donor coordination. As a 
central tenet of the aid effectiveness agenda, the Bank has favoured and promoted 
itself as a global leader in aid coordination at the country level for many years. Bank 
staff has very explicitly formulated the comparative advantages that the Bank holds 
for this role as an institution.!
Third is the paradigm shift away from donor-managed foreign aid towards a use-
of-country-system, which would be safeguarded against fiduciary risks by a risk-
management-approach. Such a risk-management-approach for foreign aid donors 
requires advanced diagnostic tools and quantitative analytics of development results 
from foreign aid, which is itself another hallmark of the Bank’s expertise. Though 
this is arguably one of the less successful aspects of the aid effectiveness agenda in 
practice, the use-of-country-systems ideal remains a key ambition for efforts to 
improve the systemic effectiveness of foreign aid.!
Furthermore, the investigation of the aid effectiveness paradigm through the 
Bank’s engagement with this evolving agenda also reveals important differences to 
the dynamics investigated in the previous chapter’s case study on the OECD DAC. 
Notably, these are the Bank more dispersed, even fragmented interest in a selection 
of issues within the broader aid effectiveness agenda. As organisation, different 
topical interests are rooted in different departments or directorates with the Bank. 
Moreover, the Bank lacked, particularly in the earlier days of the agenda, a clearly 
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defined bureau with an explicit aid effectiveness mandate. In no small part, this was 
a result of the limited success of the Bank’s own earlier forays on the global political 
level, such as the CDF, to construct a paradigm for foreign aid.!
Finally, the Bank has, in all matters relating to aid effectiveness, always retained a 
strong focus for what it calls the country level, which Bank staff emphasises in 
explicit contrast to the global, political level. In the latter, the Bank early on saw its 
perceived mission to represent recipient-country interests in the global policy 
discourse on aid effectiveness. However, to the degree that the aid effectiveness 
agenda increasingly focused on broader principles over technical specifics and the 
specific challenges facing donors in specific aid recipient countries, this particular 
role of the Bank became increasingly less relevant. !
Along with other contributing factors, including a change in guard among Bank 
staff working on aid effectiveness, as well as changes in the Bank’s presidency and 
leadership, these factors contributed to a rather different trajectory in the Bank’s 
engagement with the aid agenda compared to the DAC. Where the DAC identifies 
itself with the expanding agenda to a point, where the credibility and utility of the 
DAC as focal point for this global agenda has become increasingly strained and 
questioned, the Bank has taken an increasingly distant and selective approach to the 
political aid effectiveness agenda as it unfolds through the series of international 
declarations (as opposed to the more technical agenda of, for example, procurement 
reform). Instead, the Bank pursues its interests through a wider range of different, 
often more specific and technical forums.!
The chapter now following these two case studies focuses on what Craig Parsons 
termed the fourth step of process tracing analysis, using counterfactual analysis to 
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sketch how the actor might have done something different given different ideas 
(Parsons 2011, pp. 135). !
Next to contradicting views, particularly from the perspective of bilateral agencies 
that may challenge the narratives from the DAC and the World Bank, chapter 7 will 
further discusses the specific relationship between, on one hand, IOs’ strategic 
interest and institutional make-up and, on the other, their engagement with a broader 
political environment through mechanisms of ideational artistry and agency. !
Despite the fact that the research design underpinning this thesis is not a cross-
case comparison, some measure of cross-case study comparison – with a focus on 
the noted differences between the DAC and the Bank in their work on the aid 
effectiveness agenda – will prove helpful in discerning more generalisable insights 
from the observations and evidence presented in the two case studies of chapters 5 
and 6. In turn, the aspects of the aid effectiveness agenda that are uniquely 
determined by their historical roots in the agency of the DAC and the Bank, will, 
from a policy perspective, be the aspects most likely to change fundamentally if/as 
the aid effectiveness agenda increasingly emancipates itself from the DAC and the 
Bank, who were the agenda’s two early key pioneers and benefactors so far.!
!
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Chapter 7 – Multiple Streams of Aid Effectiveness in Public Policy!
The overall thesis investigates the role of the OECD DAC and the World Bank in 
shaping the aid effectiveness agenda, but chapter 7 highlights other, additional 
factors important to the translation of aid effectiveness into public policy. So far, this 
thesis investigated how the idea of aid effectiveness, as a transnational policy 
agenda, was formed. This chapter examines further factors might help explain how 
the idea of aid effectiveness came to the fore, and might even explain how it then 
gained traction in the sense of actually influencing policy, or – in the worlds of 
Lieberman (2002) – it found its time. 
One reason for adopting this broader perspective is methodology. George and 
Bennett (2005) highlight several constraints of process-tracing-methods, notably 
including the observation that these methods often struggle to account for more than 
one explanation for any observed effects. This presents researchers with “the 
difficult challenge of assessing whether alternative explanations are complementary 
in the case, or whether one is causal and the other spurious” (2005, p. 222). This 
chapter seeks to address this methodological blind spot by considering possible 
further factors relevant to the emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda.!
Another reason is a consequence of this study’s emphasis on – in a dichotomy of 
agency and structures27 – the formation of the aid effectiveness agenda by IOs’ 
strategic agency, rather than on how transnational frameworks such as the aid 
effectiveness agenda influence policymaking in turn. It is worth noting that 
dichotomies of this kind – between agency and structure, and between the formation 
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of a transnational policy agenda and its impact on policy – are abstractions, and 
looking beyond them can potentially unearth new insights.!
Throughout, this thesis pursues a constructivist-leaning question of ‘how’ IOs 
helped shape the aid effectiveness agenda. Using case studies, this thesis investigates 
how IOs helped shape the aid effectiveness agenda through “strategic social 
construction” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The term ‘strategic’ here refers to a 
notion of self-interest, which is nonetheless constrained, internally by institutional 
path-dependency of IOs and externally by the global political environment. Two in-
depth case studies have shed light on this relationship between IOs and donor states 
in foreign aid politics, a relationship that potentially inverts (within limits) the 
relationship of strategic self-interest and compliance – as it is often portrayed by 
studies drawing on principal-agent models (e.g. Hawkins et al. 2006), and which has 
arguably not been sufficiently demonstrated in the field of foreign aid.  !
By focusing on the question of ‘how’ IOs helped shape the aid effectiveness 
agenda, this thesis places great emphasis on what constructivist methodology terms 
“establishment of constitutive relations”. This differs in many ways from the 
“establishment of causality” (Lupovici 2009, 201). In other words, it is not the 
primary aim of this thesis to demonstrate how the agency of IOs is causal to 
domestic aid effectiveness reforms, but how IOs shaped the “framework of ideas and 
standards” (Hall 1993, p. 279), which in turn likely motivates, informs and 
influences this multitude of reforms. Tensions between causal and constitutive 
research are well known. Alexander Wendt writes “there are significant analytical 
and methodological differences between causal and constitutive theorising, which 
reflects the different kinds of questions that they answer” (1999, p. 85). The focus in 
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this thesis is mostly constitutive: It investigates how IOs helped shape the emergence 
of the aid effectiveness agenda, less how this agenda helps shape policy.!
This chapter now turns to alternative and perhaps complementary possible 
explanations to help account, at least superficially, for the latter, that is to say how 
agendas influence policy. To reflect this shift in emphasis, the structure of this 
chapter differs from the preceding case studies. The preceding case studies followed 
a chronological logic of historical explanation, as their aim was to follow the life 
cycle of the aid effectiveness paradigm from its ideational origins to its 
establishment as a shared, normative policy agenda. But this approach is not feasible 
for exploring other possible explanations including any that follow through from 
shaping a new aid agenda to actual policy adoption. Instead, the chapter borrows 
from public policy analysis on idea-driven change (see Cairney 2012, 232+). 
Specifically it draws on what has been termed multiple streams (MS) analysis 
(Kingdon 1984, 1995, Lieberman 2002, Cairney 2012) as a method for inspecting 
political ideas as putative causes of policy change. !
In MS analysis, policy changes are not simply direct results of compelling ideas 
or pressing needs. Instead, successful policy change requires a conflation of multiple 
factors (e.g. ‘streams’) as a necessary condition under which ideas can be translated 
into policy changes. These factors, or ‘streams’, are: First, agents with motives to 
champion ideas in politics (‘why’). Second, an institutional position with the means 
to translate ideas into practices (‘how’). Third, a window of opportunity where 
relevant actors (policymakers) are receptive to these new ideas (‘when’ and ‘where’).!
Though the emphasis of this thesis is, and remains, the ascendancy of the aid 
effectiveness agenda, not its application in policy reforms among donor countries, 
this particular chapter briefly investigates the latter. It does so by discussing which 
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actors (‘why’), factors (‘how’) and opportunities (‘when’ and ‘where’) help explain 
the impact of the aid effectiveness agenda as a more complete phenomenon, 
including its impact on foreign aid policy. This query corresponds with Lieberman’s 
(2002) assertion of multi-causality underpinning idea-driven policy change: !
An idea’s time arrives not simply because the idea is compelling on its own terms, 
but because opportune 09C"/"@GC circumstances favour it. At those moments when a 
political idea finds persuasive expression among actors whose institutional 
position gives the both the motive and the opportunity to translate it into policy – 
then, and only then, can we say that an idea has found a time. (p. 709)!
The chapter – in keeping with the concept of a ‘multiple-stream-analysis-test’ – is 
structured as follows. First, I discuss the three concepts of (i) motives, (ii) means and 
(iii) opportunity as employed in this thesis. Second I discuss additional, alternative 
and perhaps even complementary possible explanations relevant not only to the 
emergence of the aid effectiveness as an influential policy paradigm in the sense of 
Peter Hall’s “framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of 
policy and kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very 
nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing” (1993, p. 279), but also as a 
multitude of tangible and parallel policy reforms made in most donor countries. 
Finally, I then assess these other factors against the three-part framework to show 
where and how each of these explanations comes into play in explaining the 
emergence and formation of the aid effectiveness agenda in its current form.!
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7.1. The ‘Multiple-Stream-Test’ of Motives, Means and Opportunity!
The ‘multiple-stream test’ that is developed and applied here is adopted from the 
literature on public policy analysis. It aims to explore why (motives), how (means), 
as well as when and where (opportunity) ideas became influential in policymaking. !
It is important to note that the original multiple streams model does not employ 
the terms of motives, means and opportunity, as I do in this chapter. The concept of 
multiple streams goes back to Cohan, March and Olsen (1972) and their notion of 
“organized anarchy”, which consists of a number of “relatively independent streams” 
(1972, p. 3). Kingdon (1984) expands on this concept in his work on government 
policy. In Kingdon’s multiple-stream model, he identifies the three relevant streams 
of (i) problems, (ii) policies, and (iii) politics. !
These three streams are described in Kingdon’s work as relatively independent 
from one another. Kingdon employs the model to challenge the notion of reasonably 
rational governance, which assumes an orderly, linear process that starts with (a) the 
identification of problems, (b) proceeds with developing policies to address these 
problems, and (c) concludes with vetting and implementing these policies through 
the processes of politics. The multiple stream model was developed after observing 
that national politics usually contradict this seemingly rational and linear sequence of 
policy change.!
This chapter discusses each of the three streams – (i) motives, (ii) means, and (iii) 
opportunity - in turn. For each stream, it outlines their original use in public policy 
analysis and references Kingdon’s (1984) original designation for these as (i) 
problems, (ii) policy, or (iii) politics, to clarify the emphasis of each in the context of 
this thesis.   !
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Motives: The first ‘stream’ formalised by Kingdon (1984) deals with policy 
problems. Policymakers, Kingdon notes, “could attend a long list of problems” but 
they “pay serious attention to only a fraction of them” (1984, p. 120). With a near 
infinite number of problems competing for attention on the finite agenda of politics, 
a crucial question in public policy research is: Which problems make it onto the 
agenda, and which problems do not? Often the answer is straightforward, such as 
when a sudden crisis draws attention to a particular field. At other times, political 
actors might draw attention to problems that justify their policy desires. Inversely, 
problems may also be ignored, often because of a lack of political appeal, 
intractability, or excessive costs associated with them (Cairney 2012, p. 234).!
The aid effectiveness agenda is an exemplary case of political attention shifting to 
new and previously little appreciated problems. The notion of turning the perspective 
of decision makers to the inner workings of foreign aid themselves as a potential 
policy problem (over and above questions of how to overcome the socio-economic 
challenges of developing countries) defines and drives the aid effectiveness agenda.!
For Kingdon, ideas “come from anywhere” (1984, p. 78). He considers tracing the 
dominant actors behind the promotion of certain ideas futile, as “nobody really 
controls the information system” (1984, p. 81). This is unsatisfying for two reasons. 
First constructivists, including those working on international politics, convincingly 
demonstrate how ideas, norms and their political urgency are often socially 
constructed (see Chapter 2). For research with a focus on policy change, it is often a 
useful abstraction to take politically influential ideas as a given starting point, and to 
examine how prominent politically influential ideas shape policy; or conversely fail 
to shape policy as in the case of Sharman’s study on the mostly fruitless attempts, 
including by the OECD (2006, p. 127 ff.), to regulate international tax competition. !
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However, this leaves the question – asked by Schmidt – which ideas become 
those that shape political reality, while others do not (Schmidt 2008, p. 307). One 
possible answer to this question is cross-national discourses, often facilitated by IOs 
(e.g. Finnemore 1996), which fall outside the often strictly national frameworks of 
public policy analysis. But even if the true origin of any given idea is truly 
untraceable, it is still relevant to investigate what forces and whose agency is 
bringing ideas to the political agenda. It means asking: Why is somebody investing 
political (and possibly economic) resources to bring a given problem to the political 
agenda? For this question, recent constructivist theory (e.g. Wiener 2009) 
emphasises the competitive contestation by political actors over ideas and norms 
(and over the interpretation of ideas, which are subject to “the irreducible ambiguity 
of language” (Sharman 2006, p. 12), and thereby may open divergent, even 
incompatible motives by different, even competing political actors).!
Means: Kingdon further identifies policies as a second, relatively independent 
stream. One of his key insights is the observation that policy solutions are not 
necessarily, or even commonly, developed to address specific or acute (political) 
problems. Kingdon lists several examples of policy solutions that preceded the 
‘problems’ they were eventually applied to, as well as policy solutions adapted to 
different policy problems over time, in different countries or by different political 
parties. As examples, Kingdon refers to mass public transport, which according to 
him was framed as a solution to a variety of problems, including traffic congestion, 
urban pollution and oil shortages (also Cairney 2012, p. 235). Likewise, Health 
Maintenance Organizations in the US were initially framed in political discourse as 
means to extend health care delivery to the poor, and later as means to reduce health 
care costs more generally (Stone 1989, p. 298). !
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These ‘solutions-without-problems’ mirror the previously described notion that 
problems without an apparent or feasible policy solution may fail to draw attention 
from political decision makers for just this reason. Inversely, the motives for 
drawing attention to a particular problem may include the means to provide a policy 
solution, which – I argue – goes a long way to explain the interest and agency of the 
OECD DAC and the World Bank for the aid effectiveness agenda. My research on 
the OECD DAC and the World Bank points towards crises of legitimacy (see 
chapters 5 and 6), which both IOs experienced after the end of the Cold War, as 
incisive events that demanded institutional change (which in turn involves changes 
to the IO-state relationships crucial to IOs’ identity and authority). As the broader 
architecture of foreign aid relations changed in the 1990s, these two IOs in many 
ways became what could be described as ‘policy solutions without problems’. The 
legitimacy of these IOs was challenged in no small part by the fact that both were 
originally created to solve problems that no longer held the same urgency to 
governments in the 1990s.!
Opportunity: Kingdon refers to the last stream as ‘politics’, covering a variety of 
variables that shape the broader political sphere. They range from public opinion 
over interest group campaigns to electoral change. In essence, Kingdon’s third 
stream captures the stop-and-go nature of policy change, which often resembles 
dynamics described with the “punctuated equilibrium-model” of change (True, Jones 
and Baumgartner 1998). He considers receptivity and opportunity for new ideas and 
policies to be limited by default. Established processes and policies, he argues, tend 
to have an established clientele, which new ideas and policies often lack. The result 
is a default bias for inertia. However, changing circumstances (e.g. election of a new 
! ! ! &'-!
government, an exogenous crises, etc...) can disturb the status quo and provide 
windows of opportunities for new ideas to successfully drive policy change.!
Opportunity and receptivity are crucial for political ideas to transition into broader 
political norms, that is, to become “intersubjectively shared, collectively legitimated 
and/or institutionalized” (Park and Vetterlein 2010, p. 14).  
Emphasis on this last aspect of opportunity is also important from a 
methodological perspective, as it illustrates very well how notions of linear causality 
struggle to represent the full picture. Successful paradigm shifts not only point 
towards ideational change, possibly driven by agency, but also imply a relevant 
audience that is receptive for new political ideas at a particular place and time. That 
is certainly true for the aid effectiveness agenda, and for the role played by the 
OECD DAC and the World Bank in shaping this agenda. Their strategic agency and 
the tools of their (epistemic or discursive) authority are, virtually by definition, 
grounded in a specific place and time and constellation of political actors. 
 
7.2. Discussion of Additional!Explanations & Factors 
The OECD DAC and the World Bank played an active part, as strategic agents, to 
enact and shape transnational ideational changes about how policy makers today 
think about effective foreign aid policy. The notions of ideational and strategic are 
crucial. The former emphasises a constructivist dynamic, which shapes political 
perceptions, agendas and priorities. The latter emphasises the institutional self-bias 
behind these two IOs’ agency. Though IOs are confined by path dependencies and 
structural constraints, I argue that the origins, character and eventual success of the 
aid effectiveness agenda can only be fully understood by acknowledging the IOs’ 
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efforts to strengthen their legitimacy as international institutions. This should not be 
confused with a claim to place the sole causality of all aid effectiveness-related 
reforms, the scope of which was described in chapter 4, at the door of the OECD 
DAC and the World Bank. There are more and different factors to consider in any 
attempt to ‘fully’ explain the phenomenon of the aid effectiveness agenda. Indeed, 
the very notion of IO authority through a strategic social construction in IR rests on a 
notion of authority and influence within an active environment of multiple actors, 
preferences, interests and identities.!
John Kingdon’s Multiple Streams approach offers fantastic theoretical toolkit to 
approach such a more “muddled” notion of causation – in a non-quantitative sense – 
and as is suggested here for devising a frame for discussing other factors that could 
be relevant to understanding the contemporary shape and success of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. Three further explanations, or factors are discussed below. !
." The role of donor states in the formation and dissemination of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. This explores the role of donor governments, or 
possibly a smaller sub-group of donor governments, and their domestic 
constituencies in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda.!
/" The role of aid receiving states in the formation and dissemination of the aid 
effectiveness agenda, with or without the support of NGOs and similar 
advocacy groups. As the aid effectiveness agenda explicitly advocates, among 
other things, empowering aid-receiving governments in negotiating the terms 
of foreign and in its implementation, discussion of the role the aid agenda’s 
nominal main benefactors could be significant. !
@" A discussion of the emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda as result of 
advancing knowledge and scientific insight into the workings of the global aid 
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architecture. IOs have been described as ”science policy bureaucracies” 
(Finnemore 1996, p. 35), mirroring the Weberian idea of bureaucracies as a 
rationalization of policymaking in modernity. The tight association between 
international organisations and notions of rationality, bureaucracy, and 
science is long standing (Sharman 2006, p. 131). Thus the possibility must be 
considered that the aid agenda is genuinely an application of advancing 
scientific knowledge into the workings of foreign aid, facilitated by IOs. !
In the space available each of the above will be discussed in turn.!
Strategic construction by donor states: The first aspect to consider is the strategic 
agency by donor governments, or possibly by a sub-group of donor governments, as 
a factor in the formation and dissemination of the aid effectiveness agenda. This 
approach is likely the most sympathetic to realism-inspired P-A models on the 
interactions and relationships between states and IOs. Nevertheless, though this 
alternative explanation may lead to conclusions congruent with P-A models, it 
remains, as discussed here, grounded in constructivist theory on the role and impact 
of political ideas on policymaking. There are two main variants to this argument. !
The first variant looks for a potential minority of states among the larger group of 
donors. Promoting the aid effectiveness principles could be in the interest of some, 
but not all of the DAC-donors. One possible example for a research-hypothesis along 
these lines could be that smaller donor governments, such as the Nordic states, often 
seen to be more sympathetic for the aid effectiveness agenda, perceive and advocate 
the agenda as a way to increase their influence and their relative “voice” vis-à-vis 
other larger donors like Japan and the US. !
The second variant would be a widespread interest on the side of donor 
governments, possibly is response to domestic politics, for promoting aid 
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effectiveness in its current shape. One example hypothesis could be that aid agencies 
and line ministries in donor countries favour the agenda to boost their own political 
standing and legitimise their (foreign aid) budgets vis-à-vis other domestic political 
actors, under constrained public finances, thereby improving domestic accountability 
for foreign aid budgets.  !
Strategic construction by recipient states: A second alternative explanation 
would attribute the aid effectiveness agenda to the efforts of aid recipient states. This 
explanation has intuitive appeal, as the aid effectiveness agenda is designed with the 
intent of strengthening the voice of aid-receiving countries in global aid relations 
characterised by asymmetry in power relations between donor and aid recipient 
governments. The PD’s emphasis on country ownership and mutual accountability 
and the idea of shaming (potentially) harmful or counter-productive donor practices, 
such as earmarking or parallel implementation, illustrate the point. !
Again, this explanation rests on constructivist assumptions, which would see the 
success of the aid effectiveness agenda as the result of social interactions of actors in 
IR, even as the (ideational) agency of aid-receiving countries is “singled out” for 
investigation. And again, there are two main variations to this. The first would seek 
ideational agency for the aid effectiveness agenda among (some or all) aid-receiving 
states aiming to improve their standing in global aid relations. The second variant 
would seek agency for the aid effectiveness agenda on behalf of aid-receiving states 
by more indirect means, including possibly through the influence of activist groups 
and/or international NGOs.!
Examples for both variants could by hypotheses based on processes similar to 
those described by Sharman, in a different, non state-to-state context, as rhetorical 
entrapment. This is “where weaker actors can defend their interest against the strong 
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through the use of rhetoric” (2006, 143), which exploit the aforementioned 
ambiguity of language. Such rhetoric entrapment would start from donor 
governments publicly proclaimed commitment to promote development through 
foreign aid – including the Paris Declaration itself, after its signing – as well as 
potentially other political goals, such as efficient and economic use of public 
finances, to exert “social influence” (Johnston 2008) over governments, compelling 
them to cooperate and to comply with the aid effectiveness agenda, motivated by 
concerns of states with their perception (or status) as ‘good’ donors among peers. 
Thus Johnston (2008, p. 151) points to!
[...] the role that identity, or social category, plays in eliciting cooperation, 
namely, the link between self-categorization and social rewards/punishment. 
Given assumptions about status as a motivation for action, identification with a 
group/role/category creates sensitivity to particular kinds of status markers. The 
accumulation of these markers becomes a motivation of cooperative behaviour. 
Models like the aforementioned of states receptive to social interactions and 
constructed norms, values and – ultimately – interests, opens up the possibility of 
strategic agency countering even the asymmetry in power relations that exist in 
relations between aid donors and recipient.!
Advancement of knowledge: A final alternative explanation would attribute the 
success of the aid effectiveness agenda to progress in scientific (and, in turn, 
technocratic) knowledge. This could include a new appreciation of factors inherent 
to the global institutional architecture of foreign aid, including aid fragmentation, 
institutional structures of bi- and multilateral aid organisations (e.g. disbursement 
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pressures28) and factors intrinsic to the political economy of foreign aid per se (e.g. 
the absence of a “normal feedback loop available to democratic or market actors” 
(Easterly and Williamson 2011, p. 8)), as well as new insights into the variables that 
determine the impact of foreign aid on development and poverty-reduction.!
To ascribe the aid effectiveness agenda to genuine scientific progress cuts to the 
core of a vibrant scholarly discussion on the nature of IOs as ”science policy 
bureaucracies” (Finnemore 1996)), whose “knowledge-based authority or ‘epistemic 
authority’” (Sharman 2006, p. 12) is fundamentally tied to their identity and 
perception as science-based and rational (in a Weberian sense) organisations free of 
political (or any) bias. A wealth of research, including the seminal “Rules for the 
World” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004), along with many studies drawing on Barnett 
and Finnemore’s work (e.g. Woods 2006, Sharman 2006, Park and Vetterlein 2010) 
provide great amounts of evidence on how IO authority in IR predicates on being 
perceived as rational, technocratic and scientific.!
The research challenge here lies in exploring the degree to which the scientific is, 
in the case of aid effectiveness, the mode of IO agency, or instead a driving cause of 
the aid agenda itself, facilitated through the work of IOs as science policy 
bureaucracies. Unlike questions about the role of donors or aid-receiving countries, 
this alternative possible explanation remains closely tied to the role of IOs.  !
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7.3. Comparative Assessment of Alternative Explanations!
This section discusses the three explanations introduced above, assessing each of 
them against the three aspects of the multiple-stream test. Limited evidence is cited 
to explore the appeals and caveats of each variant explanation, even though it is not 
possible to offer a truly comprehensive and in-depth assessment here. Nevertheless, 
they are important to consider the strategic agency of IOs for the aid effectiveness 
agenda (see chapters 5 and 6) in the broader context. They also offer useful starting 
points for possible further investigations.     !
!
7.3.1. Strategic Construction by Donor States 
The major DAC donors include the world’s most powerful states. Without doubt, 
these states have the means to realise the aid effectiveness agenda. However, one 
important reason why the aid effectiveness agenda makes such an intriguing research 
subject is the observation that its principles and provisions appear to both constrain 
the foreign aid spending of aid donors and to subject donor governments to 
supranational monitoring and oversight, as well as to the possibility of public 
shaming. The key then are plausible motives, which would see donor states as a 
driving force behind the aid effectiveness agenda, and not primarily as its targets; as 
objects of the aid effectiveness agenda’s influence.  
Motives: If the preferences – or motives – of the major DAC donors are 
approximated as those of utility-maximizing, rational powers, there seems to be – 
almost by definition – very little that would encourage them to launch and promote 
the aid effectiveness agenda as it currently stands. Rational states (in a broadly 
realist/neo-liberal conception) would, by default, be averse to ceding control over aid 
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expenditures according to their current and future political preferences. The need to 
harmonise with other donors, to align public spending with the priorities of recipient 
countries, and to submit to the name-and-shame audits of the DAC, would all seem 
to run counter to rational states’ desire to employ foreign aid policy as an instrument 
in what realists claim is an anarchic or highly competitive world. Further reasons that 
encourage donor countries to support practices explicitly ostracised by the aid 
effectiveness agenda could include various forms of tied aid, which directly benefits 
domestic constituencies and industries, and the branding aid projects with national or 
organisational identities. Finally, donors have strong incentives (and often 
constitutional obligations) to keep foreign aid budgets under their control and audit 
of their national institutions, including parliaments, rather than subordinate them to 
recipient country systems and to the political priorities of recipient country 
ownership. A central argument forwarded by the aid effectiveness agenda is that 
divergent donor interests, as well as their divergent administration, are one of the 
structural flaws in today’s foreign aid system.!
However, plausible motives for donor countries (as a mostly unified group) to 
support the creation and dissemination of an aid effectiveness agenda along its 
current lines are easier to deduce, if the analysis extends beyond the interest of states, 
to the arena of domestic politics. For example, aid agencies, as actors within 
domestic politics, have an incentive to improve aid effectiveness – however defined 
– in order to forestall criticisms of aid as a wasteful form of spending public money, 
or even the more damaging critique that aid might be counterproductive and actually 
harm the lives of the poor (an argument famously and controversially made before a 
relatively broad public audience by such books as the bestselling ‘Dead Aid’ (2009) 
by Dambisa Moyo). Both critiques could in turn contribute to a decline (from a high 
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level) of public support for foreign aid (e.g. Glennie, Straw and Wild 2012) and 
increase pressure to cut aid budgets, which would be unattractive for aid agencies 
themselves.!
An important caveat here is the synchronicity of aid effectiveness reforms across 
most donor states (see chapter 4), both preceding the signing of the Paris Declaration 
and in its comparatively rapid implementation. For just as domestic politics differ 
from country to country, so the domestic political circumstances relevant to 
explaining the aid agenda can be expected to take on their own individual character 
accordingly.  !
Means: There is little doubt that the most prominent donor countries have the 
means to install an aid effectiveness agenda. These donors are among the world’s 
wealthiest and most powerful countries. They are the very objects that the aid 
effectiveness agenda seeks to influence, above all. But it is important to note there is 
no necessary inevitability about this. Kingdon’s second ‘policy’ stream (which 
corresponds with ‘means’ in this analysis) acknowledges that not all problems may 
have viable policy-solutions, and certainly even states like the United States, the UK, 
Germany and Japan do not always succeed in reforming their own policies, much 
less so in a coordinated, international manner. Nevertheless, this scenario offers a 
close alignment of (loosely speaking) “cause” and “effect”, which other scenarios – 
including the influential role of IOs as argued in this thesis – clearly lack. !
Opportunity: With respect to the agency of donor states as a driving force shaping 
the aid effectiveness agenda, opportunity is the most ambiguous among the three 
multiple-streams that structure this analysis. On first glance, rational donors have 
little intrinsic interest to address the problems highlighted by the aid effectiveness 
agenda, such as tied aid, aid fragmentation or aid volatility. In the example of the 
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latter, recipient countries mostly bear the costs of aid volatility (e.g. Kharas 2008) 
and aid fragmentation (e.g. Knack and Smets 2012), yet the costs for fixing the 
problem – reducing the volatility of aid by achieving more predictable disbursements 
or reducing aid fragmentation through international coordination, in the examples 
above, fall squarely on the donor governments and their administration. 
In the years following the end of the Cold War, donor governments had to 
confront the same global changes in the field of foreign as IOs, such as the World 
Bank and the OECD DAC, thus facing comparable needs to adjust foreign aid in this 
new global context, though arguably not staring at a full-blown legitimacy crisis. 
Moreover, the early 1990s saw electoral change in many important donor countries 
towards governments, as “Third Way” (Giddens 1998) credentials, social democrat 
or similar governments come to power in several European countries, like the UK. 
These governments would (generally speaking) be more sympathetic to devolution 
of ownership and to a greater emphasis on poverty reduction. 
In summary, the third stream of opportunity – or ‘politics’ in Kingdon’s model – 
must, in absence of more in-depth research, be considered ambiguous with regards to 
donor agency for the aid effectiveness agenda, especially in the years before the 
signing of the 2005 Paris Declaration. On the one hand, electoral change – one of 
Kingdon’s examples, which may supersede the general (assumed) bias for inertia – 
in a period of significant geopolitical change, may go some way to explain a window 
of opportunity for change for donor governments who favour and support the rise of 
an aid effectiveness agenda. The international nature of many problems highlighted 
by the aid agenda, such as aid fragmentation, or efforts to penalise unilateral free-
riders, for example in efforts to curb tied aid, also suggest the need for an 
international solution. 
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On the other hand, there are costs associated with addressing these problems, such 
as coordinating aid internationally, and opportunity costs for forsaking some policy 
instruments condemned by the new aid agenda, such as tied aid, at least in certain 
situations, as in countries with high levels of corruption (e.g. Knack and Smets 
2012). Ultimately, more research, including in-depth (donor) country case studies 
and, possibly, game-theoretic modelling, is needed to truly resolve this ambiguity 
and to explain whether historic factors of this period were sufficient to tip the 
balance against donor countries’ assumed bias for inertia even without the agency of 
IOs in the picture. Such research is beyond the limits of this thesis. 
Either way, there appear to be some overlaps with the arguments presented in 
chapters 5 and 6 on the unique window of opportunity for shape donor preferences 
that the World Bank and OECD DAC enjoyed at this particular period of time.  
Variant Hypothesis: There is an important variant to this discussion on the role 
played by donor governments in :.G0"4< the aid effectiveness agenda. This variant 
draws attention to a division among groups of donor states, where one group would 
seek to influence the other by shaping the “framework of ideas and standards” (Hall 
1993, p. 279) in a given policy field through efforts of strategic social construction 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In the aid effectiveness literature, the argument has 
been made that smaller donors, in particular Nordic countries, view the Paris 
Declaration more favourably because they are generally more likely to delegate the 
implementation of foreign aid (cp. Knack et al. 2010, 14). The aid effectiveness 
agenda would – in this variant – provide this group of donor countries with 
additional security that their delegated foreign aid is broadly used as they intended. !
The DAC’s evaluation of the donors’ progress in implementing the PD (OECD 
2011) provides some data to explore this latter claim. One case frequently cited in 
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support (e.g. Knack et al. 2010) is the outlier case of the United States (US), which is 
both the world’s biggest provider of foreign aid and one of the poorest performers in 
complying with the PD. In several of the PD’s indicators discussed in chapter 4, the 
US performed worse in 2010/2011 than in 2005. Examples for this include a drop in 
coordinated US Technical Co-operation (TC) from 47% of all TC in 2005 to only 
37% of all TC in 2010 (OECD 2011, p. 146), well short of the 50% target for 2010 
(OECD 2011, p. 199). The US also regressed in programme-based aid (OECD 2011, 
p. 156) and coordinated donor missions (2011, p. 158). Beyond the US however, the 
OECD data does not support a picture of ill-behaving large donors and well-
behaving small/Nordic donors. Tables 9 and 10 contrast the largest donors by net 
ODA with the largest donors by ODA as percentage of GNI based on Paris 
Declaration’s indicator number 4. This is, of course, shows only one indicator from 
the PD. Nevertheless, the tables help illustrate how trends are not distributed evenly 
between the groups of states: France and Germany, two of the largest DAC donors, 
made significant progress. The UK and Japan made relative less relative progress, 
but started from a high level well above the 50% target back in 2005.!
Five largest DAC-Donors by net ODA as of 2009 !
(US, France, Germany, UK, Japan)!
Paris Indicator 4 – Technical Cooperation: Target for 2010 = 50% Coordinated TC 
Country Coordinated 
TC!
(2010)!
Total TC!
(2010)!
2005! 2010! 2010/2005 in 
%!
USA 1715! 4648! 47%! 37%! -11!
France 47! 92! 20%! 51%! +31!
Germany 370! 535! 39%! 69%! +30!
UK 178! 275! 61%! 65%! +4!
Japan 360! 444! 75%! 81%! +6!
Table 8  Five largest DAC-Donors Progress for Paris Declaration Indicator 4 (OECD 2005) 
!
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!
Five largest DAC-Donors by ODA as % of GNI
29
 as of 2009!
(Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, Denmark, Netherlands in order)!
Paris Indicator 4 – Technical Cooperation: Target for 2010 = 50% Coordinated TC 
Country   Coordinated TC!
   (2010)!
Total TC!
(2010)!
2005! 2010! 2010/2005 in 
%!
Sweden 28! 58! 64%! 47%! -16!
Norway 8! 17! 79%! 45%! -34!
Luxembourg 7! 16! 0%! 46%! +46!
Denmark 61! 66! 51%! 93%! +42!
Netherlands 47! 85! 35%! 55%! +20!
Table 9  Largest DAC-Donors by ODA as % of GNI Progress for Paris Declaration Indicator 
4 (OECD 2005) 
In contrast, Sweden and Norway, perhaps ironically, actually regressed sharply, 
though Denmark is the DAC’s overall top performer on indicator 4. Using different 
measures of their own creation, Easterly and Williamson arrive at similar 
conclusions regarding Scandinavian (or Nordic) donors:6
[...] Scandinavian donors appear to be average to mediocre on the overall 
ranking. [...] Apparently, the reputation of Scandinavia as altruistic is based on 
the volume of its aid, and not on following best [i.e. Paris Declaration] 
practices in aid giving. (2011, p. 45)!
Of course, strictly speaking, the fact that Scandinavian donor countries – as a sub-
group of all major foreign aid donors – apparently do not all live up to the principles 
of the aid effectiveness agenda, do not necessarily prevent them having an influence 
on policies of other donors through the aid effectiveness agenda. Likewise, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29  OECD DAC International Development Statistic (IDS) at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/  
(Accessed 20 March 2014).   
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dichotomy of non-Nordic-vs.-Scandinavian donor countries is certainly not the only 
potential source of division among donors.    !
To summarise, there are many good arguments why donor countries would 
support, and actively promote, the aid effectiveness agenda, even if its provisions, at 
first glance, possibly contradict the interests and preferences that many IR scholars 
attribute a rational state. The post Cold War period, with its changes to geopolitics 
and changes to how foreign aid is perceived, presents challenges for states as much 
as for IOs, all of whom may be capable of undertaking ideational change. 
Mechanisms such as those of socialization or peer pressure among states, as 
described by Johnston (2008), could prove more important following the end of 
foreign aid’s domination by Cold War “power-politics”. Even if IOs – as argued in 
this thesis – had a larger role in strategically shaping the aid effectiveness agenda, 
they still met and – very importantly – required (potential) donor sympathy to these 
ideas in order for the PD to be signed and for the agenda to then impact on actual 
foreign aid policies. Donor receptivity, or at a minimum acquiescence, is an essential 
enabling condition for policies to change and be faithfully implemented.!
!
7.3.2. Strategic Construction by Recipient States 
Developing countries, which receive ODA from DAC-donors, are the direct 
beneficiaries of foreign aid. Improving the effectiveness of aid is meant to benefit 
them first of all. Much of the PD (and more so the 2008 Accra Agenda and the 2011 
Busan Partnership) focuses on giving aid-receiving countries a stronger voice in 
negotiating and implementing foreign aid. This gives aid-receiving states a clear and 
strong motive to promote the aid effectiveness agenda. Assessing criteria of means 
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and opportunity, on the other hand, highlights caveats about the role of aid-receiving 
countries in shaping and promoting the aid effectiveness agenda.  
Motives: Aid-receiving countries have two closely related reasons for promote the 
aid effectiveness agenda on the international stage. First, because the agenda aims to 
improve foreign aid implementation to better achieve its explicit purposes of 
supporting developing countries. Second, the agenda seeks to achieve this by giving 
aid-receiving developing countries a greater voice within the global aid architecture. !
The declared purpose of foreign aid is to help developing countries grow their 
economy and reduce poverty, as well as a range of subsidiary socio-economic goals. 
The aid effectiveness agenda is not without implementation difficulties Political 
scientists and others sometimes see aid as an instrument donors use for more implicit 
and self-serving purposes than helping development or the poor, such as advancing 
commercial or security interests, or increasing their geopolitical influence (Riddell 
2007, p. 91). These grounds are often cited as reasons why aid is sometimes not 
effective. Compliance with the aid effectiveness agenda would presumably shift the 
balance away from the donors’ alleged (more or less implicit) motives and towards 
the ends that are supposed to motivate it, namely development goals. Moreover, the 
aid effectiveness agenda strives to achieve its stated aim by giving aid recipients a 
greater voice in the design and implementation of foreign aid. Its very logic assumes 
that the effectiveness of foreign aid will improve when the recipients become more 
active, more involved and better respected partners of the donors in the various 
stages of planning and implementing foreign aid. !
To conclude, plausible motives for recipient countries to shape and promote the 
aid effectiveness agenda are easy to identify. In theory, an agenda of this kind could 
help aid-receiving countries in pursuit of “rhetorical action” or “rhetorical 
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entrapment”, as outline by Sharman (2006), to bind donors to their declared aims of 
foreign aid.!
There is one caveat: aid recipient governments may also perceive benefits in the 
dysfunctions of the aid system, for example for rent-seeking or in ‘donor shopping’ 
(to circumvent conditionalities – e.g. Annen and Moers 2012, p. 30). This 
corresponds to opinions voiced during my interviews, especially at the World Bank 
(e.g. Roome, J., personal communication, October 24, 2011). Experts I spoke with 
saw efforts to coordinate donors also as means to achieve a more unified donor 
stance on delicate or politicised issues in aid-receiving countries, which would 
prevent ‘donor shopping’. Ngaire Woods (2006) describes the aid coordinating 
mechanisms of the IDA as means to improve ”information in a way that could be 
much more greatly leveraged by donors” (p. 189), though describing it as a 
possibility, less a reality.!It is hard to gauge – without further research – whether 
these possible downsides for aid-receiving governments could qualify as 
overriding motives for aid-receiving countries as a whole. Likewise, the aim to 
better discipline problematic aid recipients with the aid effectiveness agenda may 
clash, in parts, with findings by Stephen Knack and Lodewijk Smets (2012) who 
argue potential benefits of untying aid (now one principle of the PD) are not 
realised in highly corrupt least developed countries. !
Means: The “means” of aid-receiving countries to influence the foreign aid policy 
of donors to their advantage is a more difficult criterion. For a start, there are very 
few academic institutions, think tanks or policy-making traditions preceding the 
1990s, where aid recipient countries consciously engage structural questions of 
foreign aid policy and foreign aid relations. Post colonialism, in all its diversity (e.g. 
Young 2003), is perhaps the next closest discourse to expound the problems of 
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asymmetrical relationships between aid recipient and donor states. However, 
postcolonial theory is often political charged and technically unspecific; the near-
diametric opposite of the aid effectiveness discourse in many ways. It is difficult to 
conceive postcolonial discourses as a ‘policy solution’ to a ‘policy problem’ in the 
sense of Kingdon’s second policy stream. Moreover, it also lacks access to donor’s 
policy processes.!
Sharman’s (2009) concept of “rhetorical action” and “rhetorical entrapment” 
provides plausible mechanisms for ideational change, though it is not clear where 
aid-receiving states have access to a discursive arena for such “rhetorical action”. 
Scholars like Dostal (2004) who have investigated the question of expertise-based 
agency of IOs in public policymaking through a discursive lens to emphasise the 
need to look for a temporal sequence and location of the original policy ideas. !
The analysis of public policy from an organizational discourse perspective 
requires observers to search for ‘ﬁrst mover’ situations in order to trace back 
the histories of currently hegemonic policies: we may ask, in which particular 
institutional settings were new policy-relevant ideas and cognitive frameworks 
ﬁrst developed; and how did they subsequently acquire their hegemonic status 
inside of the relevant policy-making networks? (Dostal 2004, p. 444) 
The World Bank and the OECD DAC – shapers of the aid effectiveness agenda 
even if the precise nature or extent of their agency still remains open to debate – are 
unlikely forums for concerted rhetorical action by aid-receiving (and non-OECD 
member) states. As an institutional setting for the aid effectiveness discourse, they 
also challenge, the ‘first-mover’ consideration introduced by Dostal. Reducing the 
barriers for aid-receiving countries to the aid effectiveness discourse facilitated by 
these two IOs is not the earliest but instead one of the more recent aims of the aid 
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effectiveness agenda, notably the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action (itself the result of 
the first aid effectiveness forum hosted by an aid-receiving country).  !
Opportunities: Finally, the question whether recipient countries had the political 
window of opportunity – as initiators of the aid agenda – to successfully shape the 
aid effectiveness agenda and to promote it to an audience of (receptive) donor 
countries. The geopolitical changes of the early 1990s, the overall decline of foreign 
aid and the emerging criticism of earlier forms of foreign aid, including challenges to 
the Washington Consensus (e.g. Stiglitz 2002), could conceivably have created a 
similar mix of crisis (foreign aid budgets declining) and opportunities (new 
geopolitics allowing new narratives to emerge) for aid-receiving countries just as it 
did for the IOs investigated in chapter 5 and 6.. !
However, opportunity here is in doubt (at a risk of tautology) because the early 
aid agenda is linked to institutions, not least the DAC and the World Bank, which are 
donor-biased aid-receiving countries came late into the aid effectiveness discourse. 
This last point runs counter the methodological recommendations of Jörg Dostal 
(2004) who says we must disentangle the interwoven process of discourse and social 
construction along chronological lines in order to establish the ‘first mover’ behind 
what only later becomes a cascading policy norm.  !
Both the DAC and the World Bank are clearly dominated by (traditional) donors. 
Indeed, as described in detail in the case study on the DAC, significant efforts were 
taken after the PD was signed to actually help include the aid recipient countries that 
stand to benefit most from the aid effectiveness agenda. The WP-EFF was 
restructured with the aim of moving “from a working party to the international 
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partnership of aid effectiveness”30. This reflects the widespread perception that, 
somewhat ironically, aid-receiving countries were underrepresented in the very aid 
effectiveness discourse on how to empower them in the global foreign aid discourse. !
The donor stakeholders were well represented in the process [of drafting the 
PD]. I am not sure about the developing countries. They were not as well 
represented certainly in setting the targets. But they have been more and more 
vocal indeed since Paris. Their participation in the structure and the monitoring 
has increased. They have parity of numbers. Their views are being much more 
listened to. (Hammond, B., personal communication, May 6, 2011)  !
It is this expansion of the DAC’s work – stretching its mandate – that triggered 
calls for decoupling the aid effectiveness agenda from the DAC (Glennie 2011). !
To summarise, recipient states have good reasons to promote aid effectiveness. 
However, research to date points towards the fact that the aid effectiveness agenda 
cascaded from heavily donor-biased platforms, with little initial input from aid 
recipients. This raises doubts about both the means and the opportunities of aid-
receiving countries to act as early or ‘first-movers’ to promote and shape the aid 
effectiveness agenda. The World Bank and the DAC were unlikely places for aid-
receiving countries to successfully construct new narratives about global aid 
relations. In contrast, regional organisations such as South-South networks, or even 
the UN presumably would have played a greater role if the first-movers had been 
aid-receiving states.!
Variant Hypothesis: One variation of this alternative explanation, that aid 
receiving states were a driving force in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda, 
considers an ‘indirect representation’ of aid-receiving countries through other agents. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30  http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/45498646.pdf  (Accessed 31 March 2014) 
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International NGOs seem to be one of the natural candidates for this. Though 
international NGOs are often based in OECD-countries, they frequently campaign 
for changes in foreign aid policy. Indeed, as described in the case study on the World 
Bank (Chapter 6), NGOs originated and amplified public criticism of the World 
Bank and the Washington Consensus in the early 1990s. NGOs played a similar role 
in the late 1990s, when they marshalling public support for debt relief for highly 
indebted poor countries. In a big development financing conference in Monterrey in 
2002 they were instrumental in the getting donor countries to pledge at least 0.7% of 
GDP in foreign aid by 2025 (see Riddell 2007, p. 43). !
There are good reasons to think that NGO campaigns were equally active in 
shaping the aid effectiveness agenda, as a part of their role in shaping public 
perceptions and political priorities in foreign aid in 1990s. Indeed, as shown in 
chapter 6, the public and political pressure by NGOs on IOs, notably the World 
Bank, was an important factor animating the World Bank to consider and adapt its 
position on a range of development-related issues, for example environmental 
concerns (e.g. Park 2005). However, little evidence has been seen to suggest that 
NGOs made direct contributions to shaping the aid effectiveness agenda and its 
specific ideas and principles, over and above disowning structural adjustments, aid 
conditionality and campaigning for debt relief. !
As with the alternative explanation above – recipient-country agency - this variant 
raises caveats, not in the possibility of NGOs being architects of the process, or with 
regards to the many contributions by NGOs to the aid effectiveness agenda in its 
later stages, but in light of the temporal sequence. In the aid effectiveness-literature 
NGOs are generally perceived as latecomers to this specific discourse, an assessment 
matched by my research interviews. In particular, NGOs appear to have played, at 
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best, a marginal role in Paris 2005 and up until perhaps the 2008 Accra Agenda for 
Action. !
The Paris Declaration focuses predominantly on donor-partner country 
relationships and does not explicitly address the role of non-governemnt [sic] 
organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) in the process to 
improve aid effectiveness. The role of NGOs and CSOs has been more visibly 
incorporated into the follow-up agreement on aid effectiveness, the Accra 
Agenda for Action (AAA). (ACFID 2009)!
Concluding, this variant explanation on the distinctive role of NGOs in shaping 
the aid effectiveness agenda is faced with many of the same caveats about ‘means’ 
and ‘opportunity’ pointed out for the broader variant of aid-receiving countries 
strategic agency. These doubts are based on similar observations of NGOs ‘being 
late’ to this particular policy discourse, rather than spearheading it, in contrast to 
what they have done elsewhere (e.g. debt-relief). Of course, this does not negate or 
contradict the possibility that NGOs made important contributions to the aid 
effectiveness agenda once they engaged with it more thoroughly, notably after 2008. 
The sequencing of the aid effectiveness agenda’s cascade as a normative policy 
agenda however, suggests a near-perfect inverse of the dynamics described, for 
example, by Susan Park (2005) on the interaction of the World Bank and IOs on the 
diffusion of environmental norms. There, Park describes “the role of IOs as norm 
consumers as well as norm diffusers” (2005, p. 111), who adopt, or consume, norms 
from NGOs, advocacy-networks and other non-state actors. In aid effectiveness, the 
reverse appears to have been the case.!
!
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7.3.3. Advancement of Scientific Knowledge 
It is worthwhile to briefly discuss the variant explanation that stresses how the aid 
effectiveness agenda is primarily the result of advancing knowledge and new 
insights into the workings of foreign aid. Or, in a similar vein, that aid effectiveness 
is a rational (in a technocratic sense) response to new policy problems that were 
emerging or particularly pressing in foreign aid in the 1990s.  
This particular topic was discussed earlier, notably in tracing the initial ‘ideational 
artistry’ of the DAC and the World Bank in creating today’s aid effectiveness agenda 
(chapters 5.2 and 6.2. respectively). One example has been the long tradition in 
academic literature on concepts of limited absorptive capacities (e.g. Guillaumont 
and Guillaumont 2010) and on the bureaucratic burden of uncoordinated foreign aid 
(e.g. Tendler 1975). Both play roles in the aid effectiveness agenda but predate the 
2005 PD and its 1990 roots, including Shaping the 21st Century (1996) and the 
World Bank’s CDF (Wolfensohn 1999), often by decades. 
Arguably, this variant explanation touches on the very core concepts of IOs’ 
expert authority and legitimacy, both of which were shown to be intimately 
connected to the IOs’ nature or character as ”science policy bureaucracies” 
(Finnemore 1996, p. 35), whose “policy influence and institutional effectiveness 
depend on its being perceived as an “apolitical,” rational, and expert bureaucracy“ 
(Sharman 2006, p. 11). Differentiating – with academic rigour – between science as 
the mode of IOs’ strategic social construction, and science as a genuine factor 
shaping policy ideas, norms and paradigm shifts, such as the aid effectiveness 
agenda, is problematic. The obvious approach is chronological, which was applied in 
the case studies in chapter 5 and 6. If a particular scientific insight significantly pre-
dates its advocacy as a policy idea, the reasons for its advocacy are likely more than 
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simply the closure of a knowledge gap through scientific progress. And while IOs 
may have strategic interests that go beyond their calling as rational, apolitical, expert 
organisations, their credibility as science policy bureaucracies depends on the 
science underpinning their policy advice being genuine. 
A further problem is that the multiple-streams-test adopted from Kingdon is ill 
suited to study the role of advancing scientific knowledge in shaping the aid 
effectiveness agenda. Indeed, the underlying assumption that greater insights and 
knowledge into specific policy problems lead to an appropriate response is precisely 
the sort of ‘rational sequence’ in policymaking, which Kingdon (1984) rejects with 
his multiple-stream model. Moreover, the lack of a distinct agent or actor makes it 
difficult to discuss their ‘motives’ or ‘means’ in this agent-focused model.   
However, this final variant merits some discussion here, however brief.  
Motives: Motives are not truly applicable. This particular alternative explanation 
rests on the logic that advances in scientific knowledge, more than any actor’s 
conscious agency, lead to a rational policy response. This variant goes against 
Kingdon’s basic assumption of (over-)crowded political agendas. By default these 
are closed to new insights unless championed by actors in the contestation of politics 
(Wiener 2009, p. 175; Wiener and Puetter 2009, p. 7) within a broader political 
environment assumed to be biased towards inertia, outside of limited, critical 
opportunities for change (Kingdon 1984, p. 165-6). However, not all mechanisms or 
processes of norm diffusions studied in the literature (e.g. Park 2005, Vetterlein and 
Park 2010) include the twin-assumptions of (i) a limited political agenda, and (ii) a 
resulting need for political contestation of policy ideas whereby the ideas that 
”become the policies, programs, and philosophies that dominate political reality” 
(Schmidt 2008, p. 307) become separated from those that do not. However, without 
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an alternative to the mechanism of contestation, these approaches must struggle to 
answer Schmidt’s (2008) question about why only some ideas cascade and come to 
shape political reality whereas others do not.    
Means: Means, likewise, are not truly applicable. This alternative explanation 
builds on the assumption that advances in scientific knowledge lead to appropriate 
policy responses. This translation of advancing knowledge into policy (even if it is 
‘diluted’ by political processes and compromise, as Easterly and Williamson (2011), 
among others, assume by default) is an intrinsic assumption to this variant 
explanation. It is the persuasiveness of scientific insight itself that motivates reform. 
A slight variation to discuss the, possibly rewarding from a theoretical 
perspective, would be to integrate the concept of “epistemic communities” (Haas 
1992) into the discussion at this point to introduce a notion of agency, here the 
means of specific scientific and/or academic community to raise scholarly insights to 
the political agenda. In the specific case of aid effectiveness however, there is likely 
a conceptual overlap between the research and knowledge productions associated 
with the two IOs investigated here, and the political means (including institutional 
access) of an epistemic community invested in the aid effectiveness agenda.  
Opportunity: Opportunities (‘Politics’) is thus the only relevant criterion. The 
plausibility of this explanation rests on the coincidence of new insights into a 
problem (new knowledge) and a policy response. Responses may not be immediate, 
but a link should be identifiable.    
The World Bank and OECD DAC studies both touched upon the observation that 
this coincidence of insight and policy seems not to exist, and on how key 
components of the aid effectiveness agenda built on a combination of pre-existing 
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concepts. References to the concept of limited absorptive capacity of aid-receiving 
countries, to name one example, can be traced back to the economic studies of 
Nurske (1953), Millikan and Rostow (1957), and Rosenstein-Rodan (1961). As a 
policy problem in line with the use of absorptive capacity in today’s aid 
effectiveness agenda – i.e. describing the limits of domestic institutions to deal with 
the demands of (too many) donors – the concept reaches back at least to Tendler 
(1975, p. 86). Problems that result from foreign aid tied to procurement systems of 
donors have likewise been known for decades. Indeed, the DAC, “since its inception, 
has devoted much attention to the possibility of untying aid, but little progress has 
been made” (Coverdale and Healy 1981, p. 185). 
It lies beyond the scope of this thesis to make an exhaustive exploration of all the 
possible alternative explanations, which would require a while thesis in itself. Yet, as 
exemplified by the examples above, insight into these problems did not in itself 
trigger a policy response. The opportunity for policymakers to be receptive to these 
insights came at a particular time and with the specific narrative frame provided by 
the effectiveness agenda.  
Variant Explanation: A notable variant to this discussion of advancing scientific 
knowledge deals with the currency of policy problems, rather than with scientific 
progress. Academics, technocrats, even policymakers could be well aware of a 
certain policy problem, yet no response is triggered, until the problem becomes grave 
or urgent enough to warrant political attention. Concerning this variant, however, it 
can likewise be shown that many of the problems, which are addressed by the aid 
effectiveness agenda, also precede the end of the Cold War.  
Aid fragmentation is a good example. Overall, fragmentation of foreign aid 
increased significantly over all the years since the OECD DAC was established. The 
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average donor disbursed aid to 20 recipient countries in 1960, but to over 85 in 2009 
(Annen and Moers 2012, p. 5). Combined with (a) the fact that the total number of 
donors increased and (b) the observation of foreign aid donors’ tendency for 
“herding”31 (Frot and Santiso 2011), instead of specializing efficiently, the growing 
scope of the problem of fragmentation is apparent.    
Authors such as Annen and Moers (2012) and Easterly and Williamson (2011) 
employ the Herfindahl Index32 (e.g. Hirschmann 1964) to analyse aid fragmentation 
across this longer time frame. The Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of the 
squares of the “market shares” (or in this case, shares of the foreign aid) of the 
largest actors. Increases in the Herfindahl index generally indicate a decrease in 
competition and an increase of “market share”. Inversely, a measure approaching 1 
would represent a monopoly. Applied to foreign aid, figure 14 below from Annen 
and Moers (2012) illustrates the trend towards fragmentation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31   Emmanuel Frot and Javier Santiso borrow the concept of herding from financial economics 
(which in turn adopted it from early 20th century sociology) and apply it to foreign aid. Herding 
describes “economic behaviour in terms of social influences such as “emulation”, where some 
members of a group mimic other members of higher status” (2009, p. 4).This study finds evidence 
for herding among bilateral donors only.  
32  Originally the Herfindahl index was a measure of the size of firms in relation to an industry and an 
indicator of the amount of competition among them.  
Figure 14  Global Aid Herfindahl Index (Annen and Moers 2012, 7) 
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This visualization highlights growing aid fragmentation observable. Crucially 
however, this visualization also shows that fragmentation increased most 
dramatically long before the 1980s, was relatively stable during the 1990s, and 
deteriorated again after 2000. The latter is mainly a response to new donors 
emerging after 1970. In short, there is little indication that the problem of aid 
fragmentation should have become a particular pressing problem at the inception of 
the aid effectiveness agenda, i.e. roughly in the time span between Shaping the 21st 
Century (OECD 1996) and the Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness (OECD 
2005). Similar long-term observations can be made and have been made for other aid 
effectiveness issues, including aid selectivity and tied aid (e.g. Easters and 
Williamson 2011, p. 40-43). 
This cursory examination however does not indicate any signs of specific changes 
or shifts in policy problems that would point to an exogenous cause (or ‘trigger’) for 
the aid effectiveness agenda on the basis of newly emerging, or newly urgent policy 
problems within the particular timeframe (or timeframes) of the aid effectiveness 
agenda’s initial conception and its later cascade towards becoming a policy norm. 
Table 10  Multiple Stream Assessment for Variant Explanations 1 to 3  
 
Strategic Construction by Donor States (multi-stream test)!
Motives Means! Opportunity!
- +! +!
Strategic Construction by Recipient States (multi-stream test)!
Means! Means! Means!
+! -! -!
Advancement of Scientific Knowledge (multi-stream test)!
Motives Means! Opportunity!
N/A N/A! -!
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7.4.  Chapter 7 – IO Agency,  Multi-Causality and Policy Change  
Chapter 7 presents and discusses variant and complementary explanations to the 
observable policy changes previously discussed in chapter 4. Though the emphasis 
of this thesis is not in explaining policy changes, but in investigating the role of the 
OECD DAC and the World Bank in shaping the emergence of the aid effectiveness 
agenda, the aid agenda’s topicality and relevance for political studies follows in no 
small part from the widespread reform efforts associated with it. Chapter 7 thus 
adopts a broader perspective, aiming to briefly explore some of the context, 
additional aspects and supplementary factors that define the broader environment of 
the DAC’s and the World Bank’s strategic agency.  
Chapter 7 has adopted a multiple-stream-analysis from the public policy literature 
to use as a shorthand test for comparing key aspects of these variants. The three 
aspects discussed in this chapter were (i) the role of donor countries, (ii) the role of 
aid-receiving countries, and (iii) the role of advancing scientific knowledge in 
shaping the emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda in the context of post Cold 
War IR.   
On the role of donor countries, these certainly play a role in the emergence of 
the aid effectiveness agenda. Any policy advice by IOs to reform foreign aid policy 
needs to compete and succeed in the contestation of national politics, as well as on 
the international stage. Though there are costs associated with reforming policies 
along the prescriptions of the aid effectiveness agenda, several reasons can be found 
to explain donor country receptiveness to the aid effectiveness agenda. Notably, they 
committed to (parts of) the aid effectiveness agenda, for example the UK’s 2002 
abolition of tied aid, which would tie in with supporting the same norm as a more 
broad-based international principle. The key caveat is whether donor countries could 
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have been the ‘first movers’ to shape and diffuse aid effectiveness agenda before it 
gained momentum. That seems implausible, not least due to a lack, in the logic of 
the multiple-streams-test, of an apparent motive. What could motivate donor 
countries (or, alternatively, their aid agencies) to advocate a set of policy norms, 
which they (a) struggle to comply with (to the extent of the targets agreed upon in 
the PD), (b) subjects them to a multilateral “name-and-shame” benchmarking 
processes, casting many in an unfavourable light (e.g. OECD 2011), and (c) restricts 
(if only by ‘soft power’) their freedom to disburse and implement foreign aid along 
their political (or organisational) priorities?  
At least donors were clearly receptive to the aid effectiveness agenda and, 
ultimately, aided its diffusion. They imbued it with authority. The empirical work for 
this thesis could identify no obvious ‘first mover’ (Dostal 2004) among donor states, 
who initiated the aid effectiveness agenda. Likewise, the more abstract ‘multiple-
streams-test’ raises doubts about the motives of any given donor, or group of donors, 
to launch such a process. 
On the role of aid-receiving countries, they appear to be natural advocates of 
the aid effectiveness agenda, as they are the agenda’s intended main beneficiaries. 
The key caveats here, after applying the multiple-streams-test framework, are 
questions about means and opportunity, rather than motives. But if (some or all) 
recipient countries really had initiated the agenda, either directly or represented by 
international NGOs and advocacy groups, then questions must arise why they joined 
the process only recently? The more plausible explanation, in line with the 
documented chronology, would see aid-receiving countries, along with NGOs and 
advocacy-networks, as “norm consumers” (Park 2005). Later, both contributed to the 
process and played a role in expanding the breadth and depth of the aid effectiveness 
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agenda. Arguably, the recent expansion of the aid agenda to this broader group of 
participants caused both a controversy on whether the OECD DAC is still the 
appropriate forum (Glennie 2011) and hastened the World Bank’s disengagement 
from the aid effectiveness agenda (see chapter 6.3.).  
On the advancement of scientific knowledge, any notion that science of aid 
effectiveness itself was a factor shaping the emergence of the policy agenda of that 
name does not conform well to the multiple stream test. Nevertheless, the key caveat 
here appears to be a question of opportunity. Neither the specific scientific insights 
on problems highlighted by the aid effectiveness agenda, nor the actual problems 
appear to coincide or correlate well with the actual emergence and cascade of the aid 
effectiveness agenda as a policy paradigm.  
Overall, none of the main explanations identified in this chapter fully conform to 
all three aspects of ‘motives’, ‘means’ and ‘opportunity’. None are sufficient to 
explain the emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda in its current shape. They do, 
however, draw attention to the significance of context and the conflation of parallel 
interests and scientific trends for the ideational artistry and agency by the DAC and 
the World Bank in respect of the aid effectiveness agenda and so may well help 
explain the agenda’s success at this particular point in history. Further research into 
this aspect should be encouraged. 
    
!
!
!
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Chapter 8 – Mechanisms of Ideational Agency and Institutional Change!
This thesis set out to study the aid effectiveness agenda as a recent, influential 
and, as political phenomenon, understudied policy agenda to improve foreign aid. 
The aid effectiveness agenda and its principles – among them donor coordination, 
greater use of country systems in aid-receiving countries, and better alignment of aid 
with aid-receiving countries’ priorities, ideally through joint aid efforts – are a focal 
point of present-day foreign aid policy discourses. Today’s prevalence of this 
agenda, its assumed influence on foreign aid policies, and its relative novelty – the 
agenda is mainly associated with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, adopted 
in February 2005 by over 100 signatories – as well as the relative rarity of academic 
research on the origins and nature of the aid effectiveness agenda as a political 
phenomenon, all motivated this study to trace back the agenda to its origins and to 
investigate the processes that shaped its emergence and its present form. 
Preliminary forays into the topic suggested an important and, in aid effectiveness 
literature, little researched role played by IOs, in particular the OECD DAC and the 
World Bank, in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda. This in turn adds a topical, 
more theoretical dimension to this study, raising the question of how IOs can 
potentially shape preferences of donor states in the field of foreign aid, and possibly 
in other policy areas. With this added dimension, the research presented in this thesis 
no longer speaks only to the scholarship dedicated to understanding the aid 
effectiveness agenda and improving foreign aid, but also to a thriving literature on 
the relationships between states and IOs in global affairs, which includes works on 
the OECD and the World Bank specifically, and constructivist studies on how IOs 
influence state preferences. For these reasons, this thesis set out to answer the central 
question of:!How did IOs shape the emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda?!
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8.1.  Empirical Findings 
This thesis’s study on the aid effectiveness agenda reveals four main findings. 
The first finding is that the ideational origin of many of the concepts, principles and 
norms that constitute today’s aid effectiveness agenda can be traced back to 
processes within two IOs, the OECD DAC and the World Bank, both of which are 
now closely associated with facilitating the policy discourse on aid effectiveness. 
Today, these two IOs are tasked with monitoring policy reforms undertaken by 
donor governments to improve the effectiveness of foreign aid, and help implement 
crucial tenets of the aid effectiveness agenda in aid-receiving countries. The OECD 
DAC and the World Bank, in the 1990s, were the place and the time from where and 
when the early precursors to the aid effectiveness agenda originated. The roots of the 
agenda can be traced back to ideas and concepts that were put to paper in documents 
such as Development Partnership in the New Global Context (OECD 1995) and 
Shaping the 21
st
 Century for the OECD DAC, as well as the World Bank’s Strategic 
Compact (World Bank 1997) and Comprehensive Development Framework (World 
Bank 1998). More to the point, these earliest efforts to conceive an improved, more 
effective way to systemically administer, to improve and to govern foreign aid were 
closely entwined with these IOs’ experiences of public criticism, crisis, and 
institutional change at the time. From its beginnings, the aid effectiveness agenda 
was shaped not only by an ambition to improve foreign aid after the end of the Cold 
War, but also by efforts from these two IOs to ascertain their role as international 
expert bureaucracies in foreign aid in a changed geopolitical environment.!
The second finding from the case studies is that both IOs have, in promoting the 
aid effectiveness agenda, and in acting as “ideational agencies” (Marcussen 2001, 
Kidal 2003) for it, adapted and evolved their repertoire of approaches for this task. 
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The OECD DAC strongly relies on monitoring and measuring, on expert advice and 
peer reviews: all classic examples of the entire OECD’s way of operating, and all 
very much in line with the kind of “expert authority” (Clegg 2010, p. 477) it is 
known for. However, the OECD DAC also launched efforts to broaden the discourse 
beyond its member states and to facilitate the position of aid-receiving countries, for 
example with organisational changes of the Working Party for Aid Effectiveness to 
better represent states there were not DAC members. Doing so, the DAC entered 
new territory, also leveraging, unusually for the OECD, something closer to “moral 
authority” (Clegg 2010, p. 477). The World Bank, in contrast, approached the 
political aid effectiveness discourse more as an opportunity to communicate, to build 
political support, and to legitimise insights and innovations born from the Bank’s 
1990s efforts, in the face of much public criticism, to decentralise and reform its 
operations.!
A third finding, not dissimilar to the second, is that both IOs acted strategically, 
aiming to influence ideas and discourse both at the level of policymaking in donor 
countries and at the level of policy implementation in aid-receiving countries. One 
ambition by the World Bank for the aid effectiveness agenda was, purposefully as 
interviews showed, to create a widely shared understanding and a favourable 
disposition among policymakers to help further more technical or operational 
innovations, like standardising and harmonising procurement by aid organisations, 
where a lack of “high-level political support” (World Bank 2001b) was, as one of the 
interviewees said, perceived to be the main ”show stopper” (Nightingale, I., personal 
communication, October 25th, 2011). Conversely, efforts the World Bank’s 
involvement in improving the implementation of foreign aid in aid-receiving 
countries is to be expected. However, initiatives launched by the OECD DAC, an 
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organisation created as a forum for policy experts from a club of industrialized 
countries, to run regional workshops with aid experts and representatives from aid-
receiving countries is an unexpected finding. Several interviewees at the OECD 
DAC in Paris made similar-sounding statements on how “[i]t is not happening in 
Paris. It is actually happening in these [aid-receiving] countries” (Hammond, B., 
personal communication, May 6, 2011). Both IOs, even though they cooperate 
closely on the aid effectiveness agenda, also seek to supplement the efforts in their 
traditional sphere of expertise – the World Bank at the level of foreign aid 
management and implementation at a country-level, the DAC at the level of policy 
discourses among experts and civil servants in aid agency headquarters and donor 
governments – by reaching out to the respective other sphere of influence.!
In the cases of the OECD DAC and the World Bank, ideational agency for the aid 
effectiveness agenda was, and still is, not limited to efforts to pass policy ideas from 
IOs to policymakers. Instead – for both IOs – promoting the aid effectiveness agenda 
included a strategic expansion of how, with whom, and where they acted as 
ideational agencies – seeking to influence, in the field of foreign aid, the framework 
of ideas and standards that specifies goals of policy and the nature of problems they 
are meant to be addressing (Hall 1993, p. 279). Both of these IOs adapted, changed 
and expanded, sometimes in experimental ways and with occasionally mixed results, 
how they interact with foreign aid policy discourses and other actors in the field.!
This leads to the fourth finding on the complexity of factors driving widespread 
ideational change, both at the international and at the domestic level. This last 
finding reflects the divergent experiences by the OECD DAC and the World Bank 
after the success of the Paris Declaration (OECD 2005). It is a finding draw from the 
observed contrast between, on one side, the OECD DAC’s wholehearted embrace of 
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the aid effectiveness agenda, even as the follow-up to the Paris Declaration – a more 
diverse, more inclusive, and less technocratic Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation (OECD 2012b) – strains the bounds of this comparatively 
small, highly specialised organisation, and, on the other side, the World Bank’s 
gradual disenchantment with the aid effectiveness agenda. The findings of this thesis 
point to an interesting dilemma for the OECD DAC and the World Bank as actors 
engaging – through their agency of the aid effectiveness agenda – in strategic social 
construction “in which actors strategise rationally to reconfigure preferences, 
identities, or social context” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 888). On one hand, 
agency for the aid effectiveness agenda proved successful for both IOs, as the 
agenda, which carries their mark, now has a strong presence in contemporary 
discourses among policymakers and foreign aid experts. Moreover, both IOs today 
fulfil critical functions for improving the effectiveness of foreign aid within the 
global institutional architecture of foreign aid. On the other hand, the aid 
effectiveness agenda, as a policy agenda, is subject to a growing number of complex 
influences, preferences and actors beyond the boundaries, and usually beyond the 
control, of these two IOs. After the Paris Declaration and the aid agenda’s success, 
many of these factors, notably the role of aid-receiving countries or the voice of 
international NGOs, became increasingly more involved and increasingly more 
influential in the aid effectiveness agenda. In a simplified picture, the aid 
effectiveness agenda’s success, in some ways, changed it from a strictly 
“coordinated discourse” among experts towards an ever so slightly more inclusive 
“communicative discourse” (Schmidt 2010, p. 3), subject to different rules, which in 
turn gradually lessened the ability of these IOs – as expert bureaucracies – to shape 
the agenda effectively through their trademark expert authority. 
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8.2. Contributions to the Literature 
This thesis makes several important contributions to the literature. The first is that 
it provides case study on the understudied organisation of the OECD DAC, and on 
its role in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda. Though there are IR scholars 
investigating the OECD as an international organisation (e.g. Marcussen 2001, Kidal 
2003, Sharman 2006, Mahon & McBride 2009, Woodward 2009), first-hand 
research on it is still sparse compared to the literature investigating organisations like 
the World Bank or the IMF. This is doubly true for the more specialised OECD 
DAC, which, much like its chairman, is semi-independent, in but not quite of the 
OECD. The scarcity of research on an organisation as specialised, as the OECD 
DAC, may not be surprising from a perspective of IO scholarship. However, given 
the DAC’s prominent role in aid effectiveness, the neglect in the aid effectiveness 
literature to investigate the role of the DAC as institution and as a political actor 
stands out more noticeably. With first-hand evidence from research into the OECD 
DAC’s work, this study takes a small step to redress this omission, and to provide a 
first account of the DAC’s strategic agency in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda. 
The second contribution, complements the first, is providing insights into the 
World Bank’s role in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda. Though few IOs receive 
as much scholarly attention as the World Bank, the sheer size and complexity of the 
Bank ensures that there are still blank areas on the map. By investigating the World 
Bank’s engagement with the aid effectiveness agenda, this thesis highlights a 
specific, but relevant aspect of the World Bank’s relationship with its most 
influential members, albeit without tracing in detail how the ideas then cascaded 
among donor country aid agencies and policymakers. The findings of this thesis, by 
stressing the World Bank’s own efforts to influence policy discourse through efforts 
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of strategic social construction, challenge common assumptions on how donor states 
exercise a high degree of control over the Bank in a principal-agent relationship. 
Taken together, the empirical accounts of the OECD DAC and of the World Bank 
in their complementary, but not always parallel efforts to influence the shape and 
substance of the aid effectiveness agenda, speak both to the aid effectiveness 
literature and to the broader IR scholarship on IOs in world affairs. With regards to 
the former, this thesis highlights how the aid effectiveness agenda is, by its very 
nature, inescapably entwined with the institutional character and the strategizing of 
these two IOs. With regards to the latter, it offers twin-case studies on “strategic 
social construction” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 888) by two IOs that, at least 
in these cases, include not only outgoing agency, but also concomitant changes to 
both IOs’ international institutional configurations and how they interact with their 
political environment.  
 
8.3. Limitations of this Study 
One limitation of this study is its strong focus on role of the OECD DAC and the 
World Bank in shaping the aid effectiveness agenda. The overall research design 
emphasises the investigation of the processes that shaped the aid effectiveness 
agendas’ shape and substance – the question of “why some ideas become the 
policies, programs, and philosophies that dominate political reality while others do 
not” (Schmidt 2008, p. 307). Conversely, this thesis does not offer a research format 
designed to investigate agency IOs in periods of crisis and change more broadly. The 
very selection of not-independent cases limits the ability to deduce insights from this 
study for IO research more generally, over and above research specific to the aid 
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effectiveness agenda. This caveat notwithstanding, research on the OECD DAC’s 
and World Bank’s agency for the aid effectiveness points to highly relevant links 
between IOs’ ideational agency and institutional change, thus suggesting ideas for 
further research in this field (see below), potentially offering important insights, if 
explored with a methodological framework more appropriate for this kind of study. 
A further limitation of is that relatively little attention in this thesis is given the 
national policymaking-side of the aid effectiveness agenda. Chapter 4 provides a 
descriptive overview of policy reforms frequently associated with the aid 
effectiveness agenda. However, as demonstrated in chapter 7, the web of factors, 
influences and actors grows vastly more complex, the further the investigation 
moves from the agenda towards its implementation in national policy. Adequately 
accounting for the variances and peculiarities of specific countries adds further 
complexity. There is thus inevitably an attribution gap between, on one hand, the 
narrow research focus of this thesis – how IOs helped shaped the aid effectiveness 
agenda – and, on the other, initial observations, which were partly responsible for 
motivating this research in the first place – the perceived impact of the aid 
effectiveness agenda on foreign aid policy and practice. Constraints of time and 
space prevent this thesis from closing this gap. As above, the limitations for this 
thesis point towards opportunities for future research.     
 
8.4. Recommendations for Future Research 
The findings and contributions of this thesis call for further theorising and 
investigation along three lines of potential future research; (i) additional research 
into the changes to global foreign aid relations related to the aid effectiveness 
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agenda; (ii) an expansion of the case studies presented in this thesis to include 
additional case studies on IOs seeking to shape policy agendas through strategic 
social construction, ideally cases unrelated to the aid effectiveness agenda, to expand 
on the insight on the ideational artistry and ideational agency of IOs as strategic 
actors in world affairs; and (iii), building on existing literature, a more systematic 
and comprehensive investigation of the domestic policymaking side of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. 
The first avenue for future research follows from the insights gained through the 
research presented in this thesis for the aid effectiveness and the continued reform of 
global foreign aid governance, for example in the form of the Busan Partnership 
(OECD 2012b). Possibilities for future research exist in following the evolution of 
the aid effectiveness agenda in the most recent years, not covered by this thesis. This 
includes greater emphasis on the recently more important and more vocal role of 
other actors, including NGOs and, following the Busan Partnership, new donors such 
as China. Potential to follow up on insights and findings from this thesis also exist in 
exploring the impact of the aid effectiveness agenda in specific donor countries, 
which would be an important complement to this research on IOs and the aid 
effectiveness agenda. Whether such research would find evidence for an important 
role of IOs in translating the aid effectiveness agenda into actual policy, or evidence 
refuting this, it would almost certainly advance the understanding of contemporary 
policy reforms to improve the effectiveness on aid, and, possibly, of the complex 
relationships of IOs and donor governments in processes of policymaking. 
A second opportunity for future research is to expand upon the findings of this 
thesis on the endeavours of IOs, specifically IOs’ efforts at strategic social 
construction, which seek to engender ideational change, usually in a policy field of 
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IOs’ specialise in. The main challenge for this kind of future research is finding 
comparable case studies. Additional case studies should be similar to the case studies 
of chapters 5 and 6 to allow cross-case study comparisons, yet lie outside the specific 
context of foreign aid policy to overcome the methodological limitations of this 
thesis, which focused on the aid effectiveness agenda specifically, rather than 
providing a research framework for a study of IOs more generally. However, future 
research along these lines could shed more light on the hinted-ad duality of 
institutional change as a process that can encompass both changes to IOs’ internal 
institutional configurations and changes to external ideational frameworks in a policy 
field, which in turn my have a role in defining the perceived purpose and role of IOs. 
Finally, another possibility future research, potentially rewarding in theoretical 
insights, would be to expand upon the effort made in chapter 7 to situate the role of 
the aid effectiveness agenda and, potentially, of IOs in domestic policymaking in the 
complexity of factors shaping processes of policymaking with the help of a multiple-
streams model, inspired by the model by Kingdon (1984). Kingdon drew on 
theoretical works going back to the garbage can model of organisational choice 
(Cohan et al. 1972), and employed his multiple-streams model, in the study of public 
policy, to criticise conceptions of orderly, rational governance. Applying such a 
model of policymaking under conditions of “organized anarchy” (Cohan et al. 1972, 
p. 1) in research on the role of IOs in national policymaking processes, could offer a 
worthwhile contrast to the – in IR research – more frequently employed theories on 
“epistemic communities” (Haas 1992) or “transnational government networks” 
(Slaughter 2005). 
! ! ! &+-!
8.5. Conclusion 
For the final conclusion to this thesis, it seems appropriate to return to the 
question that guided it: How did IOs shape the emergence of the aid effectiveness 
agenda? Specifically, how did the OECD DAC and the World Bank shape the aid 
effectiveness agenda?  
The first half of the answer is that both IOs did so through forms of social 
construction, relying heavily on the kind of expert authority build on the nature, and 
the perception of IOs as apolitical, unbiased, and competent international 
bureaucracies that specialize in advancing knowledge in their field of expertise. 
Here, a critical finding is that the authority of these two IOs in the field of aid 
effectiveness is not one simply a result of an external mandate or demand. Instead, 
both the World Bank and the OECD DAC are perceived as expert authorities in this 
field because the aid effectiveness agenda itself originated from discourses from 
within these IOs during the 1990s. In many ways, the aid effectiveness agenda (still) 
is a child of its institutional origins, its cradle so to speak, and a product of processes 
of social construction in which the institutional outlooks of these IOs, and their 
specific concerns of the time, helped define the character of the present-day aid 
agenda. This alone has important implications for present-day debates on 
international foreign aid relations, and on the evolving aid effectiveness agenda in 
particular: for example applying aid effectiveness principles to international transfers 
earmarked to combat climate change, or to engage China in a discourse on good 
foreign aid practices in Africa through the aid effectiveness agenda. 
The second half of the answer is that in acting as agents for the aid effectiveness 
agenda, in spreading the ideas and influencing policy discourses on foreign aid, both 
the OECD DAC and World Bank drew on a surprisingly wide variety means and 
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mechanisms, many of them experimental to these IOs and new to their repertoire. 
There is evidence that both IOs strategically expanded, or tried to expand, the ways 
in which they interact with experts, policymakers, aid practitioners, and other 
political actors in the field. They did so by investing the core of what defines them as 
institutions – institutions as defined by Scott’s (2008) meticulous dissection of 
organisations vs. institutions vs. narratives and frames – into an effort of strategic 
social construction, and thereby also successfully reasserted themselves as 
international expert bureaucracies following a period in which they faced open 
criticism and challenges to their authority. 
Taken together, these findings offer insights that are very different from many 
previous studies on aid effectiveness. This thesis shows how the aid effectiveness 
agenda is not merely an opportune, but ultimately replaceable agenda conveyed 
through a fixed set of mechanisms, such as social learning or persuasion. Instead, the 
aid effectiveness agenda is, or was, especially in early stages, more fundamentally an 
expression these IOs’ own preconception of the political environment pertaining to 
their specific field of expertise, and of their role within this political environment. In 
shaping the aid effectiveness agenda, both institutions’ constructed self-conception 
was projected, from the institutions’ internal process of analysis and knowledge 
production, to the broader ideational framework shaping policy discourses in 
international foreign aid relations. 
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ANNEX 1 – List of Interview Partners 
Carey, Richard, former Director of the OECD Development Co-operation 
Directorate, OECD, Paris, France, March 17, 2011 
de Milly, Hubert, Senior Analyst, Development Cooperation Directorate 
(DCD/EFF), OECD, Paris, France, April 14, 2011 
Dethier, Jean-Jacques, Reserach Manager, Development Economics (DEC), 
Washington DC, USA,October 24, 2011  
Fyson, Sarah, Policy Advisor, Aid Effectiveness Division, Development Co-
Operation Directorate, OECD, Paris, France, January 17, 2011 
Gelb, Alan, Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Development, Washington DC, 
USA, October 21, 2011 
Hall, Christopher, Independent Consultant and former World Bank staff member, 
Washington DC, USA, October 19, 2011 
Hammond, Brian, IATI TAG Chair (formerly OECD DAC), London, UK, May 6, 
2011 
Isenman, Paul, former Head of the Division of Policy Co-ordination of the DAC, 
OECD, Paris, France, March 17, 2011 
Jackson, Penny, Policy Advisor, Aid Effectiveness Division, Development Co-
Operation Directorate, OECD, Paris, France, January 17, 2011 
Kharas, Homi, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Brookings Institution, 
Washington DC, USA, October 20, 2011 
Lee, Barbara, Head Aid Effectiveness Unit of the World Bank, Telephone 
Interview, October 28, 2011 
Nightingale, Ian, Lead Procurement Specialist, Procurement Policy and Services 
Group, Washington DC, October 25, 2011 
Phillips, Traci, Advisor, Office of the Vice-President of the World Bank, 
Washington DC, USA, October 24, 2011 
Quesnel, Brice, Senior Policy Writer, Carbon Finance Unit, Washington DC, USA, 
October 26, 2011  
Rogers, Patricia, Senior Policy Writer, Operations Policy and Country Services 
(OPCS), Washington DC, USA, October 19, 2011 
Roome, John, Director for Sustainable Development, East Asia and Pacific Region, 
Washington DC, USA, October 24, 2011 
Soe Lin, Independent Expert and former World Bank staff member, Washington 
DC, USA, October 26, 2011 
Stout, Susan, Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank, Washington DC, 
USA, October 19, 2011 
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